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Abstract 
This study traces the development of the welfare state in Mauritius and South Africa from 
the early 1900s until the present, with specific reference made to the non-contributory old-
age pension scheme. It seeks to understand the intersections between big capital, the state 
and broad-based social forces in heralding different welfare outcomes in the two countries. 
Mauritius has retained its long-standing traditions as a social democratic welfare state 
stretching back to the late 1950s. In contrast, the current welfare model of South Africa 
continues to be the embodiment of the liberal welfare state, similar to that of the ancien 
regime set up in 1928, even though it has maintained a generous social grants system since 
the advent of democracy in 1994.  
As a result it is important to unravel patterns of historical evolution that are 
responsible for different welfare outcomes in seemingly identical socio-political contexts. 
Similarly, it is important to scratch below the surface of these historical patterns of 
evolution to account for these disparate welfare frameworks which, nonetheless, exhibit 
identical outcomes in the social security sector in terms of their unfaltering commitment to 
old-age pensions. To this end the dissertation employs the comparative historical analysis 
approach in a bid to draw cross-national parallels between the social processes that 
unfolded and consequently underpinned development paradigms over time.  
This study suggests that accounting for the divergent policy outcomes is the 
disproportionate powers being wielded by neoliberal market forces within the main arteries 
of the South African economy, which hindered the state from defining the policy direction 
of its welfare framework to dovetail with expansive social reforms. This restraint was 
compounded by the left as a 'labour aristocracy', whose alliance with the political ruling 
class compromised their ability to champion the pro-poor agenda with as much vigour as 
they would have if they had pursued an independent course. This is a far cry from the 
welfare trajectory of Mauritius, in which a mutual understanding between the state, cross-
class movements and capitalist market forces bridged contesting class interests by 
reconciling market economics with social fundamentals.  
Unlike in South Africa, the independence of the working classes in Mauritius – whose 
mobilising traditions cut across the class spectrum – has added special impetus to the social 
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reform movement, having served as the bulwark against welfare retrenchments and/or less 
egalitarian reforms in the past. That the universal pension scheme and the state’s 
commitment to the pro-poor cause remain intact in Mauritius is a result of these pro-active 
class contestations. On the other hand, the absence of the balance of power struck between 
social actors and the economic élite in South Africa propelled a class compromise that 
allowed for the dominance of pensions to come at the cost of extensive social reforms. Such 
outcomes would not have come into effect in South Africa had the playing field for all 
relevant stakeholders been level, as in Mauritius. 
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Opsomming 
Hierdie studie volg die ontwikkeling van die welsynstaat in Mauritius en in Suid-Afrika vanaf 
die vroeë 1900’s tot op hede, met spesifieke verwysing na die nie-bydraende 
ouderdomspensioenskema. Dit poog om die snypunte tussen groot kapitaal, die staat en 
breë-basis maatskaplike kragte wat gelei het tot verskillende welsynuitkomstes in die twee 
lande te begryp. Mauritius het sy langdurige tradisie as ’n sosiale demokratiese welsynstaat, 
wat sedert die 1950’s bestaan, behou. In kontras gaan die huidige welsynmodel in Suid-
Afrika voort as die beliggaming van die liberale welsynstaat, soortgelyk aan die ancien 
regime wat in 1928 ingestel is, selfs al het dit ’n vrygewige stelsel van maatskaplike toelae 
sedert die vestiging van demokrasie in 1994 onderhou.  
As gevolg hiervan is dit belangrik om die patrone van historiese evolusie te ontsyfer 
wat verantwoordelik is vir verskillende welsynuitkomstes in blykbaar identiese sosiaal-
politiese kontekste. Eweneens is dit belangrik om onder die oppervlak van hierdie historiese 
patrone van evolusie te krap om hierdie uiteenlopende welsynraamwerke te verklaar wat 
nietemin identiese uitkomstes in die maatskaplike sekuriteitsektor vertoon in terme van 
hulle onwrikbare verbondenheid tot ouderdomspensioene. Ten einde dit te bereik gebruik 
hierdie proefskrif die benadering van vergelykende historiese analise in ’n poging om 
dwarsliggende nasionale ooreenstemmings te vind tussen die maatskaplike prosesse wat 
gelei het tot die skep van ontwikkelingsparadigmas oor tyd en hulle gevolglik onderskraag 
het.  
Hierdie studie stel voor dat die verklaring vir die uiteenlopende beleidsuitkomstes 
berus in die ongelyke magte wat binne die belangrikste kanale van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
ekonomie deur neoliberale markkragte beheer word, wat die staat daarvan weerhou het om 
’n beleidsrigting vir sy welsynraamwerk te definieer wat by die breedvoerige maatskaplike 
hervormings pas. Hierdie remming word vererger deur die linkersy as ’n ‘arbeidsadelstand’, 
wie se alliansie met die politieke regerende klas hulle vermoë gekompromitteer het om die 
pro-arm agenda met soveel lewenskrag voor te staan as wat dit moontlik sou gewees het as 
hulle ’n onafhanklike koers ingeslaan het. Hierdie verskil hemelsbreed van die welsyntrajek 
in Mauritius, waar ’n wedersydse begrip tussen die staat, bewegings wat klas oorskry, en 
kapitalistiese markkragte kompeterende klasbelange oorbrug het deur die markekonomie 
met maatskaplike grondbeginsels te rekonsilieer.  
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Anders as in Suid-Afrika het die onafhanklikheid van die werkersklas in Mauritius – 
wat se mobiliserende tradisies oor die klasspektrum heen sny – besondere impetus gevoeg 
by die maatskaplike hervormingsbeweging, aangesien dit gedien het as verskansing teen 
welsyninkortings en/of minder gelykmakende hervormings in die verlede. Dat die universele 
pensioenskema en die staat se verbondenheid tot die pro-arm saak in Mauritius onaangetas 
bly, is as gevolg van hierdie proaktiewe klasstryd. Andersins het die afwesigheid van ’n 
magsbalans tussen maatskaplike akteurs en die ekonomiese elite in Suid-Afrika gelei tot ’n 
klaskompromis, wat toegelaat het dat die oorheersing van pensioene gekom het ten koste 
van breedvoerige maatskaplike hervormings. Sulke uitkomstes sou nie in Suid-Afrika 
ingetree het nie as die speelveld vir al die relevante belanghebbers gelyk was, soos in 
Mauritius. 
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“We need to bring politics in, centrally, to the analysis [...] of pro-poor development and welfare 
regimes”. 
(Leftwich, 2008: 5) 
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Chapter I: Unravelling historical antecedents behind the remarkable 
variance in welfare policy outcomes in South Africa and Mauritius 
1.1. Background 
The welfare paradigms of South Africa and Mauritius have spanned over half a century. So, 
in 1990, when the World Bank urged developing countries to prioritise social security for the 
elderly1, both countries had already established a social grant system devoted to addressing 
the plight of the dispossessed, most notably the aged. Since then the welfare state has 
continued to dominate the political economies of these two countries by forming part of the 
discourse on poverty alleviation, social equity, adjustment to the global economy, and the 
social mandate of the state as a whole, to mention but a few.  
The year 1994 marked a turning point in the history of South Africa. The end of 
Apartheid ushered in a renewed commitment by the state to prioritise pro-poor goals to 
accord with the spirit of political freedoms attained2. As a nation that had always been 
battling with poverty and inequality, the need for a redistributive paradigm in South Africa 
was more than ever apparent. Even though South Africa has shed the quagmire of 
apartheid, the end of white minority rule has not translated into the overwhelming majority 
of citizens participating in the economic mainstream. This reality is further compounded by 
the overlap of race and class, which has put in the spotlight the government’s responses to 
the plight of those on the margins of society3. A generous means-tested social grants system 
characterises the government’s interventionist approach, without which research has 
shown that social equity will remain unachievable. Hence, currently over four per cent of 
the gross domestic product is channelled towards social assistance alone, and since 1994 
the number of households dependent on social grants has more than doubled, from 20 per 
cent to 45 per cent4. When factoring in the bleak economic prospects due to poor growth, 
coupled with high unemployment, one can assume that this dependence is nowhere near 
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 World Bank: Averting the old age crisis: policies to protect the old-age and promote growth, Washington, 
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waning in the foreseeable future. Notwithstanding these facts, the prospect of erecting an 
expansive welfare state in South Africa remains out of sight, with the government more and 
more exhibiting disdain in favour of mechanisms that are minimalist in approach. These 
welfare outcomes, which contradict the promise of the liberation struggle to champion 
social reformist ideals that resonate with a classless society, have become the epitaph of a 
social democratic welfare state that almost was.  
Standing in stark contrasts to South Africa’s development experience is Mauritius, an 
island state that is not overwhelmed by the scale of social challenges bedevilling modern-
day South Africa. It has won plaudits for its high human development scores, which have 
always been pursued in terms of the framework of its universal welfare state approach. 
Indeed, a social democratic state not only characterises Mauritius’s approach to the goal of 
achieving equity, but it has also been regarded as the key ingredient to achieving economic 
success as well as social cohesion5. The universal old-age pension scheme remains the pride 
of Mauritius as a welfare state, and it enjoys broad societal support that regards the scheme 
as sacrosanct, thus serving as a symbol of the state’s commitment to advancing the cause of 
social justice. The social budget is reflective of this commitment, with the budget for social 
assistance in particular accounting for 6.6 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
when combined with general welfare expenditure, of which a disproportionate portion of 
35 per cent funds the old-age pension scheme6. As a result, since the advent of 
independence in 1968, successive governments in Mauritius have consistently married 
neoliberal economic interests with those that resonate with the interests and aspirations of 
the broader spectrum of society through its social democratic approach to averting social 
risks.  
Unlike South Africa, Mauritius has managed to wear two hats, as a stable and 
competitive economy that has made significant strides while advancing the cause of social 
equity through a socially responsive public budget. Most importantly, unlike other relatively 
stronger economies, such as her counterpart South Africa, the relentless commitment of 
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Mauritius towards the social reform agenda must be viewed with the hindsight of her 
humble economic beginnings. In the 40 years since the attainment of independence, 
Mauritius has had to make a virtue of the little that was available. This was done by 
elevating the humble sugar-based economy to catalyse more productive sectors that 
facilitated Mauritius’s entry into the rank of most economically successful island states7.  
A cursory look at both South Africa and Mauritius reveals obvious variations in the 
approach to the premise of ameliorating social risks, even though welfare paradigms in both 
countries share the similarity of being defined mainly by social assistance. Hence, Mauritius 
embodies a social democratic welfare state model that advances social justice, whereas in 
South Africa, the welfare framework prices developmental, market-based principles to 
mitigate social contingencies. Likewise, a detailed study of the two countries’ welfare 
paradigms indicates structural designs that echo those implemented by the old systems of 
political control. This reality suggests that the current social development frameworks in 
South Africa and Mauritius have traces that are rooted deeply in historical circumstances. A 
further investigation of these historical circumstances in South Africa and Mauritius 
demonstrates that economic interests were on a collision course with those of the broader 
society, which caused a convergence that spawned variations in welfare outcomes. The 
differences in the manner in which these intersections happened in the two countries 
produced divergent welfare approaches that were compelling enough to form the subject of 
scientific inquiry in this study.  
1.2. Problem Statement 
Whilst the welfare regimes of Mauritius and South Africa share strong similarities in terms 
of their staunch pro-poor focus, their different welfare designs mirror stark contrasts in 
resolving the conflict between market economics and social politics, which have had a 
bearing on overall social policy choices in the two counties. Certainly, the literature has yet 
to unravel the effects of the configuration of social and economic forces on production and 
distribution regimes8 in the two countries from a comparative perspective. Whilst the 
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advent of industrialisation in Mauritius engendered vibrant social resistance politics over 
time, an unanswered question remains why the promise of industrialisation did not yield 
social politics of a similar nature in South Africa. In line with this inquiry, the literature 
remains tasked to unravel the reinforcing mechanisms between societal resistance and the 
structural makeup of an industrial economic system within the wider context of welfare 
policy outcomes in relatively advanced industrial societies in the global South. This study is 
intended to fill this void with the hope that it casts light on the divergence of production and 
distribution regimes in South Africa and Mauritius against the background of social forces 
that champion social reforms in the two countries. Likewise, was the convergence of 
distribution and production regimes supposed to have been the norm in these relatively 
industrialised societies, and if so, how did differences in the configurations of social and 
economic forces produce contrasting welfare approaches.  
1.3. Research Question(s) 
This study is informed by the quest to answer the following main question: 
a. What role did social forces play in shaping the different welfare frameworks of South 
Africa and Mauritius? 
To narrow down the scope of this research, the question of social security, especially old-
age pensions, was focused on. This is borne out of the need to further understand the status 
and social dynamics of the old-age pension scheme as a preeminent feature of the dissimilar 
welfare regimes of Mauritius and South Africa. In this respect, the following sub-research 
question will serve as the guide to tackle the foregoing main research question: 
b. To what extent does the dominance of the old-age pension scheme in the welfare 
frameworks of the two countries reflect the efficacy of social forces in achieving 
egalitarian social policy outcomes?  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
distribution regime denotes established norms and alignments which carry out the function of dispersing 
resources as set out by the actors which preside over the production mainstreams. On production regimes, 
see: Huber, Evelyne, and Stephens, John. D, “Welfare state and production regimes in the era of globalisation”, 
Institute for Advanced Study, Occasional Paper No. 1, 1999, p. 2. On distribution regimes, see: Rudra, Nita, 
“Welfare states in developing countries: unique or universal?, in Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 2, May 2007, 
pp. 378 – 396  
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In the next section, the notion of the welfare state will be defined to explore its different 
meanings across various geopolitical settings.  
1.4. Conceptualising the Welfare State 
The concept of the welfare state can be traced back to 1601, when Britain adopted the 
Elizabethan Poor Laws out of the need to enforce the moral responsibility and acceptance of 
wage labour by the poor and to create a national market. It then gradually developed into 
the 19th century middle-class ‘benevolence’ that was aimed at relieving destitution without 
reducing the incentive to work9. This shows that, since the time of the industrial revolution, 
the welfare of the citizens became the concern of the business class only if such a move had 
a direct bearing on the capital accumulation project. Hence, for capitalism to exist and 
continue to thrive, it requires a healthy and intellectually sound workforce to labour 
efficiently in offices and on factory floors.10  
From a broader perspective, the welfare state can be defined as the state that is 
concerned with the business of alleviating social risks for its most economically vulnerable 
citizens. To that effect it goes so far as to adopt measures that are capacitated to contain 
further deprivation. The welfare state is characterised by having its social policy geared 
towards meeting the prevailing social conditions11. Although the notion of social welfare 
emanates from the Christian doctrines of the protestant ethic - the premise that the rich 
must help the poor and the healthy must help the weak12 - most contemporary nation-
states currently understand the notion of the welfare state from the context of the division 
of citizen responsibilities. It is conceived in this context that the political office bearers 
should concentrate on their mandate to draft policies that would tackle lingering social 
problems, whilst the social servants are charged with the duty to give much of their 
personal income to help others (usually done in the form of tax)13. To this end, the state 
feels morally compelled to protect “standards of income, nutrition, health, housing and 
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 Romanyshyn, John and Romanyshyn, Anne.: Social Welfare: Charity to Justice, Random House: New York, 
1971, p. 10 
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education for every citizen assured to him as a [social] right”14. This will result in the 
restoration of dignity for those who have been economically marginalised15.  
As illustrated above, the quest to alleviate social exclusion through policies that are 
sympathetic to the ideal of egalitarianism is traditionally understood as the primary duty of 
the state. However, it has been accepted that the provision of public goods is not purely the 
duty of the state alone, since various non-state actors can fulfil a similar function: the 
private sector (based on market demand or welfare for own employees), familial 
arrangements, and voluntary non-governmental organisations (in situations where 
government apparatus is ambivalent to social change or simply incapacitated to provide 
social benefits from the fiscal point of view)16.As a result, social security sits at the centre of 
the welfare policy of most countries. By social security it is broadly meant the provision of 
public safety nets through public health facilities and public education, amongst others, as it 
is intended to pre-empt and prevent the various kinds of injustice and unfairness inherent in 
the capitalist economy by ascertaining precisely the needs of the society17. It is important to 
note, however, that the type of welfare regimes will serve as the unit of analysis in this 
study, instead of state-building itself. This is so even though state-building and welfare state-
building are processes that are naturally inclined to be mutually reinforcing. Welfare state-
building, on the other hand, entails political, social, and economic processes that create the 
conditions for the creation of a socially responsive state. 
Social scientists distinguish between social security and social assistance, as the 
latter focuses primarily on poverty relief. It entails deliberate acts of specialised relief 
intended to meet the needs of clearly distinguishable groups among people without 
adequate means for self-sustenance. Increasingly, social grants have come to include not 
merely cash grants for maintenance, but also for health and other services designed to 
reduce the need for insurance in the future18. In the cases of both South Africa and 
                                                          
14
 Romanyshyn, John and Ramonyshyn, Anne, p.  1971, p. 10; Leibfried, Stephen.: Welfare State Futures, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001, p.  26 
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Mauritius, the concepts social security and social assistance will be used interchangeably to 
refer to publicly-funded means of income support such as social grants, against occupation-
based ones, which will be referred to specifically as occupational social security. 
The fear that universal welfare programmes, which are in certain political contexts 
perceived as handouts, give rise to the disincentive to be self-sufficient is perhaps driven by 
its stressing of indiscriminate redistributive origins. Although deeply rooted in socialist 
orthodoxy, it is apparent that welfare policy is different from socialism in the sense that, 
with welfare policy, human need is placed above the interest of profit maximisation, 
whereas with socialism the quest to control wealth and profit remains the key priority of the 
working class. It is premised in this sense that such a move would arouse a democratic 
approach to social reform in favour of collective control of economic resources19. It is for 
this reason that there has been strong advocacy for the democratisation of the capitalist 
system, for it is envisaged that such a move will automatically enable organised labour to 
transform capitalism in a way that it is as sympathetic to human needs as it is to the quest 
to sustain profit margins. By so doing it shall reflect what others like to call class 
compromise20. At the heart of class compromise is the acceptance by the rich of a degree of 
redistribution in exchange for the acceptance of a liberal economic framework that is 
generally responsible for the underlying inequalities21. The nature of this compromise is not 
uniform across the board; it differs over time and is country specific22.  
For the purposes of the scope of this study, it is imperative that the working class be 
differentiated from social forces. According to Joel Migdal, social forces are those elements 
in society which seek to shape public policy regarding issues they have been conceived to be 
in conflict with the collective interests of the society23. Although it originally denoted the 
                                                          
19
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 Przeworski, Adam, “Material Interests, Class Compromise, and the Transition to Socialism”, in Politics and 
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industrial working class, the concept of social forces has become an umbrella term that 
incorporates actors such as social classes, the state, civil society, labour, and the like24. 
The notion of the working class having direct ownership of the economy is rooted 
deeply in Marxist traditions, since it renders the growing accumulation of wealth (in the 
hands of the few) and poverty to be co-relational25. It is for this reason that radical Marxists 
deem social benefits as sacrosanct ideals. Hence, they conceive of the capitalist world as 
one that is divided between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The former are the owners 
of capital/the means of production, whilst the latter constitute the working class, who are 
commodified by selling their labour to the bourgeois class for daily survival. A relationship 
exists between these two starkly opposing socioeconomic classes, but it is certainly not 
symmetrical, nor is it mutually beneficial. The wealth of the modern society is created by the 
labour of workers, but the commodities they produce generate wealth for the bourgeoisie 
to the workers’ monetary equivalent of the value their labour produces. To maintain this 
wealth, the workers are compelled to work extra hours, while the wealthy remain the 
overseers of the production processes. For Marxists, this pattern as a result not only 
perpetuates an exploitative relationship, it also creates a class struggle between these two 
forces. And because the market is primarily embroiled in the pursuit of profit maximisation, 
the needs of the people are often forgotten26 - usually taking priority if doing so proves 
apparently beneficial to the interests of the business élite. 
Therefore it is from this form of class compromise described above that the journey 
to social democracy begins – whereas, in contrast to socialism, the former embraces 
efficiency of the market, national economic improvement, success with the capitalist 
economic system, and the pursuit of national interests abroad. On the other hand, the latter 
champions the cause of eradicating the worst manifestations of poverty and inequality, and 
seeks to expand social benefits to all through state intervention27. The creation of this 
middle ground sparks what Karl Polanyi regards as a concerted effort of the political and 
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economic élite to reconnect the market economy with social communities28. It is believed 
that, in this form, the despotic nature of the capitalist accumulation project can be tamed 
by having the state taking the driver’s seat in the running of the economy, whilst remaining 
cognisant of the interests of the general public without frightening off market forces. 
Nation states have not all adopted a homogenous approach to tackling the social 
pathologies of inequality. For Esping-Andersen, public expenditure and the scope of welfare 
programmes are important determinants of the extent to which society remains 
commodified and stratified. It is for this reason that he proposed a threefold typology of 
welfare states, thereby revealing how different countries have different conceptions of the 
alleviation of deprivation. The social democratic model of welfarism is the most desirable of 
the three. Normally associated with Scandinavian countries, this is the most generous of the 
three types, as it entails universal access to social benefits, even beyond the area of social 
services (health care and education). Universal access to non-contributory social assistance 
is the hallmark of social democratic welfare states and provides an enabling environment 
for union activity to champion the policy discourse. Perhaps, if there is anything that 
explains the popularity of social democratic regimes amongst readers of social policy, it is 
the component of universal non-contributory old-age pensions that come with it, as they 
have been proven to be the most effective anti-poverty mechanism in the lives of the 
poor29. According to Esping-Andersen, a welfare regime is differentiated from a welfare 
state in that it comprises the “combined, interdependent way in which welfare is produced 
and allocated between state, market and family”30. 
The liberal/Anglo-Saxon welfare state is the most residual one of the three. It 
conceives of social protection from the narrow confines of poor relief for the most 
desperate. The liberal market economy is deemed the most efficient, thus it is entrusted 
with the responsibility of providing social goods, which in turn results in reinforcing the 
process of the commodification of labour. The continental typology, commonly known as 
the conservative type, is characterised by a mix of statist, familial and corporatist traditions. 
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It modestly provides public goods beyond education and health care, and it focuses on 
guaranteeing employment as a result of its corporative associations.31 
Although the three typologies provide a framework to make an assessment of other 
social protection measures in other areas of the world, it goes without saying that they are 
riddled with fundamental errors. In continental Europe, the rudimentary nature of the social 
protection measures in southern Europe are quite incompatible with the above, as the latter 
group of countries rely heavily on traditional forms of social protection, where family ties 
assume much of the welfare responsibilities and where religious doctrines of sharing and 
looking after the needy are commonplace. Looking northwards in continental Europe, 
countries such as the Netherlands, which have been classified as having conservative 
welfare regimes, have been shown to possess traits of both social democracy (as a result of 
their generous spending) and conservative features32.  
As a result of this shortcoming, readers of social policy in the global south have 
proposed a typology of welfare states tailor-made to suit the developmental contexts of 
these countries. Drawing on Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Jeremy 
Seekings incisively divides these states into three: Agrarian, Workerist and Pauperist. With 
regard to the agrarian welfare state, the provision of social benefits is dependent upon 
accessibility to land and/or kin. On the other hand, a workerist state is characterised by 
occupational welfare policy, where access to benefits is dependent on employer and 
employee contributions to the pension fund, without major involvement of the state for the 
unemployed; whilst a pauperist state encompasses a two-tier social security sector with 
both contributory and non-contributory pension benefits deemed by the state to be sine 
qua non. Mauritius certainly fits into the latter group, as access to non-contributory social 
assistance benefits is universal and non-means-tested. On the other hand, the welfare 
regime of South Africa reflects both workerist and pauperist traits: employer-based 
contributory pension arrangements legislatively still dominate the social security sector for 
those in the labour market, but the state nonetheless still makes provisions of pension 
benefits for the unemployed. To put it in a global comparative perspective, South Africa 
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leans more towards the liberal model as a welfare regime because of its focus on generous 
social security schemes which seems to have eclipsed other safety nets as market-based 
doctrines of individualism and self-sufficiency hold sway. Mauritius’s universal approach to 
welfare is resonant with the social democratic welfare state in Scandinavia, which focuses 
on social security services. Services are all-inclusive and encompass areas such as health 
care, education, recreation, as well as recreation services33. The next section provides an 
outline of the art of the literature on welfare state-building. It begins with the general 
overview of the literature, which focuses on the welfare experiences in the global north and 
south, before delving into Africa. It thereafter will address the literature on the question of 
welfare state-building in South Africa and Mauritius respectively. 
1.5. Literature Review 
1.5.1. State formation and welfare state-building in the Global North and South 
The responsiveness of the state is tied closely with the process of state formation. From 
early times, the mere existence of the state was a culmination of a social contract agreed 
upon by the propertied classes and those at the bottom rung of the social hierarchy 
governed by the former34. This reality renders the mandate of the state – elitist as it may 
have been – to extend beyond presiding over the bureaucratic structures of the apparatus 
and centralisation of power. The state also was charged with the mandate to be socially 
sensitive by way of safeguarding the wellbeing of the dispossessed, and not just that of the 
élite.  
Nevertheless, the franchise remained the preserve of the propertied classes and, as 
a result, it evolved to be a subject of much contestation within the social caucuses. Due to 
the exclusion of the subordinate classes from mainstream political processes, the state lost 
sight of the mandate to safeguard the interests of the broader spectrum of society. Instead, 
it created a value commitment that prioritised meeting the interests of the affluent classes 
to the exclusion of the poor. Douglas North, Peter Katzenstein and Theda Skocpol note the 
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preoccupation of the state as the institutor of property rights as well as the regulator and 
distorter of the market35. Their theses indirectly emphasise the point that the state and the 
market are inseparable in the advancement of private accumulation. 
Meanwhile, Martin Doornbos contends that the state has demonstrated the ability 
to ‘penetrate’ the society that enabled it to carry out policy frameworks36. This became a 
trend that James Coleman has termed ‘political penetration’ to denote the existence of the 
political-administrative-juridical as the centre of the new state, through which it performs 
the following tasks: (1) establishing an effective and authoritarian presence across the 
‘geographical’ and ‘sectoral’ peripheries, and (2) acquiring the capacity to extract and 
mobilise resources to implement policies37. That the state extracted resources from the 
public through tax bolstered the notion of a social contract and social ownership amongst 
the lower classes, which made them feel justified voicing their grievances against social 
exclusion38. Indeed, their exclusion from the mainstream political processes and the state’s 
continued ignorance of their plight triggered resistance from the lower classes, who made a 
case for the extension of political rights to the erstwhile excluded quarters of society39. With 
the small-holding middle classes also on board, it gave new impetus to the reform 
movement, which resulted in the state extending universal suffrage to educated adult 
males. A class compromise underpinned the outcome of these power contestations, which 
took the form of the welfare state40. What added to the difficulty in striking a class 
compromise in the South as opposed to in the North was the sequencing of 
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industrialisation, democratisation and social citizenship. In the core these phases took 
individual and separate turns, whereas at the periphery they tended to overlap. By 
implication, the demand for social democratic reforms by the subordinate classes preceded 
the accumulation of a substantive material base by the capitalist forces, and this was done 
against the background of a distinctive and complex class structure41.  
In the global South, the rise of capitalism also carved the path towards the welfare 
state. These experiences were marked by cross-class collaborations with the small-holding 
classes, leading the reform movement in the quest to have universal suffrage extended to 
the subordinate classes. Concerning the welfare experiences of Mauritius, Chile, Costa Rica 
and Kerala, Richard Sandbrook et al contend that these forms of class compromise yielded 
social democratic welfare outcomes. It is worth mentioning at this stage that the emergence 
of social democracy in the large industrialised states in the North and the South did not 
follow similar historical evolutions. In the former, social democracies followed the admission 
by the left in the aftermath of WWII that capitalism was not coming to its demise, since all 
indications were of the rise of private enterprises and the propertied classes instead of a 
downward trend42. Finding a healthy middle ground between the left (organised labour) and 
the right (private enterprise) defined this compromise, and social democracies were the 
penultimate. In the South, social forces felt ambivalent about the capitalist-based 
Establishment being given free reign. In a move to balance the power of the forces of 
capitalism – and so following in the footsteps of the small industrialised states in the North – 
cross-class mass movements in the South fought relentlessly to have the tables turned. 
Some of these welfare states adopted social democratic traditions that were underpinned 
by universal social entitlements and policies focusing on employment creation43.  
1.5.2. Finding the Puzzle: The Art of Literature on Welfare Policy in the Global 
South 
Historical conditions are significant to understanding welfare outcomes in various socio-
political contexts. They have carved the path on which policies are carried out at each stage 
of welfare state formation. A large part of the work done by Richard Sandbrook et al entails 
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creating a linkage between contemporary welfare outcomes and the patterns of historical 
evolution of those social democracies in the global South, as mentioned in the previous 
section. I have conceived the inferences reached in the work of Sandbrook et al to have 
been guided by the ideological traditions of the institutional and structuralist perspectives 
combined, which draw the relationship between historical process tracing and policy 
choices over time.  
Concerning social democracies in the global South, colonialism has had a lasting 
impact on the welfare trajectories of these countries. What this assertion implies is that 
history weighs heavily in the emergence of social democracy at the periphery, where 
conditions generally are not hospitable to the values of democracy and social justice. The 
end of colonialism was marked by authoritarianism, which disposed of the ideals of social 
justice to dominate the socio-economic discourse. Be that as it may, colonialism in certain 
cases did bequeath the legacy of social justice to continue dominating the progressive 
caucuses. South Africa and Mauritius are amongst those countries in the global South that 
continue to be characterised by considerable welfare budgets that try to advance the pro-
poor agenda. Mauritius remains resolutely a quintessential social democracy, and South 
Africa a liberal welfare state. Although significantly different in character, both welfare 
models emulate policies adopted in the North due to their focus on social assistance, which 
is mainly in the mould of old-age pensions44. As a result it is important to unravel the 
patterns of historical evolution that are responsible for different welfare outcomes in 
seemingly identical socio-political contexts. Similarly, it is important to scratch beneath the 
surface of these historical patterns of evolution to account for these variations in welfare 
frameworks that, nonetheless, exhibit similar outcomes in the social security sector in terms 
of their unfaltering focus on old-age pensions maintained throughout the course of history. 
Just as colonial legacies left an indelible mark on statecraft in the global South, so did 
the advent of industrialisation on the character of the welfare outcomes that came into 
being. Liberalisation became the conveyer belt that underpinned most of these nascent 
industrial societies, and it was so entrenched within the social life that it left scores of the 
lower classes exposed to a host of social risks without adequate means of averting them. 
The plight of the poor during the initial stages of industrial take-off was highlighted by the 
                                                          
44
 Midgely, James.: Social Security, Inequality and the Third World, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984, p. 129 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
15 
 
 
 
working class, who echoed the evocations of their counterparts in the industrialised North 
in pursuit of a living wage, decent living conditions, health-care benefits, safety and 
occupational social insurance, to name but a few amenities45.  
Across the developing world, the choice of welfare policies over time provides strong 
indications of social forces having intersected the system of economic control in a bid to 
ensure that the market does not remain out of touch. Indeed, where these structural 
platforms remain nonexistent for social forces, the system tends to remain obstinately less 
reformist. The political economies of Latin America and Asia continue to be presided over by 
a neoliberal system of control that takes umbrage at the social reform agenda46. The 
presence (or absence) of social forces in counterweighing the disproportionate powers of 
market forces during various phases of economic progress has exposed the vulnerability of 
the progressive policy agenda in the face of the dominance of global economic capitalism.  
While noting the obvious differences in the welfare outcomes of Mauritius and 
South Africa, the compelling question relating to the influence of social forces in advancing 
progressive social reforms has yet to be sufficiently addressed within the institutional and 
structural configurations shaping them. This debate furthermore needs to be localised within 
the geopolitical context of the South, in which we can unravel the reasons why these social 
forces have elicited different welfare outcomes in countries that have similar institutional 
and structural alignments. Undertaking this task requires that we put the working class in 
the spotlight in an effort to understand the development and sustenance of different welfare 
paradigms (a detailed exposition is provided in Chapter 2). Responding to this call is 
especially important, considering the different approaches workers have employed to spur 
social reforms in the various industrial societies in the South throughout the course of 
history. I echo Carles Boix’s sentiments that the presence of the working class or centre-left 
parties does not guarantee social reforms47. However, the working class in developing 
countries plays a significant role in defining the course of social reforms, especially when 
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they do not face draconian labour legislation or give in to the temptation of serving the 
sectional interests of the élite. Unlike the organised working class, social movements are 
susceptible to aging and early death, as they are cyclical in nature48. A close collaboration 
between the workers and lower classes can spur a vibrant, progressive social discourse to 
penetrate the social fabric, thus keeping the centre-left political ruling classes in check. The 
absence of an inclusive class usually leaves centre-left political parties to their own devices, 
and they can end up embracing sweeping pro-market causes at the cost of the egalitarian 
agenda, as happened in Chile49, Brazil50 and India51.  
To conclude this section, social forces assumed as crucial a role steering 
developmental trajectories in the South as they did in the North. We certainly can claim that 
the reason southern countries are more unequal than their industrialised counterparts52 is 
due in part to social forces being less widespread and less preponderant in those 
geopolitical settings. Income inequality is further compounded by the high levels of 
unemployment, which factor in the aspect of contributory social security coverage. Those in 
the informal economy are likely to fall into the cracks because of the lack of contributory 
social security coverage for those in that sector of the economy. According to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), informal employment in the southern countries 
accounts for 45 to 85 per cent of non-agricultural employment53. According to Sandbrook et 
al, only Costa Rica in the whole of Latin America can boast universal social security 
coverage54. Apart from those countries in the Maghreb region, most of Africa has a poor 
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record, with many citizens not having access to publicly-funded social security nets55. As a 
result, informal social security arrangements have emerged to compensate for the absence 
of the government in that regard. Geoffrey Wood and Philippa Bevan attest to this trend by 
showing that various communities have taken the matter of social (in)security into their 
own hands by devising a broad range of offerings that encompass, inter alia, microfinance 
and burial schemes56. Countries in Southern Africa have set themselves apart in this regard, 
with Mauritius, South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Lesotho now dispensing social security 
to the elderly. The rest of Africa lags behind due to the continent being a nascent 
democracy with poorly developed civil society. According to Steven Block, democratic 
experiments on the continent have coincided with neoliberal reforms, which have resulted 
in the market-based growth approach becoming prioritised more than pro-poor goals57. 
Mauritius’s unique universal welfare state, the only longstanding one of its kind on the 
continent, mirrors the persistent campaigns of social forces to retain the social commitment 
by the state. The following section provides a review of the literature focusing on Africa, 
which adds credence to the argument made above. 
1.5.3. Literature on African welfare generally 
Prior to the 1980s, the discourse on the state of social development in Africa was largely 
absent, as it was overshadowed by the narrative that centred entirely on the politics of 
independence. According to Thandika Mkandawire, this dearth was compounded by the fact 
that the notion of development as a whole carried the heavy connotation of ‘rights’, a 
luxury new nation states dreaded to embrace so as to avoid overloading the national 
agenda58. Also, this proclivity was fuelled by the fact that, in the post-colonial period, 
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research on African politics, and the political economy of Africa as a whole, was inclined to 
zoom in on the redefinition of the African continent in the wake of independence. This 
research agenda also included the quest to understand the ripple effects of political 
emancipation as Africa advanced to assume control over her own affairs with external 
politico-economic interests59. To reinforce the sentiments of Andrew Kirby and Michael 
Ward, and Cameron Thies, the epithets of African statehood and African statecraft 
remained elusive, as Africa was still trapped in the early cycles of state creation60. 
Suffice it to say that the 1980s saw, for the first time in the post-colonial period, 
research on the African social development agenda reaching its high-water mark. In John 
Dixon’s edited work, the contributors consider the ideological framework underpinning the 
social welfare systems in Africa61. Countries that were under consideration included South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and Mauritius, for which the historical and socio-political context formed 
the frames of reference to evaluate the structures and administration of each welfare 
system. However, no explicit comparisons were made in that respect, as each country was 
studied individually to draw general conclusions about the welfare systems on the 
continent.  
John Iliffe adopted an explicitly historical approach to account for the prevalence 
and persistence of poverty in Africa against the background of the structural defects that 
deprived the indigenes of productive resources and skills62. In a direct and sympathetic 
response to this reality, John Iliffe makes a deliberate attempt to understand the dynamics 
of poverty and what it means to be poor in Africa. This is done by exposing the various 
adaptations and mechanisms of survival adopted by different societies in the context in 
which structural configurations perpetuate non-pro-poor ideals. In this case, John Iliffe 
notes the persistence of colonial patterns of capitalism in the post-colonial state that 
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conditioned the new regimes to undervalue the notion of social justice, as did their 
predecessors in the colonial period.  
The lack of explicit comparisons on the welfare front was filled by Thomas Callaghy, 
who studied the social budgets of selected African countries in the aftermath of structural 
adjustments that were imposed by international financial institutions. Although drawing 
general conclusions about the impact of the adjustments on social gains on the continent, 
Callaghy focused mainly on Zambia, Nigeria and Ghana to fit Joan Nelson’s intent of making 
tentative comparisons to similar experiences in Latin America and Asia in Economic Crisis 
and Policy Choice63.  
The 1990s saw most research on Africa veering away from the social development 
agenda. According to Basil Davidson, research on political instability and intra-state conflict 
on the continent was at the top of the agenda64, whereas Nicolas van de Walle reckoned the 
research enterprise had a predilection for understanding the relationship between 
governance and the continent’s economic prospects65. Little attention was paid to social 
development, as illustrated by Arthur Goldsmith, who also notes the impressive social gains 
of Mauritius and Botswana attained within the framework of civil rights and a competitive 
political environment66. Indeed, Arthur Goldsmith’s focus on the social budgets of the 
aforementioned countries is an indirect plea for the research agenda to be oriented towards 
social development, which is echoed throughout his thesis.  
The current research on social security measures in Africa, which casts in 
comparative perspective the continent’s performance on the social policy front and that of 
other developing regions elsewhere, seems to make up for the drought of the 1990s. In her 
assessment of contemporary Africa’s social development landscape, Philippa Bevan 
bemoans Africa’s disdain for the notion of social justice, which is reflected in the general 
lack of state commitment on the welfare front. She discovered that, compared to her Latin-
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American counterparts, Africa seemed to demonstrate quite a strong presence of informal 
insecurity arrangements that inextricably are linked to a clientelist approach to social 
security67. Not only is the research lacking explicit comparisons between Mauritius and 
South Africa, it is also reluctant to note the socioeconomic and socio-political factors that 
mould certain welfare paradigms over time.  
Tade Akin Aina et al contribute a collection of thoughts on the effects of economic 
liberalism driven by the globalisation of African public spending and how different states 
have adopted a wide array of adaptive measures to countervail those effects. They contest 
that the weakening of power to deliver social welfare in the current form would seem to 
lead to the understanding that social policy in this era is acquired within a broader ‘Pan-
African’ context68. Whilst globalisation and welfare state resilience are the primary focus 
Tade Akin Aina et al’s thesis, it does not acknowledge countries in Africa whose welfare 
frameworks have shown resilience in the face of global economic pressures that dictate 
national economies. The exception of Mauritius in this regard would have been given the 
attention it deserves, not forgetting the unsettled tug of war between socialist ideals and 
neoliberal economic interests underpinning South Africa’s generous, yet less expansive, 
approach to reforms in the welfare sector. The need to understand the composite factors 
that account for the welfare approaches of Mauritius and South Africa in the comparative 
perspective has become ever more apparent. More so, although sharing stark contrasts in 
approach, it is also important that we understand the reasons why these welfare 
trajectories have come to be defined by social assistance, and pensions in particular. While 
noting the variations in approach between the two welfare regimes in South Africa and 
Mauritius, a study preoccupied with tracing the foundations of the current welfare approach 
would have unearthed those salient elements that have shaped the current welfare 
framework and its entanglement with pensions. This study is inspired mainly by the quest to 
fill this gap within the confines of the convergence of economic and social forces that have a 
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bearing on social reforms over time. The literature survey conducted on South Africa and 
Mauritius below illustrates this need.  
1.5.4. Literature on South Africa  
An understanding of the roots of the current welfare framework in South Africa requires a 
survey that would help identify the gaps in the literature on this subject. It is clear that an 
assessment of the works of Frances Lund, Sampie Terreblanche, Servaas van der Berg, 
Jeremy Seekings and Leila Patel, who have written extensively and most authoritatively on 
the subject of welfare and welfare state development in South Africa, completes this 
exercise. 
Writing in the period just before democracy, Frances Lund sheds light on the 
dominance of pensions from a sustainability point of view, thus providing evidence of the 
growing culture of dependence in rural communities, which she deems to be a concern69. 
Elsewhere, Frances Lund recognises that the growing dependence on pensions has rendered 
this income safety net an intrinsic part of the nascent welfare framework of post-apartheid 
South Africa70. I hasten to say that there is a need to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
the foundations that give the current system of ameliorating social risks its meaning. In this 
respect, Frances Lund recognises that the area of social protection in South Africa, and the 
field of social security in particular, has yet to “receive sufficient attention”. This awareness 
calls for a deeper understanding of the “economic and social meaning of the system”71. 
Based on an analysis of Frances Lund’s works, it is clear that the power struggles between 
the various forces within the socioeconomic landscape have not been given the 
consideration they deserve.  
Leila Patel pondered the kind of social security South Africa should consider 
implementing when it becomes a democracy. It is in this case that the question of old-age 
pensions is featured in the analysis in which they are painted as primary buffers against 
social insecurity for white people and as the raison d’être for economic and political 
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stability. Moreover, Leila Patel explicitly casts pensions as instruments that have served the 
purpose of maintaining white political support72. It is clear that attempting a deeper 
understanding of the social dynamics at play in articulating the basis of state support falls 
outside the remit of the objectives of her research undertaking. Instead, her work focused 
mainly on providing the conceptual basis for the social development approach to welfare in 
South Africa. In her other works, Leila Patel provides an appraisal of the welfare framework 
in South Africa, with specific reference to policies that were adopted in the wake of 
democracy and that overhauled the country’s approach to tackling the plight of the poor. 
This shift in approach, she argues, carried far-reaching implications for the broader South 
African society, financial resources, policy and legislative reforms within the confines of the 
new constitution and the legislative frameworks in that respect73.  
According to the work of Sampie Terreblanche, understanding the socioeconomic 
problems confronting modern-day South Africa requires consciousness of the effect of the 
politics of race and the dynamics of race relations prior to the dawn of democracy and after 
1994. According to Terreblanche’s observations, this consciousness is useful in drawing 
parallels between ‘old’ and ‘new’ as they help to shed light on the persistence of social 
problems in South Africa over time74. Implicit in Sampie Terreblanche’s work is that, while 
the political dynamics have changed, poverty and social dislocation persist, and this calls for 
an understanding of the structural composition of the economy, which is steeped in 
historical traditions established centuries prior to the advent of democracy. The notion of 
social security is not a big theme of Terreblanche’s thesis, which is about social injustice as a 
whole. Elsewhere, and more recently, Sampie Terreblanche has bolstered the argument that 
the economy and the global economic enterprise as a whole continues to call the shots in 
South Africa75. This is a reality he reckons to stifle the state’s response to addressing the lack 
of social equity head-on.  
Unlike Terreblanche, Servaas van der Berg assesses the adequacy of social security 
measures against the background of those provided by the state during the period of 
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apartheid. To this end, Van der Berg makes explicit references to apartheid’s methods of 
provision, as well as inferring that there are traces in the current system of alleviating social 
risks that resemble the system before the arrival of the democratic dispensation76. 
However, Van der Berg makes no attempt to uncover the forces that drove the system to 
remain unchanged insofar as the philosophies of social beneficence are concerned. In other 
words, Van der Berg moots the development prospects for South Africa during the 
concluding years of minority rule in terms of which he assesses the ability of economic 
growth to continue serving as the panacea for South Africa’s socioeconomic woes77. Apart 
from the economic forces at play, Van der Berg makes no acknowledgement of the broader 
social context which intersects with the economy and the implications the nature of this 
intersection has on overall social policy outcomes. Key to Van der Berg’s thesis, however, is 
that policy decisions lie solely within the domain of the economy. As a result, this line of 
reasoning has closed the debate to gauge policy choices within the context of the power 
struggles between the two spheres of influence, i.e. the economy and the society. In later 
work, Van der Berg responds to the question of fiscal incidents by looking exclusively at 
racial disparities in public expenditure during the apartheid era, which had implications on 
the shaping of social policy in the period afterwards78.  
A critical appraisal of some of Jeremy Seekings’s works is useful for the purpose of 
identifying the gaps in the literature with regard to South Africa’s welfare trajectory. Jeremy 
Seekings has probably done the most work on the role of welfare and political legitimacy in 
South Africa. He has recounted South Africa’s socioeconomic scene from a historical 
perspective. However, unlike Servaas van der Berg and Sampie Terreblanche, Seekings 
analyses social safety nets as instruments of political expediency that sustained the political 
dispensation prior to 199479. In an assessment of the current system of social provision, 
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which breaks with the approaches of Van der Berg, Terreblanche and Patel, Seekings gives 
an account of the power of labour as a catalyst steering South Africa’s social development to 
remain favourable to pro-poor ideals80. The analysis centres more on educational outcomes 
than on the philosophical foundations underpinning the current social wage system. 
Nevertheless, the dynamics of Seekings’s account offers insights into the ever widening gap 
between the broader society and organised labour in terms of spearheading the social 
discourse as a collective.  
In other works, using South Africa as a case study, Jeremy Seekings, along with Nicoli 
Nattrass, introduced the concept of “distributional regime” to combine welfare, the labour 
market and growth path policies to give account of South Africa’s current social 
development sector81. The usefulness of Seekings’s take on the social wage discourse is 
strengthened by his comparative approach, which parallels South Africa and her peers 
elsewhere in the global South. In this instance, he looked at the influence of the industrial 
working class in the early development stages of welfare systems in Argentina and South 
Africa during the 1930s82, as well as the development of welfare policies since the 1920s. A 
similar undertaking, informed by similar objectives, is adopted elsewhere to compare South 
Africa and Brazil, as well as India83. However, the debate also needs to be brought closer to 
home by comparing South Africa with an African counterpart whose welfare regime paths 
can be compared with those of the former. Indeed, in his attempt to explain the different 
welfare typologies in the global South, Seekings84 presents the possibility of studying the 
welfare trajectories of Mauritius and South Africa in comparative perspective, as they are 
noted to fall in the same development scale.  
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Herein lies the evidence that the task of providing a comprehensive narrative on the 
evolution of the welfare state in the two countries, and the factors presiding over their 
individual welfare regimes over time, is not complete. Jeremy Seekings’s work offers further 
glimpses that suggest that the current welfare system in South Africa is conditioned by 
historical antecedents, which, if compared with the historical trials underlying Mauritius’s 
contemporary welfare outcomes, can add to the discourse on the welfare systems in the 
global South. Hence, when giving account of the historical roots of South Africa, Jeremy 
Seekings studies the welfare state against the background of the politics of race that 
dominated the period of white minority rule. However, Seekings does not make allowance 
to assess the intersections of capital, labour and the emergence of the welfare state during 
white minority rule and the period thereafter. Unlike Seekings, what I intend to do in this 
study is to offer insights into the intersections between state, big capital and organised 
labour throughout the period of white minority rule, as well as in the period thereafter, in 
an effort to draw parallels between the structural and institutional configurations 
underlying the two welfare regimes in question. It would be useful to study the roots of 
welfare state-building within the aforementioned context, not forgetting the ideologies 
underpinning these welfare regimes. 
1.5.5. Literature on Mauritius 
Not much has been written about Mauritius’s welfare policy within the context of state 
legitimisation. The leading voices on the evolution the developmental character of 
Mauritius’s welfare are Sheila Bunwaree85, Richard Sandbrook86 and Larry Willmore87. 
Marianne Ulriksen has recently contributed to the welfare state debate in Mauritius. This is 
done by attempting to fill the important void in the understanding of the modern welfare 
state in that country in the era of globalisation and the deepening integration of national 
                                                          
85
 Bunwaree, Sheila, “Economics, Conflicts and Interculturality in a small island state: The Case of Mauritius”, 
Polis/RCSP/CPSR, Nurérospecial, 2002; Bunwaree, Sheila, “State-Society Relations: Re-engineering the 
Mauritian Social Contract”, Draft Paper, CODESRIA General Assembly Conference, Maputo, December, 2005; 
Bunwaree, Sheila, “The Ballot and Social Policy in Mauritius”, in Bangura, Yusuf (ed.): Democracy and Social 
Policy: New York, 2007, pp. 219 – 242  
86
 Sandbrook, Richard, “Origins of a Democratic Developmental State: Interrogating Mauritius”, in Canadian 
Journal of African Affairs, vol. 39, no. 3, 2005; Sandbrook, Richard, et. al, Op. Cit, 2007 
87
 Willmore, Larry, “Universal Pensions in Mauritius: Lessons for the Rest of the Us”, United Nations DESA 
Discussion Paper no. 32, 2003; Willmore, Larry, Universal age pensions in developing countries: The example 
of Mauritius”, in International Social Security Review, vol. 59, no. 4, 2006; Willmore, Larry, Universal Pensions 
for Developing Countries”, in World Development, vol. 35, no. 1, 2007 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
26 
 
 
 
economies. The works of the aforementioned authors, along with others, will be explored in 
further detail below.  
Sandbrook et al88 and Bunwaree89 separately give historical and descriptive accounts 
of old and contemporary welfare state debates on Mauritius from the context of social 
security measures. Although similar, what distinguishes Bunwaree’s works from those of 
Sandbrook is that the former further explores the role of women in the alleviation of 
poverty within the broader scheme of the welfare state in Mauritius. The latter rather 
highlights Mauritius as a candidate for a model of development for her African counterparts.  
The works of Bunwaree and Sandbrook should be assessed further in the wake of 
the need to understand the system of production and distribution in welfare provision, and 
the structural configurations that have compelled the welfare framework to remain in its 
current form. Bunwaree did not seek to understand the role of women in the social sector 
of Mauritius, including their ability to change the levers of power so that they sympathise 
with the broad spectrum of society. In this instance, questions regarding whether this 
propensity is a result of Mauritius having a mega civil society that adopts a pluralistic 
approach could have been addressed. By not recognising these social alignments, Bunwaree 
makes the bona fide mistake of overlooking the roots that encourage women’s participation 
in fulfilling the welfare function. The works of Lange90 and Mayput91 attest to the fact that 
community-based groups, which initially were intended to serve ethno-cultural purposes, 
were introduced during colonial times to help rural communities in Mauritius to cope with 
various social challenges, including those speaking to the heart of the social development 
sector. Women played a pivotal role as supportive pillars that kept these community-based 
associations alive, and went on to grow into influential entities that tilted the balance of 
power in the state apparatus of the colonial state to resonate with the broader society.  
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Sandbrook et al, on the other hand, address the universal character of old-age 
pensions in Mauritius as part of the country’s general success on the socioeconomic front. 
No attempt is made to study pensions as an outstanding feature of Mauritius’s welfare 
framework that warrants dissecting in isolation so as to understand its historical roots, 
social processes and sequences that played part in their structural makeup. The fact that 
Mauritius’s welfare trajectory is compared with several others means that a detailed 
historical account of the welfare state, including its entanglement with pensions, falls 
outside the purview of Sandbrook et al’s research objectives. Thus, the research of 
Sandbrook et al pays attention to the contemporary age, although with not-so-detailed 
references to past dispensations.  
If anyone comes close to giving a comprehensive historical account of Mauritius’s 
socially responsive approach to governance, it is Matthew Lange. Lange provides an 
assessment of the impact of British colonial rule on development outcomes in her former 
colonies, which is done by way of comparing Mauritius with Guyana, Sierra Leone and 
Botswana, using statistical analysis alongside in-depth case studies92. Central to Lange’s 
argument is that British colonialism in Mauritius created colonial structures of control that 
served as necessary preconditions for the bureaucratisation of the state and paved a path 
towards an inclusive approach to governance. The combination of a well-functioning state 
bureaucracy and inclusiveness became invaluable in generating socially responsive 
development outcomes. Whilst Lange’s work provides a foretaste of the historical 
circumstances that conditioned the modern-day welfare state in Mauritius, his work is 
limited by the time period of his analysis, which extends beyond the dispensation of 
independence. Moreover, the welfare state, let alone pensions, is not the main subject of 
academic inquiry of Lange’s thesis.  
Mohipnarain Joynathsing provides an assessment of welfare policies in Mauritius 
from 1981 to 1985. He posits that the Mauritian welfare state perpetuated inequity rather 
than equality of opportunity93. Similar to Joynathsing’s approach, Larry Willmore touches on 
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universal non-contributory old-age pensions within the overall welfare design of Mauritius, 
albeit in the contemporary age94. His analyses focus inter alia on the sequencing and 
patterns of distribution of such pensions, and their sustainability, although from the fiscal 
point of view, rather than exploring the actual societal implications of these forms of 
pension within the broader context of Mauritius’s socio-political milieu. Hence, like 
Joynathsing, Willmore addresses only one side of the debate and shies away from delving 
deeper into understanding the structural make-up of Mauritius’s welfare framework within 
the broader context of class-based social politics and the implications for policy outcomes. 
Indeed. Willlmore’s shortcomings are compounded by the inhibitions of the scope of the 
design of his inquiry, which remains conspicuously quantitative in nature. This, as a result, 
has robbed the researcher of the chance to explore the historical origins of social security in 
comprehensive detail and the factors that saw the welfare structure being shaped in the 
manner it was.  
Recently, Marianne Ulriksen entered the debate to address the compelling question 
of welfare state sustainability in Mauritius95. Elsewhere, Ulriksen has had an impact on the 
analysis of the welfare state in Mauritius in winning the battle against poverty in that 
country in the age of globalisation96. In all her narratives on the welfare state, however, 
Ulriksen has compared Mauritius with Botswana by using the historical comparative 
approach to demonstrate the path towards welfare state-building, which is combined with 
statistical analysis to draw deductive inferences97. The drawback of Ulriksen’s works is that, 
whilst a comparison is being made between the two cases, the focus is placed on Botswana, 
whereas Mauritius is used as a peripheral point of reference from which parallels are being 
drawn. Unlike Matthew Lange’s work, which strikes a balance between in-depth historical 
analysis and regression, the historical comparative approach in Ulriksen’s work assumes a 
marginal function in the analyses, as attention is paid to the statistical use of analyses to 
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draw conclusions. Moreover, safety nets do not form the central theme of Ulriksen’s 
analyses. The next section outlines the comparative historical approach as an anchor 
helping to unpack an in-depth account of the welfare trajectories of Mauritius and South 
Africa in historical detail. 
1.6. Comparative Historical Research  
Comparative historical analysis was used as a tool to unpack the roots of current policy 
choices and the reasons they have remained inflexible through the ages. Understanding the 
developmental variations of Mauritius and South Africa, and the historical processes 
underpinning their policy outcomes, necessitates the use of comparative historical analysis 
to make detailed and well-informed inferences. Adopting this approach on its own and not 
using it in tandem with quantitative methods of research corresponds with the focus of this 
study, which is preoccupied inter alia with finding the historical roots of current-day policy 
outcomes. Therefore, relying on comparative historical analysis is predicated on the reason 
that it provides an opportunity to delve deep into the socio-political and socioeconomic 
aspects of the two countries and consequently to unearth similarities and differences 
playing out within the broader context of welfare state-building.  
Current conventional methods of research, which are dominated by standard 
regression analysis, are unable to fit our ontology and provide an understanding of the 
world we strive to theorise. The task of unravelling the complex relationship between causal 
variables has been termed by Peter Hall as ontologies. In Hall’s tradition, “[a]n ontology 
consists of premises about the deep causal structures of the world from which the analysis 
begins and without which theories about the social world would not make sense”98. The 
reliance on statistical analyses becomes more pronounced as a problem when we seek to 
unravel complex causal relationships spanning an extensive period of time. Likewise, the 
situation continues unresolved when one seeks to ascertain path-dependent outcomes99. To 
resolve this problem, comparative historical analysis was relied upon to fill these gaps. 
Mauritius and South Africa remain societies influenced greatly by colonialism. Colonial 
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domination altered social formation and spawned social, political and economic 
consequences that defined approaches to ameliorating social contingencies. And since 
submission to a foreign political power was characterised by a strong, racially stratified 
system of control in both countries, we notice the different welfare approaches employed 
to address social contingencies for the subservient (inferior) and ruling (superior) 
communities during that era.  
Likewise, when we delve deeper into the historical foundations of current welfare 
methods in South Africa, we are able to recognise that they were moulded from those of 
old, as is evident in their structural make up and the institutional alignments presiding over 
them, albeit remaining devoid of racial specifications. Whilst the method of approach may 
be predominantly unchanged, we are compelled to interrogate the system of economic 
control that is inextricably intertwined with the sphere of politics and the broader social 
context. A research approach with a strong historical orientation is indispensable in carrying 
out research tasks that have a strong historical focus. The strength of this approach cannot 
be emphasised enough. Hence, it allows for process tracing, thereby creating a platform to 
pick out patterns that might confirm or discount path-dependent policy outcomes. Thus, the 
symmetrical comparative historical analysis I conducted of the two cases under investigation 
provided for a detailed examination of the unfolding of social politics and its implications for 
social policy outcomes in the two cases. Proceeding further, Peter Hall’s reference to 
ontology within the social policy discourse reinforces the comparative historical research 
approach, which is set on dissecting the welfare state into fine shreds whilst concurrently 
laying bare the roots of the system that defines it. 
According to James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, a comparative historical 
method is a reliable tool to execute this task. This is because modern social sciences has 
relied on comparative historical analysis as the preferred means to extract historical 
parallels of (usually) a small number of cases by articulating the causal sequence over time. 
Thus it can be argued that the comparative historical research methods are derived from 
case study research or small-N approach, due to their emphasis on tracking the sequential 
interplay of variables to articulate social phenomena over a defined period of time100. 
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Secondly, comparative historical analysis has gained favour amongst social scientists for its 
reliance on systematic and contextualised comparison, albeit that the approach is not 
unified by one theory or a single method of analysis101. Comparative historical research has 
proven particularly useful to understanding welfare state development in the industrialised 
world, and how varieties of welfare capitalism came into being102. In the same vein, studies 
on the welfare paradigms in the Third World have also underscored the importance of the 
comparative historical approach103. Hence, Sandbrook et al recently produced a study 
accounting for the social democratic outcomes of Chile, Mauritius, Costa Rica and Kerala 
from a historical perspective, without which we would not have the knowledge of 
differences in class compromises struck between capital and the mass movement in both 
the First and the Third World, and the implications for future welfare outcomes within those 
geopolitical settings. Comparing South Africa to Mauritius draws on this logic. By giving an 
in-depth account of current welfare policy frameworks and their proclivity to make 
unequivocal references to welfare policy choices of old, we then can fathom variations in 
the initial structural conditions that propelled the intersection of social and economic forces 
and how, in the end, this convergence created dissimilar welfare regimes. According to John 
Jackson’s observations, statistical tools remain grossly inadequate to making causal 
inferences that deepen our understanding of path-dependent trajectories104.  
Because of the nature of the comparative historical method, which relies on 
historical conditions to help theorise the world, one would be forgiven for confusing it with 
historical institutionalism or historical sociology. For instance, historical sociology entails 
comparative historical analysis; however, it includes interpretive and post-modern tools that 
remain alien to this tradition. Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, is seldom 
engaged in systematic comparisons. What makes comparative historical analysis a 
standalone approach is the tendency to undertake an in-depth study of large-scale 
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processes through noticing the temporal sequence as well as the evolutionary trends taking 
place within the social, political and economic milieus105. Due to its sequential approach, 
comparative historical method opens dialogue to engage with theory and evidence, which is 
a rare practice in quantitative social research106. The task of testing or adding new insights 
to theory using two or more cases would be inadequately executed if the comparative 
historical approach is not added to the analysis. 
Indeed, the use of the comparative historical method must correspond with the 
theoretical prose of the proposed study if deepened theoretical insights are to be derived 
from the deductive inferences being made107. Hence, the reliance on the structuralist and 
institutionalist approaches in this study facilitated the core function of the comparative 
historical method when undertaking social science research, which is to help reveal the 
historical roots of the world we have come to know. Both the institutionalist and 
structuralist approach assume the indispensable role of studying processes of social change 
over time within the broader scheme of welfare state-building. These theories expose the 
contestations between various class forces due to contradictions in the structural makeup of 
the economy and the effect these clashes may have on the redefinition of institutional 
arrangements. What is more, both the institutionalist and structuralist theories have been 
tried and tested and they have been deemed reliable in helping deepen our understanding 
of welfare state-building, both at the core and on the periphery. Esping Andersen’s ground-
breaking work on the various forms of welfare capitalism in industrialised countries was 
predicated on the theoretical expositions of the institutionalist and structuralist theories 
combined108. Richard Sandbrook et al have since followed suit as they unravelled the 
structural requisites that propelled social democratic outcomes in countries spanning 
various regions of the developing world109. As this study embarked on a similar journey, 
albeit with the focus on Mauritius and South Africa, comparative historical analysis served 
as the engine that set the wheels of analysis in motion with the structuralist/institutionalist 
approach serving as its driver. 
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1.7. Research Design 
This study was a response to the need to understand the reasons why the current welfare 
outcomes in Mauritius and South Africa have remained resolutely unchanged since their 
inception in an effort to unpack variations in policy outcomes over time. It is an explanatory 
study intended to travel far back in time to uncover the differences in social processes that 
have had a conditioning effect on the divergent approaches that emerged on social policy 
platforms. To this end I relied on qualitative research methods to make sense of the 
interplay of variables in a bid to unravel the sequence of events that prompted the 
programmatic approach towards mitigating socioeconomic risks. In essence, if the rise of 
social forces (challenging the status quo) served as the nodal points that unleashed more 
socially responsive paradigms, how significant was the role that they played and how much 
of what has come to characterise these contrasting welfare outcomes can be pinned to the 
activities of these social forces.  
The above propositions form the basis for the quest to understand the reasons for 
the rise of different welfare regimes in Mauritius and South Africa. Whilst South Africa’s 
conservative welfare framework is at odds with Mauritius’s comprehensive social 
democratic welfare state, I contend that differences in the quality of the mass movement in 
these countries played an imperative role in shaping the different welfare policies that 
emerged. A study of this kind, seeking to draw parallels between current and old welfare 
policies, and the role of social forces in this regard, no doubt can benefit immeasurably from 
qualitative methods of analysis. According to Henry Brady, qualitative research remains “the 
basic building block of any approach to measurement”110, as it addresses substantive 
questions of interest111. Comparative works tend to move from research topics to specific 
propositions. For this to occur they require the adoption of a procedure that provides 
guidance for making a set of hypotheses constituting testable theories112. Qualitative 
research methods are more capable of appreciating the complexity of causal relations than 
their quantitative counterparts, and therefore are better positioned to make modifications 
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to causal theories113. Nevertheless, I wish to make no claims about which method of analysis 
is superior and, by implication, the (in)fallibility of the findings derived from either method 
thereof. Both types of research make a commitment to causal analysis and are inclined to 
the systematic use of evidence to back up claims as per the objectives of the research114. 
Each social inquiry is different and commands the use of methods of analysis that respond 
compatibly to the objectives of the study and the universe within which the researcher 
seeks to make sense of empirical findings115. Of paramount importance within the greater 
scheme of scientific inquiry is that, regardless of the choice of approach, good social science 
must “recognise the strengths and weaknesses of different combinations”116. The following 
section outlines the process-tracing approach as tool to fulfil, in this case, the objectives of 
comparative historical research of proving path dependence insofar as policy outcomes 
have remained over time. 
1.7.1. Path Dependence and Process Tracing in Comparative Research 
The notion of path dependence purports that current policy choices are predetermined by 
those of old. For the purposes of this research, process tracing was an essentially invaluable 
exercise to unearth the intricate workings that informed path-dependent welfare 
trajectories. Certainly, by observing causal processes, process tracing helps to uncover the 
foundations of present-day development outcomes. This tool also helps to identify 
moments of critical juncture and ascertain their implications over the course of history117, 
especially in cross-case comparisons in which unearthing parallels in the development 
pathways of cases is the primary aim. In understanding the welfare trajectories of Mauritius 
and South Africa, process tracing thus offered a chance to provide evidence of path 
dependence in South Africa and Mauritius and consequently address previously 
unsubstantiated claims118. In this regard, Figure 1.1 and 1.2 provide the causal relationship 
of variables as evidence of the deep historical roots underpinning welfare policy choices in 
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Mauritius and South Africa. They also help to identify the critical junctures that propelled 
power configurations between the classes and consequently had a bearing on the 
institutional framework for the notion of social responsiveness.  
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FIGURE 1.1: CAUSAL CHAIN ILLUSTRATING THE BUILDING OF A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WELFARE CONSENSUS 
IN COLONIAL MAURITIUS 
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FIGURE 1.2: CAUSAL CHAIN ILLUSTRATING THE BUILDING OF A LIBERAL WELFARE CONSENSUS IN WHITE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
               Figure 1.3 and 1.4 similarly illustrate continuity in policy choices in Mauritius and 
South Africa even after the end of the colonial control. The illustrations also prove that 
regime change had no significant bearing on the shaping of the sort of welfare outcomes 
that prevailed. Instead, the continuity of power relations between the various classes after 
colonialism, and the contestations that characterised their coexistence, continued to 
condition the welfare paradigms to remain devoted to their traditional ways. The inability of 
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the subordinate classes to change the levers of power in post-apartheid South Africa elicited 
minimalist social reforms relative to Mauritius, where the rise of the working class to 
political prominence paved the way for social democratic outcomes to take precedence. 
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FIGURE 1.3: CAUSAL CHAIN ILLUSTRATING THE BUILDING OF A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC WELFARE CONSENSUS IN 
POST-COLONIAL MAURITIUS 
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FIGURE 1.4: CAUSAL CHAIN ILLUSTRATING THE BUILDING OF A DEVELOPMENTAL WELFARE CONSENSUS IN POST-
APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA 
In more explicit terms, welfare state development in South Africa and Mauritius, 
both in the colonial and post-colonial period, followed the following causal sequence: In 
colonial South Africa, the advent of industrialisation precipitated a radical industrial action 
by the working classes in the mines, who pressed for state-funded programmes to alleviate 
the plight of the workers. However, the working class then became co-opted into the state-
apparatus, which had a knock-on effect of reduced industrial action within the labour 
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spectrum, less comprehensive welfare outcomes, predicated on liberal principles of 
minimalist state intervention, followed. On the other hand, in colonial Mauritius, the 
working class called for improvement in the working and living conditions, as well as 
increment for workers’ pay in the agricultural sector. These calls were made alongside those 
which called for extension of the franchise to erstwhile excluded members of society. 
Because workers forged strong ties with the broader society, upon extension of the 
franchise, a centre left government was voted into power to replace that of the colonial 
administrators. . This new government enacted legislation that made publicly-funded social 
provision to mitigate the plight of the suffering a state responsibility.  
The causal sequence that retained expansive social reforms in post-colonial 
Mauritius follows a similar path to that which was paved during the colonial era. Workers 
had the uncanny ability to resist state-co-option, which enabled them to cultivate strong 
societal relations transcending social class divisions. Workers remained in the forefront of 
the welfare state discourse, and the society was able to rally behind them in their defence 
to retain the social democratic welfare consensus. In contrast, welfare state-building in 
post-colonial South Africa follows a similar causal sequence as that of the period before 
independence. Workers became co-opted into the echelons of political power, and 
consequently, they elected to eschew forging a social alliance that cuts across class with the 
broader society. This resulted in the inevitable outcome of the state not enacting legislation 
that champions with expansive social reforms.  
1.7.2. Data Collection and Interview Processes  
Primary and secondary data combined served as the basis for the inferences made in this 
study. I relied on face-to-face interviews and archival work to gain a deeper understanding 
of the cases and weigh historical explanations of causal relations contained in archival 
material against explanations offered by the respondents and the literature written on the 
cases in question. I conducted archival work at the National Library of Parliament in 
Mauritius, which is situated in the capital, Port Louis, where I also had privileged access to 
primary documents and government reports. Other archival research was conducted at the 
Africana section of the Stellenbosch University’s main library, the J.S. Gericke Library, in an 
effort to find the historical roots of modern-day South Africa. Indeed, the use of primary 
data is deemed indispensable for unleashing new insights in qualitative work. George 
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Alexander and Andrew Bennett assert that “unless statistical researchers do their own 
archival work, interviews, or face-to-face surveys with open-ended questions in order to 
measure the values of the variables in their model, they have no unproblematic inductive 
means of identifying left-out variables”119. Face-to-face interviews have been deemed more 
important than methods of primary data collection like questionnaires. Hence, according to 
Derica Lambrechts, the chances of respondents disclosing more information are greater in 
interviews than in questionnaires120.  
A total of 21 respondents were interviewed, and they comprised senior 
representatives of the major political parties in Mauritius, non-governmental organisations, 
private sector, civil society and intergovernmental organisations, and senior government 
officials. In Mauritius, respondents were interviewed in separate locations within the vicinity 
of Mauritius’s capital, Port Louis, as well as in Ébene City, which is located 15 km (nine 
miles) south of the capital. In the case of South Africa, the respondents were spread across 
the big cities, although the majority of them were located in the capital, Pretoria, and in 
Johannesburg, which is located 53 km (33 miles) south of the capital.  
Mauritius is a bilingual society with English used as the language of administration, 
whereas French remains the island’s social lingua franca121. At first I harboured concerns 
that the respondents might not be comfortable participating in English, which would call for 
translation services. However, all the respondents indicated beforehand that such services 
would not be necessary and that they were comfortable to proceed as planned. On the 
other hand, South Africa boasts a multiplicity of eleven official languages, out of which 
Afrikaans and English serve as the medium of instruction. However, all my respondents, 
including the Afrikaans speakers, possessed a satisfactory command of the English language 
to sustain a conversation. It is also important to mention that the rights of the respondents 
to remain anonymous or be disclosed were noted in writing before the commencement of 
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each interview. Apart from being an ethical question, the option of anonymity on the 
consent forms fostered the spirit of trust between the interviewer and the interviewee.  
Getting insights and views from different stakeholders was important for the subject 
of welfare state-building, which forms the key preoccupation of this research. The reason I 
deemed this approach worth employing is precisely due to the welfare state, in the case of 
Mauritius for example, having its roots embedded in a mega social pact that entails the 
state, labour, capital and society, as opposed to a traditional and more exclusive one 
comprising the state, capital and labour alone. Moreover, the social budget in Mauritius is 
never approved without the input of society through civic organisations. The all-inclusive 
approach employed in Mauritius to inform policy stretches back to colonial times and 
continues to reverberate today, which accounts for why Mauritius is able to remain 
beholden to a social democratic ethos. Conversely, South Africa’s social pact has yet to jump 
out of the traditional corporatist arrangement that excludes role players other than the 
state, organised labour and the private sector. The non-inclusive approach within policy-
making circles in South Africa has been mooted as the cause for South Africa’s propensity 
for social protest, as well as the reason civil society has a preference for legal recourse as a 
means to compel the state to carry out its social mandate. Not seeking inputs from the 
abovementioned variety of stakeholders to provide insights would have served to blight 
efforts to capture the attitude and extent to which the broader consultative network 
influences policy outcomes on a sectoral level, which is rarely covered in most works 
tackling the subject under consideration. 
I should mention, however, that the interviews did not comprise the most essential 
component of this study, as they had no bearing on the credibility of this research as well as 
on the validity of the findings. Instead, the interviews served only as supplementary tools to 
help comprehend the narrative on South Africa and Mauritius’s socioeconomic progress and 
what those stakeholders perceived as the right path to pursue in both the mainstream and 
on the sidelines of policymaking. Including interviews in the analysis, albeit in a marginal 
form, served to triangulate this study in an effort to cross-check and validate the results 
from multiple sources. According to Babbie and Mouton, triangulation of data makes for a 
very important qualitative research technique as it serves to “enhance validity and 
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reliability” of research122. Hence, from these interviews I was enabled to judge the insights 
of different stakeholders against the current welfare framework and eventually integrated 
these perceptions as nuances informing the broader understanding of Mauritius and South 
Africa’s welfare trajectories. Even though there was no shortage of literature that accounted 
for South Africa’s socioeconomic progress, with a great level of detail relative to that of 
Mauritius, it was imperative that interviews be conducted in both cases and that they were 
approached with the same level of seriousness that a study of this nature requires. This is 
because it is important that I make my own extractions as a researcher and fill the gaps that 
have been left vacant by experts in the field.  
The interviews were enhanced by my personal observations of the socio-political and 
socioeconomic environment during my stay in the two countries in the course of my 
research. The observations were made from these experiences, and they proved invaluable 
in relaying a firsthand narrative beyond the confines of the literature so that I may have a 
more informed engagement with my respondents. This exercise – although assuming an 
understated role in the production of knowledge – also played a crucial role in enabling me 
to make direct interpretations of the subject under consideration with the hindsight of 
scientifically proven findings by experts in this area of research. Observations certainly play 
an important role, adding to the quality of research in disciplines like Political Science, as the 
researcher may want to gain a deeper understanding of the subject matter under 
consideration. The next section outlines the sectoral profiles of stakeholders that made up 
the interview component in this research.  
1.7.3. Stakeholder Interviews 
Different types of stakeholders were interviewed to shed light on the topic under 
consideration. These comprised representatives of the main political parties in Mauritius 
and South Africa, civil society and non-governmental organisations, the private sector, and 
government officials. Their importance in helping to unravel the policy discourse on the 
subject of welfare state-building in the two countries is outlined in the justifications below: 
Political Parties 
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Mauritius is a multiparty democratic system that boasts a myriad of parties that compete in 
the general elections, which are held every five years. However, because Mauritius has at 
least 70 political parties that take part in the national elections123, I chose to focus mainly on 
the four major ones, as it was only practical to focus on a few. Representatives that were 
interviewed belonged to the following parties: Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM), 
Mauritius Labour Party (MLP), Militant Socialist Movement (MSM) and Mauritian Social 
Democratic Party (PMSD). For South Africa, representatives of the two main political parties, 
the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the African National Congress (ANC), were interviewed. 
Whilst South Africa has a multiplicity of political parties, it is the ANC and the DA that have 
dominated the political scene and whose ideological stances have been at the forefront of 
the policy discourse. 
Civil Society and Non-governmental Organisations 
Mauritius has a high non-governmental organisation per capita ratio, with over 5 000 NGOs 
registered to date124. These NGOs are represented by an umbrella body, the Mauritius 
Council of Social Services (MACOSS), which is called annually to make inputs on the social 
budget. The existence of such a vibrant civil society has added to the vitality of the country’s 
democracy, whilst strengthening its social democratic character over time. Interviews were 
conducted with NGOs so as to better understand the role of civil society in that regard. In 
South Africa, a representative of the Social Justice Coalition (SJC), an umbrella body 
representing the social movements that are at the forefront of health and education 
activism, was interviewed. In the labour sector, representatives from COSATU-affiliated 
unions, including the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), were interviewed. Academics 
from some of South Africa’s universities formed part of the interviews.  
Private Sector 
The role of the private sector has directly and indirectly played an important role in shaping 
welfare outcomes in South Africa and Mauritius. This is because getting the consensus of 
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the business community has been imperative in the quest to achieve substantial social 
equity. Employer federations in Mauritius participated in the interviews to get the views of 
business and their experience in working with government towards achieving this cause. For 
South Africa, these insights were offered by big business such as Barloworld Limited. 
Although not representative of the views of the business community as a whole, the views 
shared by the aforementioned research subject offered hints about big capital’s approach in 
helping to avert social contingencies in South Africa, as well as the philosophies 
underpinning their approach. 
Government Officials 
Government officials execute their administrative tasks based on the policy prescripts of the 
political party/parties in power. All officials interviewed were senior in rank and they 
stemmed from various government departments that have a welfare mandate or whose 
functions have a particular bearing on social policy outcomes. In Mauritius, the respondents 
represented departments such as the Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and 
Reforms Institutions, and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, among 
others. In South Africa, senior officials of the National Planning Commission and the 
Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation, both located in The Presidency, 
were interviewed.  
1.7.4. Mauritius and South Africa as Comparative Cases  
Qualitative research is often criticised for selecting cases on the basis of the similarity of the 
dependent variables. King, Keohane and Verba (KKV) are at the forefront of this movement 
and they contend that selecting cases in which the results are already known has made 
qualitative work prone to research bias125. By implication, at the heart of KKV’s criticism is 
that small-N research falls short because it does not study a full range of variations of the 
variables relative to large-N studies. Geddes has since entered the fray, arguing that the 
research bias marring qualitative research can be avoided if the cases are selected based on 
the independent variable126 to avoid overvaluing the dependent variable. This study notes 
                                                          
125
 King, Gart, Keohane, Robert. O, and Verba, Sidney: Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in 
qualitative research, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 139, 126, & 129   
126
 Geddes, Barbara: Paradigms and sand castles: theory building and research design in comparative politics, 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003, p. 87 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
43 
 
 
 
the co-variation of both the independent and dependent variables in a bid not to truncate 
case selection. This study is furthermore not aimed at making generalisations; instead, its 
intention was to add to theory. Moreover, given the fact that this study leans towards 
process tracing or causal process observations and not intuitive regression, it lends itself to 
be less susceptible to selection bias.  
 Both Mauritius and South Africa’s inclination to commit to broad-based 
development is compelling and worth investigating especially on a continent still known to 
be in the backwaters of advancing the notion of social justice. The two cases have dissimilar 
developmental outcomes, with one demonstrating better commitment to the social cause 
than the other. Indeed, it is precisely the variations shown in developmental outcomes that 
make for a compelling study. According to Collier et al, instances like these present the 
researcher with a “better opportunity to gain detailed knowledge of the phenomenon under 
investigation”127. Moreover, due to the study’s historical approach there is only a minimal 
chance of selection bias. According to Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, inferences drawn 
from within-case process tracing or causal process observations are good for avoiding 
selection bias relative to cases in which intuitive regression was depended upon128. 
 However, behind the intrigue that adorns the differences in policy outcomes in the 
two countries are the similar historical preconditions that weigh heavily on the 
developmental pathways that evolved over time. Indeed, the significance of historical 
antecedents underpinned the undertaking of this study. This historical hold inadvertently 
shaped social assistance, particularly non-contributory old-age pension policy. It is for this 
reason that this study has opted to compare Mauritius and South Africa over relatively new 
entrants to the social security scene, such as Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia, which offer 
universal old-age pensions similar to that of Mauritius129.  
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 Hence, these new entrants share neither historical circumstances nor longstanding 
welfare traditions similar to those of Mauritius to offer compelling cases from which to draw 
insights, as would the comparison between South Africa and Mauritius. Indeed, the work of 
Sandbrook, Edelman, Heller and Teichman on the development of social democracy in the 
global South reaffirms the need to bring historical circumstances and their impact on future 
policy choices back into the debate. They show how policy choices of old had a conditioning 
effect on current structural properties of capitalism, the configurations of social actors, and 
the critical junctures that shaped the ideological orientations of political parties. This study 
thus intends to follow in the footsteps of Sandbrook et al as a pathfinder to achieving similar 
research objectives by way of comparing South Africa and Mauritius.  
 While historical circumstances and longstanding welfare traditions may cast 
Mauritius and South Africa as comparable cases over the abovementioned potential cases, 
concerns relating to stark contrasts in inter alia population size, wealth and resource 
abundance, and social expenditure can make one question the comparability of the two 
cases. Even though I recognise the importance of these factors, the comparison of Mauritius 
and South Africa, and the concerns expressed thereon, they are downplayed by the fact that 
this study is underpinned by the quest to discover the embedded reasons that played a role 
shaping the different welfare trajectories.  
The welfare trajectories of the two countries have been distinctively marked by the 
dominance of old age pensions within their policy frameworks since their inception. Just like 
with most welfare states, which commenced on social assistance, usually in the form of old 
age pensions, South Africa and Mauritius experienced a similar historical fate. The 
peculiarity of the two cases, however, is highlighted by the relentlessness of these forms of 
social grants, and the pre-eminence they wield within their respective socio-political 
environments. In Mauritius, universal pensions, which account for the lion’s share of the 
social grants expenditure, remain the pride of that country’s social democratic welfare 
approach. Although it did not initially begin with the universal approach, the ultimate 
universalisation of pensions served as glue that created an inseparable bond between the 
indiscriminate nature of the welfare regime and the pro-reforms social fabric.  
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At first glance, South Africa’s targeted old age pension scheme may seem not at odds 
with the entire welfare regime, which has shown indifference towards the all-
encompassing, pro-poor social reforms. Hence, the social grants system, which is dominated 
by the generous pension scheme, is worlds apart from the less expansive nature of the 
welfare regime that seeks to keep state expenditure at a bare minimum. From the 
comparison of the two cases, it means that the harmony between the old age pension 
scheme and the universal welfare regime in Mauritius is reflective of the efficacy of society 
that is uncompromisingly at the forefront of the pro-poor social discourse. In South Africa, 
on the other hand, the generosity of the pension scheme, which accounts for a 
disproportionate share as a percentage of social security spending for all the social grants 
being dispersed by the state, is indicative of a perpetual disconnect and passive societal 
synergies besetting the welfare regime to remain in its current, minimalist form.  
In light of the foregoing social dynamics underlying different welfare trajectories in the 
South, this study tests the limits of a socially-progressive polity in safeguarding structural 
and institutional make-up of specific welfare regimes. Likewise, this study tests the extent to 
which social polities can serve as agents that push the boundaries of social provision to 
unleash a new, socially-driven approach.  
However, this comparative approach has also been informed by considerations relating 
to both similarities and differences between the two cases. In terms of similarities: 
1. Democratic political culture: both countries have progressed into vibrant 
democracies in which political dissent is embedded in their democratic trajectories. 
The maturity of Mauritius and South Africa’s democratic cultures has allowed room 
for various stakeholders (like civil society) to make continuous pleas for social and 
economic change. Consequently, both countries have been allowed to erect socially 
responsive economies in which the government is able to pursue rigorous social 
goals in tandem with their economic counterparts. The effectiveness of the social 
forces in getting the ruling classes to prioritise the cause of social justice depends on 
how the democratic space is utilised. 
2. Labour: labour sits at the heart of the welfare paths of both South Africa and 
Mauritius. It is as a result of the class conflict that the foundations for welfare in the 
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two countries were laid in the first place. It is due to the noticeable presence of 
organised labour in their respective developmental experiences, enabled by labour 
market institutions, that the notion of social justice in all its facets continues to have 
a high currency in the policy discourse.  
3. Multi-ethnic society: the demographics of Mauritius and South Africa display rich 
cases of multi-racial and multi-ethnic societies that were once subject to structurally 
rooted inequalities based on either race or caste. In Mauritius, the Franco-
Mauritians, Indo-Mauritians and Sino-Mauritians are the epitome of economic 
success, whilst their Creole counterparts remain at the bottom of the economic 
ranks. This is similar to the case in South Africa, where the legacy of historical 
circumstances continues to be a determinant of access to opportunity. The efficacy 
of social forces in this case is also contingent on their mobilisation strength to 
transcend these racial boundaries, which share overlaps with class. 
4. Orientation of the economy: the economies of both Mauritius and South Africa are 
ruled by market forces. Since 1996, South Africa has passed successive economic 
policies that have put the government at loggerheads with the left as a result of 
leaning more towards the neoliberal camp. Likewise, Mauritius is regularly touted by 
international financial institutions (IFIs) as the most open African economy to do 
business in, which cast it as one of the most attractive destinations for foreign direct 
investments. Irrespective of their neoliberal approaches to economic management, 
Mauritius and South Africa are both very socially responsive economies that have 
longstanding welfare traditions focused on the poor. It is clear in the two cases that 
social forces have been instrumental in ensuring that the market plays its part in 
helping realise the two countries’ long-term ambitions of building more egalitarian 
societies. The mobilisation strength of the social forces has seen the two economies 
producing different results insofar as welfare policy outcomes are concerned, with 
that of Mauritius retaining its universal approach, with South Africa still having to 
carryout extensive social policy reforms 20 years after the end of apartheid. 
5. Colonial history: briefly occupied by the Netherlands, then France, and later Britain, 
Mauritius is a direct consequence of colonialism, since it has no indigenous 
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population. South Africa’s encounter with colonialism bears striking similarities to 
that of Mauritius, as it went through the hands of two colonial masters, namely the 
Netherlands and Britain. These colonial powers left lasting political and economic 
legacies in the two countries. These peculiar colonial histories set the countries on a 
distinctive trajectory at a very early stage. The social forces currently in existence 
stem either from the colonial days, or resemble the character of those that existed 
during the colonial era. 
Despite these similarities, a number of differences make for an interesting basis from which 
to contrast the political significance of old-age pensions. In terms of differences: 
1. Human development: despite the economic success of South Africa over the past 20 
years of democracy, the country has failed to alleviate chronic poverty and high 
income disparity between the haves and the have-nots. Mauritius stands out as an 
outlier. Not only has it been hailed for its impressively low Gini coefficient, it also 
scores high in human development rankings, far outperforming the South Africa. It 
would be interesting to study the impact of economic affluence on human 
development outcomes in the different contexts. Indeed, it is not a mistake that the 
two countries have achieved different human development outcomes. The 
mobilisation capacity of social forces in keeping the economic and political ruling 
élite in check played a part here. 
2. Different party systems: South Africa and Mauritius have strikingly different political 
systems. The former remains a de facto one-party dominant system, while the 
political culture in Mauritius is a highly unpredictable and fiercely contested one. The 
proximity between the social forces and political ruling classes has either served as a 
catalyst for multi-party politics, or perpetuated a one-party political system that has 
implications for the state carrying out its social mandate. 
3. The scope of welfare policies: since the advent of independence, Mauritius has 
maintained a very comprehensive welfare system that is universal in nature. South 
Africa has not achieved universal status as of yet, but it has the potential to follow in 
the footsteps of Mauritius through its generous social grants system, which remains 
one of most famed in the world. With such economic ability and strength, one is 
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pressed to contemplate the welfare futures of these two countries in the light of the 
different approaches adopted by the social forces to champion the cause of the poor 
and the dispossessed. 
1.8. Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
By virtue of its comparative research approach, this study is confronted by various 
limitations. Comparative historical studies have the propensity to study a small selection of 
cases, which at times does not make it possible to draw inferences that can have a wider 
generalisation impact on the subject that is under consideration. This study investigated the 
welfare paradigms of South Africa and Mauritius, with particular focus on the role of social 
forces within the broader scheme of the evolution of social policy over time. While it is 
appreciated that a single case study can never be enough to make generalisations, that this 
study explored two cases still does not compensate for that shortcoming. This problem is 
further compounded by the fact that this study looks at the welfare regimes in the 
aforementioned two countries as a unit of analysis. As a result, the researcher was 
prompted to decipher the factors that have given shape to the current welfare 
arrangements in both countries as opposed to drawing conclusions that might make any 
suggestions about the modus operandi of welfare states in Africa and the global South at 
large. As Dennis Forcese and Stephen Richer put it, comparative research increases the 
“possibility of idiosyncratic information”130. As such, this study has instead sought to deepen 
our understanding of theory, including the intricate socio-political and socioeconomic 
dynamics that account for the welfare paradigms in these countries as individual cases, 
albeit taking the comparative approach. Although the limitations of this study are noted in 
so far as the case study approach is concerned, the findings nevertheless provide clues 
regarding the structural weaknesses that beset the welfare paradigms in the global South, 
albeit inconclusively. 
  I am aware that a lot more cases could have been used in this study in an effort to 
draw more solid conclusions beyond the analytical confines of the two cases in question. It 
is clear, however, that an approach entailing a large number of cases would have called in 
the use of a conventional statistical approach to account for welfare outcomes in these 
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countries. In that regard, statistical tools would perhaps have been useful, for instance to 
account inter alia for patterns of public expenditure and social phenomena. However, the 
statistical approach angle would have changed the objective of this study, which is to 
provide a detailed explanation of historical social phenomena that would be impossible to 
do with a large number of cases. Since the task of discovering general causal theoretical 
constructions falls outside the scope of this research, this study offers no more than 
illustrations demonstrating the fruitfulness and shortcomings of theories. 
Adding to the limitations of this study is the design insofar as interviews and 
observations are concerned. Although playing a triangulation role, the interviews only 
served as supplementary tools to deepen the researcher’s understanding of the dynamics at 
play. There was no compulsion to integrate the insights of respondents in this study, even 
though some were incorporated in some of the discussions. In fact, travelling to Mauritius 
was inspired by the need to experience the welfare state in operation from observation 
point of view. Interviews served mainly as complementary additions to the secondary data 
and information on Mauritius that I had become acquainted with. 
Lastly, the notion of the welfare state can be analysed from a gamut of areas, 
including health care, education and various social assistance programmes. Due to the 
limited scope of this research, which centred on old-age pensions, it was not possible to pay 
attention to other sectors of the welfare state apart from mentioning them in passing to 
highlight the general picture of the state of progress.  
1.9. Overview of the Argument and Dissertation Outline 
This study seeks to understand why Mauritius erected a comprehensive social welfare state 
and South Africa opted for a minimalist and needs-based one. This approach will provide 
leads to understanding the emergence of old-age pensions in the social development sector, 
which will then serve as the focal point of analysis within the broader context of the 
socioeconomic and socio-political dynamics that propelled them. Pensions, more than other 
social grants, are an important safety net in both cases, as they serve either as panaceas to 
contain the prevalence of poverty or as symbols of state commitment, which helps to 
dispense with social class distinctions.  
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This dissertation argues that South Africa lacked a mobilised mass movement 
formidable enough to counterweigh the dominance of capital relative to Mauritius. Indeed, 
in Mauritius there is a mass movement that is able to mobilise all corners of society to 
conscientise the ruling élite entrusted with the duty of championing pro-poor social 
reforms. Heralding welfare outcomes similar to those of Mauritius in South Africa requires 
the bridging of class divisions between organised labour at the forefront of the class 
struggle, and the large quarters of society that live on the margins. Unlike in Mauritius, 
where universal notions of fairness reign supreme on the welfare front, the emergence of 
the redistributive state in South Africa was not driven only by the quest to achieve social 
justice, but also by the need to retain stability and calm in a politically volatile nation.  
This study will proceed to unpack the dissertation in the following form: Chapter II 
provides the analytical framework for this dissertation, along with the theoretical 
expositions accounting for the development paradigms of South Africa and Mauritius in a 
comparative perspective. Chapter III quizzes the early industrial economic take-off in South 
Africa and how the rise of the liberal welfare state became a function of broader capitalist 
interests in a racially divided socio-political milieu. This chapter furthermore provides 
insights into the historical roots that formed the basis for future welfare outcomes. Chapter 
IV focuses on Mauritius’s early exposure to the global capitalist economic network. The 
various élite interests, enmeshed within the overall colonial enterprise of the British Empire, 
became instrumental in eliciting the subordinate classes to rise against the unequal system. 
This process proved vital for conditioning future welfare outcomes to become more 
responsive to the plight of the Mauritian poor. Chapter V recounts Mauritius’s post-colonial 
welfare trajectory, demonstrating the pragmatism of the left and the commitment of the 
élite to championing the cause of social democracy that emerged during the latter years of 
colonial rule. Chapter VI outlines the post-apartheid welfare paradigm in South Africa and 
the politico-economic factors that conditioned welfare policies that have yet to break with 
those adopted during white minority rule. Chapter VII revisits the argument of this 
dissertation in a concluding form and places the welfare debate centring on South Africa 
and Mauritius within the general context of institutions and the structural make-up dictating 
development paradigms in both the North and the South. It also unpacks the lessons 
learned and implications for future research.  
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Chapter II: A Tale of Two Countries: Analytical Framework 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the theoretical foundations underpinning welfare state formation 
whilst simultaneously unpacking the historical impetus of welfare state development in 
South Africa and Mauritius from a comparative perspective. It is concerned with how the 
nation-state uses significant junctures of history as frames of reference for asserting current 
egalitarian ideals. State-funded old- age pensions feature prominently in the 
aforementioned countries’ welfare policies and they have, as a result, served as important 
reference points for understanding state-society relations within the perimeter of social 
protection.  
This chapter poses the following two questions: How did South Africa and 
Mauritius’s historical conditioning shape the contemporary character of the welfare state, 
and how did this have a bearing on the position of old-age pensions within the contours of 
welfare? To help solve this puzzle, the chapter unpacks various theories that explain the 
foundational causes of the welfare state and the various ideologies and approaches they 
have adopted. The chapter also draws on the analytical framework of Richard Sandbrook, 
Marc Edelman, Patrick Heller, and Judith Teichman, who sought to cast light on the 
historical factors that gave shape to the social democratic welfare states of Chile, Mauritius, 
Costa Rica and Kerala. In this chapter, however, the aforementioned line of reasoning is 
taken a step further by not only seeking an understanding of the initial forces that set South 
Africa and Mauritius on specific welfare odysseys, but also grasping those salient political 
and economic features that are responsible for the current shape of the welfare state. This 
chapter opens with a section that delves into the theories that helped shape welfare state 
thinking, and the relevance of these ideological underpinnings for understanding the 
specific welfare paradigms of specific political and social contexts. It discovers that 
significant periods of history, such as the era of Enlightenment, served as catalysts for the 
way we understand the development of the logic of the welfare state, and how it has been 
conceived to serve different geopolitical and socio-political contexts across different time 
periods. It has been accepted that the Enlightenment gave rise to humanist ideals of equity 
and social justice, shaping beliefs that the latter could be achieved through careful and 
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rational planning, as well as through state intervention131. Other theoretical expositions 
showing a change of thought reflected in the anti-Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
schools of thought are noted here. The former offered detraction from the ideals of 
egalitarianism and social justice spearheaded by proponents of the Enlightenment on the 
grounds that modernisation of social institutions is too beholden to rationality and thus 
myopic in their understanding of social realities132.  
The post-Enlightenment thinkers, similarly, remain unconvinced by the assertions of 
the Enlightenment that there is a singular and unified lens through which to view social 
change, both historically and in the contemporary age. Nevertheless, unlike the anti-
Enlightenment pundits, the post-Enlightenment ones adopt a moderate stance based on the 
conviction that market forces need the direction of the state to fulfil their social function 
because on their own they remain grossly inadequate to rise to the challenge. A close 
inspection of individual circumstances should serve as the basis upon which policies geared 
to social formation and social reconstruction must define the welfare orientation. 
Ultimately, I show preference for the institutional and structuralist perspectives as 
resources to unpack the current dynamics of social policy in South Africa and Mauritius. The 
choice of these two theories is justified by the reason that they offer compatible tools 
through which one can establish how the convergence of social processes and politics drive 
the redistributive commitment within the broader scheme of comparative political 
economy. 
Section II offers an explanatory framework that exposes those factors, past and 
present, which provided the DNA for the welfare paradigms of South Africa and Mauritius. 
The resilience of the welfare state in Mauritius and South Africa, which have taken shape in 
social democratic and non-social democratic patterns respectively, evokes an interest in 
understanding its origins. It is in this section that I expose the concept of a developmental 
social welfare against the one of a classical social democracy in reference to the social 
development experiences of South Africa and Mauritius respectively. I conclude with a 
concise preliminary summary of the factors that spurred the welfare state in the two 
                                                          
131
 Zafirovski, Milan.: Enlightenment and Its Effects on Modern Society, Springer: New York, 2011, p. 43 
132
 O’Brien, Martin, and Penna, Sue, Op. Cit, p. 12 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
 
 
 
countries and how state-funded pension schemes have obstinately maintained a position of 
pre-eminence within their respective, albeit different, social welfare paradigms. 
Section I: Intellectual traditions and the idea of the welfare state 
The idea of the welfare state evolved in various forms across significant historical periods. 
The rise of industrialisation intensified the call for a statist approach to ameliorating social 
contingencies by the subordinate classes. This period is known as the Enlightenment, in 
which science, rational thinking and reason served as the basis upon which the nation-state 
tackled specific issues that came about as a result of the quest to advance a capitalist-
oriented industrial framework. Figure 2.1 below exhibits these periods of change and the 
philosophies that dominated each era: 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.1: WELFARE STATE THINKING ACROSS SELECTED HISTORICAL PERIODS 
As shown in Figure 2.1, there are many traditions that underlie the idea of the welfare state; 
however, they do not fall within the purview of this study. I pay particular, albeit brief 
attention, to the theories that emerged during the period of Enlightenment, namely 
liberalism and Marxism. This is because these two theoretical expositions remain key 
ideological foundations underpinning the policy discourse on social reforms across various 
geopolitical contexts to date, most notably in the South, where socioeconomic challenges 
remain commonplace. Martin O’Brien and Sue Penna class various theories explaining 
welfare state development according to various periodic traditions, as demonstrated in 
Figure 2.1.  
Neoliberalism qualifies to be classed under the anti-Enlightenment thinking. First, 
the two could not be more compatible. For instance, neoliberalism espouses not only 
extensive laissez faire approach to management of economy, it also advocates cuts in 
government spending. In other words, it detests the whole notion of the welfare state, and 
Period 1: Enlightenment 
- Liberalism 
- Marxism 
Period 2: Anti-Enlightenment 
- Neoliberalism 
 
Period 3: Post-Enlightenment 
- Institutionalism 
- Structuralism 
Welfare State Thinking 
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unlike liberalism, for instance, it has no tolerance for state-led social spending, however 
minimal. Certainly, the views of the neoliberalism school of thought are in conformity with 
those of the anti-Enlightenment traditions. Hence, unlike the Enlightenment tradition, the 
anti-Enlightenment movement does not affirm the normative value of humanitarianism, nor 
do they embrace the significance of reason espoused by the post-Enlightenment thinkers. 
The pragmatic approach adopted towards welfare state-building, which takes note of each 
case as a unique case deserving to be judged on the basis of its merit, underlies the post-
Enlightenment approach133. Conversely, conservatism has become synonymous with the 
anti-Enlightenment’s utter disdain for social spending134.  
The structuralist and institutionalist schools of thought, however, have not been 
given attention by Martin O’Brien and Sue Penna in their book, Theorising Welfare. 
Nevertheless, I have deemed both theories to fit perfectly within the post-Enlightenment 
category. Hence, for reasons that will be discussed in further detail in the sections to follow, 
the institutionalist and structuralist expositions conceive of welfare frameworks to be the 
outcomes of social circumstances and power configurations existing within their respective 
socioeconomic and socio-political settings. That these theories place a considerable degree 
of importance on the conditioning effect of social phenomena on welfare outcomes remains 
the primary reason I have deemed them applicable and adequate enough to account for the 
welfare experiences of Mauritius and South Africa vis-à-vis other theories. The possibility of 
the institutionalist and structuralist approaches accounting for welfare experiences over 
time was first hinted at by Esping-Andersen in his pioneering work, The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism, which explains the development of different welfare states in the 
industrial capitalist societies located mainly in the North. I argue that Esping-Andersen’s 
take on the significance of both the structural and institutional approach was in tune with 
post-Enlightenment traditions insofar as welfare state development is concerned. 
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2.2. Liberalism  
The rise of liberalism was marked by three distinctive phases. The first phase (1830 to 1850) 
was characterised by antagonistic attitudes towards egalitarian ideals135. During this period, 
private ownership of property reigned supreme and it ushered in the notion of 
individualistic ownership over collective sharing of resources136. The second phase of 
liberalism (1860 to 1914) was more sensitive to the social cause and it espoused a socially 
interventionist political role137. However, it believed in the case work approach, which 
provided minimal public assistance upon ascertaining family needs. The third phase of 
liberalism (1914 onwards) was dominated by the Keynesian orthodoxy of John Maynard 
Keynes, who believed explicitly in the increased role of the state as the guarantor of social 
order and as safeguard against social inequalities. This wave believed that social tensions 
were naturally symptomatic of social inequalities; nevertheless, they should not be 
attributed to inequalities of capitalism. Instead, a moral-based approach should assume pre-
eminence to allow for the allocation of resources to previously neglected communities138.  
Much as the socioeconomic equilibrium extrapolated by John Maynard Keynes never 
materialised in any capitalist society, it is best to examine the reasons for this propensity. 
Liberalism has never envisaged substantive equity139. The Keynesian welfare state seeks to 
distribute the poor’s income amongst the poor, and redistributing the total wealth of 
society has never been its goal. On the other hand, redistribution of income amongst the 
working class remains its primary purpose and no political structure should seek to tamper 
with the wealth of the rich140. 
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2.3. Marxism 
Although supporting the egalitarian cause, Marxists view the welfare state with great 
suspicion141. To them, the ‘evils’ of capitalism are hidden behind the pretext of dispersion of 
public goods142. Ian Gough has expressed similar sentiments by contending that welfare 
benefits serve merely as a function of capital accumulation – only in disguise143. In this sense 
it is contended that the state can only be empowered to spearhead the pro-poor agenda if it 
gains total control of the economy, as opposed to when the market calls the shots. The 
reason Marxists want the state at the forefront of the social reformist agenda is because 
they perceive the capitalist mode of economic control grossly unreliable and 
unsustainable144. This in itself creates even the more reason why state control of the 
economy is paramount so that it can protect the working poor against risks during periods 
of economic uncertainty. 
The next section outlines the theoretical expositions of the structuralist and 
institutionalist schools of thought in detail. 
2.4. The Structuralist and Institutionalist Perspectives 
2.4.1. The Structuralist Perspective 
The structuralist approach is concerned with comprehending holistically the logic of 
development145. Since it is the system that ‘wills’, what happens therefore is understood as 
a necessary tool for fulfilling the purpose of reproducing society and economy. The 
structuralist approach is also concerned with comparing the similarities of nation-states as 
opposed to differences – particularly from levels or depths of industrialisation – and the 
degree of capitalist development146. It therefore makes an explicit link between 
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industrialisation and social policy and the mutually-reinforcing nature of the two ideals. 
Coming to rise in the aftermath of the structural crisis of the 1930s, it popularised the 
importance of the Keynesian approach of state interventionism before its peak in the post-
WWII period as neo-Marxist theorists sought to explain the advanced capitalist state and 
state spending147. Joel A Devine views the increase in public expenditure as a response to 
the maturity of industrialisation148. As such, structuralists promote the importance of social 
policy for the reason that the market is incapable of fulfilling the role of dispensing welfare 
benefits to persons not having a connection to formal economic activity149.  
Similarly, structuralists posit that the very same industrial societies – which ought to 
be pursuing social reforms – can be inclined to espouse less egalitarian ideals or even 
jettison them during various phases of industrialisation. In this case structuralists argue that 
market forces are not entirely to blame for the absence of social reforms. Instead, it 
behoves us to understand the innermost workings of the State in carrying out its mandate of 
governance as the most superior institution. Certainly, structuralists such as Theda Skocpol 
opine that under ideal circumstances, politicians and administrators are the guardians of the 
State and should as a result act in accordance with its best interests and those of the citizens 
it governs150. As representatives of the State, these actors perform the duty of collection of 
revenues, centre of cultural authority, and enforcement of rules, without giving preference 
to any social groups151. 
However, structuralists are of the view that appointed and elected officials are prone 
to falling into the trap of advancing their own interests, and consequently put in place 
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policies that will further those interests, or at least protect them152. Because of these 
tendencies, the State turns out to be the centre of contestations in which various domestic 
and international political competitors seek to infiltrate and eventually swell the ranks of 
state power, either indirectly or otherwise. When such instances occur, Skocpol posits that 
it falls on the political office bearers and appointed officials to have these power struggles 
resolved by using capacities of the state available at their disposal153. Should the State be in 
short of existing (or adaptable) capacities to implement given lines of policies, political 
leaders tend to be less likely to pursue them. Likewise, such leaders can be inclined to 
implement new policy initiatives if the capacities of state organisations are be readapted 
and reworked to carry out functions that will bring advantages to themselves in the struggle 
with political competitors, which might take place either at home or on the international 
stage154.  
The preceding suggests that through an efficient and well-functioning bureaucracy, 
the welfare state can step in to correct these flaws. The theory accommodates the 
traditions of structural Marxists, who posit that the welfare state can only become a reality 
if socially grounded political movements take up the reigns of the state. Structural Marxists 
hold strong a conviction that such developments would ensure that the state avoids the 
folly of doing the bidding of capital155. The essence of the theory is that power is structural, 
and that the state is somewhat incapable of escaping the pressure of the powerful few who 
wield disproportionate amount of influence in the domain of policy making156. 
Neo-Marxist scholars have thus rejected the orthodox Marxist determinism 
contending that the contemporary capitalist state displays a sizeable degree of autonomy 
from the economic base as well as the dominance of any particular class157. Whilst 
advancing the relative autonomy thesis, and historical significance of various impulses, 
structuralists shy away from the idea of a neutral and the “technical-administrative” state 
assuming greater autonomy above class society158. Instead the state tends to be regarded as 
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an “active refraction” of class society with mechanisms of response that are conditioned by 
historical evolution of class relations to dictate the limits and likelihood of state involvement 
as well as direction thereof159.  
Bearing in mind that certain apparatus of the state was created during specific 
historical periods and thus reflects the balance of class forces at the time of its creation, the 
very make-up of the contemporary nation-state itself is fraught with contradictions. Hence, 
the state has grown to serve the interests of corporate capital, the working class, and state 
bureaucrats themselves. Due to the historical layout of the politically mediated 
“structuration” of intra- and inter-class relations, the society exudes proclivity to reproduce 
society at large160. In other words, the advanced capitalist state ends up becoming the 
embodiment of the interface between contesting claims of “proprietary and citizenship 
rights”, whilst succeeding in the reproduction of social formation161.  
According to James O’Connor, social formation is achieved within contradictory 
parameters of advanced capitalist states162. On the one hand, the state secures the 
functional sustainability of the market by creating an atmosphere that buttresses private 
accumulation. As a result, policies tend to be implemented in favour of the demands and 
distributive claims of the market. On the other hand, the state feels impelled to maintain 
societal legitimation. Consequently, it becomes imperative for the state to strive to 
ameliorate certain inequities and some outcomes of the market that might prove 
threatening to political instability and social cohesion by increasing state spending163. 
In essence, according to structuralists, liberal capitalism is one ‘odd’ system within which 
state managers find the platform to pursue their own interests, cognisant, of course, of the 
historical lines of division created by contesting class forces. At the same time, the social 
fabric remains fragile, creating a volatile environment that leads to the incumbent’s party 
being deposed. Therefore, instead of elections and political party behaviour serving only the 
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“gratuitous” role of legitimating the status quo, they serve the function of garnering broad-
based support for certain parties in a bid to win or tighten their grip on political power164. 
2.4.2. The Institutionalist Perspective 
The institutional approach highlights the importance of democratic politics in pushing 
welfare state development165. Since it affirms the belief of reconciling politics with economic 
forces, it argues that the adoption of democratic traditions in the economic sector is 
imperative, as this helps to restore the humanist character of the economy. In Karl Polanyi’s 
traditions, resolving the class conflict between social and economic forces is feasible for 
achieving the greater goal of achieving social justice. This approach understands that the 
logic of the welfare state can only come to pass on the understanding by business that the 
economy cannot be isolated from social communities and political institutions, since 
aloofness will result in the inevitable demise of human society166.  
Thus, democracy as an institution that protects majority demands means that the 
call for social reforms would be likely to take a serious turn as people become frustrated by 
the failures and weaknesses of the market167. It is in this regard that the collective aspect of 
democratisation conditions the welfare state to fulfil (1) the role of nation-building in which 
the extension of citizenship comes with social rights, and (2) in the tradition of the public 
choice perspective, the consolidation of democracy will propel intense party competition, 
which in turn will push for more public expenditure168.  
In more explicit terms, democracy as a political system that allows the inclusion of 
society in decision-making processes enables the creation of a society-centred approach as 
an instrument of the public’s trust in the state169. According to Bo Rothstein and Dietlind 
Stolle, the society-centred approach bodes well for the concept of social capital170. James 
O’Connor divides social capital into two forms: social consumption and social investment. 
The former form of social capital comprises physical expansion and/or enhancement of 
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infrastructure and services (e.g. the construction of roads, sewerage plants, and basic 
research and development)171. The motivation behind this endeavour is to enable public 
expenditure to generate profits by systematically moving basic constant capital costs from 
the administrative control of the private sector to being under the supervision of the state. 
The other form of social capital uses the same logic that applies within the realm of social 
investment, but it does so within the context of human development. The state assumes 
control of basic training and human maintenance costs, such as education and health-
related expenses, in the quest to develop a skilled and productive workforce172. The creation 
of political and legal institutions makes available channels that society can exploit to get the 
incumbents to honour electoral promises and to push for more expansive social reforms173. 
While democratic institutions are viewed as effective tools to change the levers of 
power, like structuralists, institutionalists adopt a state-centric approach in explaining 
processes of social change and welfare state-building. However, institutionalists purport 
that the State needs not only be bureaucratically capacitated to be effective, it also needs 
institutions, rules and regulations to preside over its everyday mandate of governance174. It 
is no surprise then that proponents of the institutionalist perspective prescribe that the 
State ought to comprise the administrative, judicial, and policing agencies tasked with 
fulfilling their respective functions under the auspices of a legislative framework.  
As regards issues cutting at the heart of egalitarian dispositions of some societies, 
institutionalists purport that institutions, rules and regulations govern economic production 
and exchange, which in turn have implications on the type of socioeconomic systems that 
ensue. It is for this reason that institutionalists make further claims that all states have gone 
through different “modes of production” – suggesting in unequivocal terms that there is no 
such thing as a “feudal” or “capitalist” state175. Instead, argument is that States are 
organised in various forms, with various rules put in place to assist in governing economic 
production and exchange. The following illustration explains the sequence about how rules 
formulated in the State policymaking apparatus give shape to the socioeconomic systems 
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that underlie social expenditure. It is reinforces a simple fact that institutions cannot be 
separated from the political context. 
 
 
Source: Skocpol, Theda, Op. Cit, p. 43 
Paul Pierson176 reinforces the message captured in the illustration above, asserting 
that theoretical expositions of institutionalism propagate two broad claims regarding 
welfare state formation: First, the existence of an administratively sound public service is an 
indication of a strong state being intact. This is indispensable since no efficient 
implementation and monitoring of reforms can take place in their absence177. Second, 
because of the influence of historical legacies, welfare paradigms seldom abandon past 
policies. More often than not they resolve to revise or continue with the welfare 
programmes of the past178. Proponents of the new institutionalism school – which emerged 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s – attribute the resilience of policy legacies to the fact that 
institutions tend to find other institutions already in place179. The public ends up being 
empowered to employ politically retributive methods to prevent the state from retrenching 
pro-poor programmes since they stand to benefit from such initiatives180. Certainly the 
collective role of state institutions and social polities in giving shape to social reforms 
captures the logic of institutional-political process. This concept is premised on the notion 
that policy outcomes can be influenced jointly by institutional configurations of the state 
and class, as well as other social relationships, but never once and for all. The reason this is 
so is because the state and social structures are constantly changing181. 
 In the next section I justify the use of the structuralist and institutionalist schools of 
thought as tools to unpack this study vis-à-vis other approaches that could have been 
                                                          
176
 Pierson, Paul, “The New Politics of the Welfare State”, in World Politics, vol. 48, no. 2, January 1996, p. 152 
177
 Loc cit 
178
 Ibid, p. 153 
179
 Hall, Peter and Talyor, Rosemary, C.R, “Political Science and the Three Institutionalism”, in Political Studies, 
Vol. XLIV, 1996, 939; and Thelen, Kathleen, “Historical Institutionalism “, in Annual Review of Political Science, 
Vol. 2, 1999, p. 400 
180
 Loc cit 
181
 Weir, Margaret, Orloff, Ann. S, and Skocpol, Theda (eds.), “Understanding American social politics”, in The 
politics of social policy in the United States, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 16 
State formation Political organisations with 
given capacities and 
operating needs 
Policy contributions of 
officials 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
63 
 
 
 
relevant. These two theories are in harmony with the post-enlightenment tradition due to 
their emphasis on historical processes as essential elements that have far-reaching 
repercussions on policy choices over time. Compared to the Enlightenment and the anti-
Enlightenment schools, the post-Enlightenment school thus places emphasis on non-market 
forces such as societal mobilisation to spearhead the process of reforms.  
2.5. Structuralist and Institutionalist Perspectives in the Analytical Framework 
The ideological overlaps shared by the structuralist and institutionalist approaches compel 
one to adopt them in tandem. Doing so allows the author to draw parallels from which to 
garner associational explanations by comparing contemporary processes of welfare 
development with those of yesteryear. For instance, the structuralists emphasise the 
methods of sourcing resources that will facilitate the process of social production in the 
complementary relationship of big capital and the state, whilst the institutionalists 
emphasise the importance of ideologies, pathways and traditions controlling the dispersion 
of resources in the ever-growing mystification of the state-capitalist order. Resource 
accumulation is important, but its redistribution is dependent largely upon the combination 
of certain ideological, historical and organised establishments. Hence, Sandbrook et al 
explicitly discredit the technocratic version of social democracy propounded by neo-
structuralists for being economically focused and paying less consideration to the 
empowerment of the subordinate classes in promoting equity. For Sandbrook et al, well-
mobilised subordinate classes can modify patterns of path dependence – a principle that 
underpins Sandbrook et al’s approach – and one that underpins the two approaches, i.e. the 
institutionalist and structuralist schools of thought. Hence Sandbrook et al lament that neo-
structuralists have yet to explain “how a growth-with-equity strategy can prevail in the face 
of entrenched and intransigent power élites”182.  
Compared to the other schools of thought illustrated in Figure 2.1, the Third Way 
and Post-Structuralism also come close to accounting for the nature of welfare regimes in 
Mauritius and South Africa. However, they fall short of recounting the full story, since they 
do not account for the unfolding of events through process tracing. The former affirms, 
amongst other functions of the state, to be the provision of mainly social security, but 
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stresses skill acquisition to meet individual welfare needs183. The latter describes the efforts 
of the state in addressing peoples’ material needs not to be borne out of altruistic motives; 
rather, it is symptomatic of power struggles between opposing factions in society who sit on 
the opposite sides of the ideological divide184. 
However, they remain limited due to philosophical defects engulfing their thinking. 
Third Way’s disposition only allows for capturing policy outcomes without providing the 
sequence of the dynamics that culminated in those specific outcomes. Its focus is mainly on 
the aesthetics of policy outcomes and it is not much concerned with the structural 
foundations of policy choices. Moreover, consulting with the Third Way school of thought 
automatically obliterates this study’s intention of cross-national historical analysis, as 
Mauritius’s welfare paradigm (compared to that of South Africa) falls significantly short of a 
conservative outlook to fit within the classical ideological profile of the Third Way approach. 
Post-structuralism does not qualify either. Its focus on needs and responses, as well as on 
political contestations and public’s power struggles, are the bones of contention here. It fails 
to provide reasons why welfare states such as Mauritius, with its impressive human 
development record and low unemployment figures, always yield to the public’s demands 
for the continuous expansion of welfare programmes when policymakers attempt to 
advance plans to retrench the welfare state. Where does it, then, leave the question of 
needs and wants, and what sort of purpose does such as a welfare state actually fulfil when 
it is no longer driven by the quest to meet needs? Equally so, what of the historical 
developments that dictated such a paradigm? Indeed, the pre-eminence of path 
dependence should not cloud one’s thinking into believing that welfare policy choices are 
confined to self-reinforcing patterns, as it remains incontestable that social policies are 
subjected to bounded change185. New policies may be introduced and old ones may be 
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revised, but the decisions ultimately adopted draw influence from policies already in 
existence, as well as being sensitive to the political and economic context186. 
It is also because of post-structuralism’s focus on the current changes of political 
power contestations and responses to the public’s demands that I deem the theory 
insufficient to meet the necessary threshold required to conjure a detailed picture of the 
evolution of specific trajectories in specific socio-political, socioeconomic, and socio-
historical contexts. Also, by highlighting political power contestations and the public’s power 
struggles, one assumes that the decision to increase the state’s social expenditure budget 
rests squarely on two actors only, namely the state and the public. As such, 
poststructuralists have lost sight of the roles played by multiple class forces and the 
interests of the private business élite in giving shape to Mauritius’s and South Africa’s 
individual welfare trajectories. As such, they tend to lose sight of the reality that, in many 
instances, various classes individually assert conflicting class interests and it is usually the 
dominant ones that enjoy the prerogative to define policy direction. Hence, in most welfare 
experiences, the rural poor may, in collaboration with the middle class, push for the 
erection of the welfare state, yet it is mainly the middle class who dictate the welfare 
direction of the welfare system itself because they have vested interests that lie embedded 
in the multilayered structure of the economy. Lastly, the poststructuralists seem to suggest 
that, whenever the public demonstrate grievances about the limitations of the social 
welfare budget, government is guaranteed to capitulate to their demands. Whilst this may 
hold true in instances where the public has developed a habit of exercising their voting 
strength to topple underperforming administrations, as in the case of Mauritius, in societies 
such as South Africa, however, the public votes more on the basis of race and the history of 
the political liberation struggle than they do on the basis of results. Indeed, the lack of 
substantial welfare reforms in South Africa proves the inability of public pressure to 
successfully push for changes in policy.  
2.6. Structuralists and Institutionalists’ Explanations of Path Dependence and 
Patterns of Social Expenditure Over Time  
The reinforcement of social spending patterns in nation states is contingent upon the 
structural coordination of the system of economic production in relation to social life, as 
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well as the institutional mechanisms that oversee and facilitate these relations. Political 
leaders in the upper apparatus of the state usually find themselves reproducing policies 
resembling those of old187. These patterns have a root, and for both the institutionalists and 
structuralists this propensity serves a function of path dependence. The logic of path 
dependence features prominently in the social development discourse and that of welfare 
state development across historical periods. Although subject to multiple interpretations, 
path dependence has been defined generally as the repetitive and continuous 
implementation of policies that remain beholden to past historical developments within the 
context of the socio-political sphere188. Peter Starke also understands path dependence to 
denote the extent to which particular policy legacies determine the boundaries and possible 
forms of change189.  
The political economy of social expenditure attests to the correlation between 
structural factors triggering the path towards the development of welfare states and the 
institutional incarnations from which welfare paradigms are reinforced. Proponents of the 
structuralist school generally have a proclivity to draw on Marxist traditions as frames of 
reference informing their convictions on welfare paradigms. This line of reasoning is 
propagated by the likes of Joel Devine, who contends that the notion of equity ought to be 
one of the primary concerns of industrialised economies190. In this case, structuralists hold 
the conviction that market forces on their own are inherently incapable of dispersing social 
goods to those exposed to economic risks, which in turn perpetuates class divisions 
between those with means and those on the lower rung of the economic establishment. As 
such, structuralists such as James O’Connor view the welfare state as a panacea that bridges 
these class divisions, and for that to occur, structuralists call for the strong mobilisation of 
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political challengers to push for the notion of the welfare state191. In his Great 
Transformation, Karl Polanyi asserts that the working class must be the vanguard of the 
mass movement in the quest to align capitalist interests with those of society as a whole192. 
Hence, in Polanyi’s traditions193: 
Indeed the secret of success lies in the measure in which the groups are able to 
represent – by including in their own – the interests of others than themselves. 
To achieve this inclusion they will, in effect, often have to adapt their own 
interests to those of the wider groups which they aspire to lead. 
 Edwin Amenta and Jane Poulsen194 echo the sentiments of Polanyi’s unified approach to 
social forces. They both believe that, in democratic and open political systems, the unity 
grants social reformers the ability to garner political resources in order to achieve political 
change. Ultimately, state bureaucrats will be compelled to espouse the pro-poor agenda 
and be assertive enough to advance social reforms through a socially responsive fiscus195.  
Leading the institutionalist school are Paul Pierson and Kathleen Thelen, who 
popularised the well-known axiom that institutions are entrenched within the contours of 
social life, which may obstruct the easy regression of initial arrangements196. In their 
acclaimed magnum opus, Varieties of Capitalism, Peter Hall and David Sockice adopt the 
historical institutionalism approach and contend that institutions have the tendency to 
shape preferences over time197. In this context they focus on firms and their implications for 
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defining the fate of national socioeconomic outcomes as a result of the institutional 
arrangements in existence. Hence, liberal market economies (LMEs) in Britain and the 
United States remain less capable of radically spearheading the pro-poor discourse 
compared to coordinated market economies (CMEs), such as that of Germany, because of 
different institutional arrangements steering the direction of the economy198. This is 
because firms in market-based economies barely tolerate trade unions and most are hell-
bent on seeing their subversion. In The Politics of Social Policy in the United States, Theda 
Skocpol et al show that in the case of the US, in particular, the absence of corporatist 
arrangements meant to bridge workers interests with those of business is attributable to 
the labour unions lacking the capacity to mobilise as a collective199. In these traditions the 
lack of relentless approach by the industrial unions has given American legislators leeway to 
pass laws that are conspicuously in favour of business interests than working class ones 
since the advent of industrialisation in that country.  
In contrast, coordinated economies allow for corporatist arrangements within the 
structures of the economy through which firms and trade unions are able to reach a 
compromise. In Germany, for instance, these corporatist arrangements have yielded 
reforms that champion the cause of the working poor200. Much as economic institutions 
play a role in perpetuating certain economic paradigms, Douglass North contends that all 
institutions – be they formal, political or economic – develop into an “interdependent web 
of institutional matrix” that underpins well-established norms and rules201. Demonstrating 
this interdependence, Douglass North and Barry Weingast contend that political institutions 
create rules for revenue collection and therefore establish regimes that enforce and protect 
property rights202. 
In the industrialised North, the reinforcing relationship between the institutionalists 
and the structuralists in steering social outcomes could not have been more apparent than 
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in Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany. According to Robert Cox’s examination of 
reforms in these countries, only Denmark and the Netherlands underwent changes in the 
social welfare sector. This is because the bourgeois-oriented ruling classes mobilised public 
debate through “path shaping”. This path-shaping process has been defined as the 
mobilisation of broad-based support for reform initiatives203. Whilst the Danes and the 
Dutch retrenched the welfare state, the corporatist welfare model of Germany remained 
uncompromised because of the centralisation of trade unions and collective bargaining 
embedded within the institutional framework. The unions’ participation in the main 
economic structures accounts for the inability of the German corporatist welfare state to 
undergo regression. In the Netherlands and Denmark, the bourgeoisies swelled the ranks of 
the state and ultimately weakened the system of corporatism. Due to the broad-based 
consultative approach, the ruling classes were able to get the consent of the public in the 
reformation of the welfare state. Through these consultations, the ruling class propagated 
the old values of hard work that predated the post-war welfare state in the case of 
Denmark, whereas their counterparts in the Netherlands popularised the notion of a caring 
state at the expense of the welfare state204.  
In explaining path dependence in the North, and the reinforcing relationship 
between the institutional and structural alignments underpinning specific welfare 
paradigms, a cursory look at the US welfare trajectory is necessary. Herein we put to rest 
the simplistic argument that the lack of comprehensive social spending in the United State is 
ascribed only to market forces swelling the ranks of every sphere of power in that country. 
While we do not deny the fact that unfettered free market forces hold sway in the realm of 
the economy, it is rather disingenuous to pin the cause of minimalist social spending solely 
on a single variable. For instance, in Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, Theda Skocpol shows 
that the emergence of a less benevolent welfare state in the US is owed as much to 
domineering market forces as the lack of proactive social forces and a national egalitarian 
consensus within the national polity205. Attesting to this assertion is a classic case in 
American welfare history of Civil War Pensions. These grants were initially dispersed to 
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soldiers but ended up being extended as forms of an old age pension scheme to elderly 
males that had the franchise in the North at the end of the 19th and around the turn of the 
20th century206.   
The question arises then as to why the Civil War Pension ended up becoming the 
preserve of elderly males with suffrage in the North and not rolled out as a nationwide 
scheme fulfilling the broader mandate of protecting the aged against poverty after 
retirement. First we need to recognise the importance of collective mobilisation of the 
elderly across various classes, who were too significant a voting bloc to be ignored by 
political office bearers in the federal government207. From that period onwards, civil war 
pensions turned into tools of politicking patronage in a patronage democracy, resulting in 
the general public detesting the system across virtually all corners of the US208. This dislike 
was compounded by the fact that late 19th and early 20th century America was the land of 
plenty, causing the general public to regard social spending as a waste of public 
resources209.  
There is no doubt that fuelling these perceptions was the controversy which 
shrouded the pension scheme mentioned above. Nevertheless, the negative public 
perception laid the foundations for policy makers to pay attention to pursing America’s 
ambitions as an industrial powerhouse, albeit at the exclusion of broad-based social gains. 
The social fabric too did not make this move difficult for policy makers to pursue as the 
public called for government to create conditions for free and private enterprise to thrive 
instead of providing the people with things they can provide for themselves. This is one of 
the reasons the working class championed “workplace bread and butter issues” as opposed 
to those of a wider social beneficence210. 
During the New Deal, however, we saw the emergence of a modern welfare state in 
the US almost akin to that of its counterparts in Western Europe211. Indeed the negative 
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economic consequences of the 1929 depression pushed for social class relations in the US to 
break with tradition. Whereas there was a great disconnect between the various classes 
before, the desperate economic times saw a collaboration of both the middle and lower 
classes. This social alliance was expedient for fuelling popular pressure that prompted the 
state to implement a social wage system that protected the poor against risks. This is what 
precipitated the New Deal after it became clear that business could provide for the social 
and economic wellbeing of Americans during the depression. The Social Security Act of 1935 
became the flagship programme of these new reforms even though it made provisions for 
contributory social insurance as opposed to a publicly funded one212.  
Indeed the current welfare state in the US owes much of its existence to the 
aforementioned piece of legislation. Yet it is worth probing the socio-political patterns that 
prevented the virtually non-existent welfare state from breaking out of its privatised form of 
social provision after the New Deal. That this approach lingers to this day is ascribed to 
working class mobilisation being concentrated in certain centres and not spread out across 
the US during the period after the depression213. This was compounded by the fact that 
there was a lack of labour-based political movements that could have added significant 
gravitas for working class causes214.  
From the foregoing analyses of the evolution of the welfare state in the North, it is 
apparent that the configuration of institutional and structural forces in shaping economic 
trajectories exposed two possible implications pertaining to the discourse on social 
spending within the general context of path dependence. First, social spending patterns, 
although hard to cut back, are subject to fundamental changes that might become at odds 
with what was traditionally conceived as the desirable method of addressing the plight of 
the poor, as in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands. Second, traditional social spending 
patterns can be reaffirmed continually, as in the case of the resolute corporatist model of 
Germany and the obstinate market-oriented social policy frameworks of the US and Great 
Britain.  
                                                          
212
 Skocpol, Thedam Op. Cit, 1992, p 11 
213
 Ibid, p. 49 
214
 Margaret, Orloff, Ann. S, and Skocpol, Theda (eds.), Op. Cit, p. 21 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
 
 
All these variations speak to the heart of the institutional mechanisms in place 
controlling economic life. As shown in Figure 2.2, powerful political challengers mobilising 
against the state’s lack of social responsiveness are paramount for structural social reforms 
to take place. They trigger a social process in terms of which questions are raised about the 
structural functions of the state in the event of society grappling with social and economic 
risks. Furthermore, they serve as a source of inducement for the ruling classes to pass 
constitutional provisions that make championing social justice the duty of the state. 
According to Karl Deutsch, “social mobilisation may even transform the function of existing 
symbols or institutions so as to turn them into agencies of group awareness”215. Essentially, 
institutions have an effect on the structural make-up of the economy and the quality of its 
response to the plight of those on the margins of society. Established institutions in 
particular generate powerful inducements necessary for buttressing stability and further 
development216. These institutions are important because they interact with ideas and the 
identities of actors and the relationship of distributional patterns of power and legitimacy of 
actors. New institutions, on the other hand, are costly and prone to trial-and-error methods, 
which render them unreliable tools for making general conclusions about path dependence 
and its implications for social spending217.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.2: STRUCTURALISTS AND INSTITUTIONALISTS’ REINFORCING CYCLE OF WELFARE PATH 
DEPENDENCE 
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               The influence of path dependence on social spending patterns in the global South 
follows the coordination of institutional and structural arrangements similar to those in the 
North. As shown in Sandbrook et al’s study of social democratic welfare paradigms in 
countries such as Mauritius, Kerala, Costa Rica and Chile, it is apparent that the ruling élite’s 
lack of response to address the plight of the poor triggered mass-based societal mobilisation 
that paved the path for embedding social reforms within the legislative framework.  
When the influence of path dependence on social outcomes in Mauritius is 
paralleled with South Africa’s social development trajectory, as shown in Figures 2.3 and 
2.4, the conditioning effect of social forces on social outcomes could not be more apparent. 
Where there is a unified bottom-up pressure/force transcending social class divisions as 
shown for Mauritius in Figure 2.3, it is clear that the push yields results that compel the 
state to spearhead structural changes geared at safeguarding the interests of society as a 
whole. However, in the event that social forces eschew mobilising as a unified force across 
the social class divide, as in South Africa and shown in Figure 2.4, the push for social reforms 
becomes less effective. Ultimately, it results in minimal pressure being exerted on the state 
to make changes in its constitutional commitment to meet its social obligations. In South 
Africa, laws have been put in place to get business to come to the party in terms of 
contributing towards social expenditure. However, the constitutional framework remains 
intent on refusing to move the current social welfare framework beyond its minimalist 
outlook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.3: STRUCTURALISTS AND INSTITUTIONALISTS’ REINFORCING CYCLE OF WELFARE PATH 
DEPENDENCE IN MAURITIUS 
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FIGURE 2:4: STRUCTURALISTS AND INSTITUTIONALISTS’ REINFORCING CYCLE OF WELFARE PATH 
DEPENDENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In the next section I shall be outlining the theoretical framework used to illustrate the 
development of welfare regimes in the two countries. I also preview the application of the 
theoretical framework as a foretaste of the more detailed discussion on different welfare 
regimes, and how these emerged in South Africa (Chapters 3 & 6) and Mauritius (Chapters 4 
& 5).  
Section II: The Framework for Analysis of the Welfare Trajectories of South Africa 
and Mauritius 
2.7. Introduction 
The previous section presented the philosophical underpinnings of the concept of the 
welfare state. It showed that different ideologies espoused and exhibited different 
understandings of the notion of welfare and how it is to be carried out by the nation-state. 
Whilst the theoretical expositions claimed no supremacy of one approach over others, they 
nonetheless provided basic conceptions of why the idea of a welfare state has been varied 
to suit various socio-political milieus, as well as why some are suitable to explain specific 
development paradigms. This proved that, in the Western capitalist economies, no uniform 
approach was employed to carry out the notion of equity and fairness. The erection of the 
welfare state in that measure was done in accordance with each country’s developmental 
experience, as the multifaceted structure of capitalism compelled different political contexts 
to adopt different responses to social challenges.  
      Structuralist Perspective 
   Institutionalist Perspective 
 
 
                           Prompting effect 
A fragmented and less 
effective social mobilisation 
challenging liberal-inclined 
social reforms 
Legislative 
framework 
echoes limited 
social reforms 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
75 
 
 
 
In this section I draw upon the analytical framework extrapolated in Sandbrook et 
al’s Social Democracy in the Global Periphery, which explains how the notion of the social 
democratic welfare state came into existence in the global South. These authors argue that 
the structural origins of capitalism, arrangements of class power, civil society and the state, 
as well as significant periods of history converged to cause a socially transformative society 
with its discourse focused on the advancement of the social wage. I adopt this framework in 
its entirety, with slight modifications made to indicate how differentiated economic 
beginnings begot a developmental social welfare model in South Africa as opposed to the 
classical social democratic welfare state in Mauritius. A sequence of historical narratives in 
this case offer a key to understanding the entrenchment of the notion of distribution against 
the background of lingering social conditions in the countries in question. Certainly, this 
sequence bears better resonance with the overarching aims of this study than that which is 
postulated by Robert W Cox in his book chapter Social Forces, States and World Orders. As it 
will be shown in the section below, Cox’s focus is on nation-states’ advancement of 
imperialist economic interests through the foreign policies they adopt, even though his 
analyses remains anchored in the historicist approach.  
2.7.1. Why the framework of Sandbrook et al and not that of Cox – or both? 
The subject of the welfare state is not at the centre of Robert Cox’s thesis on how nation 
states relate with each other in the international system, and the ambitions which drive that 
coexistence. Although the subject of the welfare state is tackled albeit in limited form in his 
analyses, it is clear that this subject is not addressed within the wider context of welfare 
state-building – be it in the North or in the South – and the processes that are involved in 
that regard. In the same vein, Cox pays inadequate attention to the role of social forces in 
keeping the welfare state alive as nation states grapple with the tricky situation of having to 
‘internationalise’ their economies and still be able to retain their autonomy. A geopolitical 
analysis would have been useful in this case, in which parallels between the various 
reactions of social forces to external influence in the developing and developed countries 
are drawn.  
Indeed at the core of Cox’s thesis is states’ fixation with pursuing national interests, 
which is reflected in the foreign policies they have come to adopt. To this end, the theories 
of international relations serve to underpin his analyses as nation states are under pressure 
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to strike that balance between state autonomy and internationalisation in the age of 
globalisation218.   This is where Cox’s framework diverges from that which is postulated by 
Sandbook et al, and invariably from the objectives of this study. First, this study is not 
preoccupied with the business of understanding inter-state relations in the era of 
globalisation. Instead this study compares the patterns of responses by the state to the 
prevailing social conditions. Also, this study is concerned with state-society nexus as well as 
its implications on policy outcomes in the long run. Secondly, the use of international 
relations theories would be at odds with this study’s intended purpose of unravelling the 
domestic context in so far as the evolution of the welfare state is concerned. Thirdly, the 
cases alluded to, i.e. Britain and the US, and the historical context Cox draws conclusions 
from, remain inapplicable to the developmental trends in the global South, including those 
underlying factors responsible for their divergent developmental outcomes.  
It is true that Great Britain and America’s imperial ambitions for global dominance 
served as a function to advance their overarching goals of expanding the frontiers of 
economic prosperity219. However, the same does not hold true for most countries in the 
South. In fact, most of these countries were under colonial control, and their participation in 
the global economic stage, was through the channels created by their colonial masters, 
mainly in the form of trade. So it seems implausible a logic to suggest that developing 
countries, with their very limited financial resources, contemplated pursuing such imperial 
ambitions as akin to those of Great Britain and the US.  
Regarding the imperial ambitions of the aforementioned countries, Cox alludes to 
the notion of pax Britannica – which denotes a peaceful period in which Great Britain 
dominated the seas and advanced her economic interests as a superpower in the period 
prior to the turn of the 20th century. The same logic applies to pax Americana, in the case of 
the US, in the period succeeding Britain’s global hegemony, beginning around the middle of 
the 20th century220. Indeed the economic imperialist ambitions of these superpowers are 
understood to have precipitated social forces in the defence of the welfare nationalist 
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consensus that followed industrialisation in those territories under the dominance of the US 
and Britain. 
Nevertheless, key questions remain unanswered regarding the character of social 
forces in spearheading the egalitarian discourse to form part of the framework of analysis 
for this project.  Firstly, it is not clear in Cox’s work what the role of social forces in shaping 
welfare outcomes in America and Britain was, after the advent of the industrial revolution.  
Secondly, Cox shies away from shedding light on the reasons Great Britain and the US ended 
up having starkly different welfare legislations even though both fall under the classification 
of liberal welfare states.  
Thirdly, Cox’s account of how these social forces protect the welfare nationalist 
consensus is unclear. Understanding the modus operandi of these social forces is important, 
particularly regarding the different roles they play in engendering variations in approach to 
pursuing the notion of social wage in both the developed and developing world. Regarding 
this issue, Cox makes the claim that social forces adopt a reactionary attitude towards 
international capital and seldom do so against national capital221. Cox, however, fails to shed 
light on why international capital is more prone to being met with opposition from domestic 
social forces than national capital.  
The alternative explanation, which is offered by Sandbrook et al, brings the debate 
about corporate capital’s relation with the society explicitly to the global South. They argue 
that the kind of a class compromise struck in the North is not the same as that struck in the 
South, and so are the conditions which propelled them. Unlike the framework of Robert 
Cox, Sandbrook et al do not explain state-to-state relations; instead they explain the 
national context. In their framework, they make a simple claim that the kind of convergence 
taking place between the social classes and capital has consequences on the welfare 
outcomes that are to come. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the fact that Sandbrook 
et al do not define the concept of social forces, I will adopt Cox’s interpretation of social 
forces in my analytical framework. He defines them as those social classes that champion 
economic intervention and social policy. The old forms of social forces were composed of a 
number of social classes comprising mainly the industrial working classes as well as the 
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petty bourgeoisie. These existed within the confines of the nation state and thus sought to 
influence social policy within those parameters. The new form of social classes, on the other 
hand, is not restricted to the aforementioned social classes nor are they exclusively confined 
within the nation state parameters222. In other words, social forces can have a global 
mandate with aspirations to have a global social and economic impact. The framework is 
outlined in Figure 2.5 below, and it shall thus serve as a guide to proceed with uncovering 
the intricacies besetting the disparate welfare outcomes of South Africa and Mauritius: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.5: EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
2.7.2. Structural Origins of Capitalism and the Global Economy 
Richard Sandbrook et al argue that, without capitalism, social democracy becomes 
unnecessary223. This suggests that the shortcomings of capitalism gave rise to the social 
democratic enterprise. Thus, the emergence of social democracy is seen as a way of the 
state to correct the flaws of classic capitalist economy without impeding or denying 
capitalist activities in the formal economy224. It is envisaged in this regard that, as the 
market becomes more unregulated, the risk of the underclass becoming forgotten in the 
economic scheme of things is high. 
However, different policy outcomes in the sector of welfare state discourse need to 
be understood within the broader context of the process of industrialisation. 
Industrialisation was accompanied by the mass production of goods and services, reduced 
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contribution from the agricultural sector to the economy and employment, increased 
population growth and urbanisation, and the emergence of a new class of producers such as 
workers who commodified their labour power for wages225. These changes induced new 
kind of social risks, namely accidents in the workplace, unemployment, irregular working 
hours, and child labour, low pay and insecurities in old age. Trade unions, either acting 
independently or in partnership with other groups, mobilised to take action against the 
state and employers to address these risks and other needs of the workers226. Even in the 
context of open economies, regardless of whether they are low- or high-income countries, 
the susceptibility to higher levels of social policy spending increases on the basis that 
exposure to external shocks in concentrated sectors of the economy intensifies the 
demands of the labour movement for social protection227.  
Both South Africa and Mauritius’s welfare traditions have their links to the rise of 
capitalism. During most of Dutch colonialism, South Africa’s economy comprised mainly an 
agrarian sector, albeit without an outward-oriented approach. It was only in the aftermath 
of the discovery of mineral resources, which occurred in the mid-1860s, that the capitalist 
economy took form geared towards markets beyond the shores of South Africa. The 
economy’s deep reliance on cheap black labour paved the way for a system of social 
stratification to define the social order of South Africa as the white English élite took 
ownership of the economy. In Deborah Posel228, Frederick Johnstone229 and Merle 
Lipton’s230 terms, cheap black labour became a key ingredient of the success of South 
Africa’s industrial economy, without which it would not have survived the test of time.  
Mauritius’s early capitalist structure, which entrenched a system of deprivation of 
the under-class by the colonialists as a form of amassing profits from the sugar sector, was 
made possible not only through the efficient configuration of labour production processes 
alone, but also by way of paying workers in the sugar sector poor wages. Over time it 
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resulted in the mobilisation of the underclass, who expressed their discontent by way of 
militancy and riotous tactics in a bid to compel the colonial authorities to take notice of the 
appalling living and working conditions to which they were subjected. Indeed, the 
mobilisation of the subordinate classes speaking truth to power, as well as taking action to 
challenge the system, would prove integral in the political success of social democracy. 
The commercialisation of agriculture and mineral commodities transformed social 
relations. Barrington-Moore proposed three trajectories in terms of which landed élites 
made a gradual transition to commercial activities and ended up collaborating with the 
bourgeoisies231. In this respect the most probable outcome to emerge is democratic 
transition. Where the landed élites are unable to adapt but still able to wield significant 
political power, they end up using the state to pursue their own interests, resulting in right-
wing authoritarianism. Finally, where the landed élites fail to adapt to the market and do 
not have political power, it leads to uprisings of the peasantry, resulting in left-wing 
authoritarianism. Whilst Barrington-Moore’s framework offers compelling analytical 
insights, it falls short of certain fundamental considerations relevant for the purposes of this 
research. First his proposition that the bourgeoisie are the custodians of democracy 
(insinuating that the absence of the bourgeois class inevitably results in failed democratic 
outcomes) blurs the reality that its role in promoting political representation in Europe only 
went so far – enfranchising men of property – and that it was the working class who became 
instrumental in pushing for universal suffrage232.  
In societies where the middle class emerged as a powerful political force, social 
democracy did not get a chance to develop233. It is very rare for the middle class to be at the 
forefront of the egalitarian discourse unless they need the support of the underclass to 
pursue causes that appear to be mutually beneficial across the class spectrum. Also, 
commercialisation is important because it created not only new actors, but also promises to 
give rise to civil society. The creation of new markets enables the formation of domains of 
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public deliberation outside the ones lying within the confines of the control of royal courts 
or aristocracy, along with demands for the protection of property through the rule of law. 
Moreover, the creation of these spaces can culminate in autonomous forms of ideological 
dissemination for the subordinate classes234. Equally crucial is that Barrington-Moore failed 
to recognise the importance of the consolidation of the market-oriented small-holding rural 
class, who were quite crucial in the emergence of social democratic transitions in 
Mauritius235. 
Understanding the emergence of social democracy in Mauritius must extend beyond 
understanding internal dynamics alone. Indeed, external economic factors also played a 
vital role in the social democratic trajectory adopted in the country. This corresponds with 
other democratic experiences in Europe, where the country’s deep connection with external 
economies via trade played a pivotal role in mapping out the social and economic 
transitions236. This dissertation posits on the basis of the empirical ground broken by David 
Cameron and Geoffrey Garret237 that the more a country is connected to external markets 
through imports and exports, the more susceptible it becomes to invest in social protection. 
Whilst these observations were made in reference to the experiences in the core, early 
integration into the global economy of countries in the periphery heralded similar 
outcomes. 
Peter Katzenstein shows that, whilst there is a correlation between external 
exposure of the economy and increases in social spending, small states whose economies 
are more outward tend to be more generous in social spending than their peers238. Looking 
at the Swiss and Austrian experiences, three variables are responsible for this pattern. The 
first is that the government steers the direction of the economies by heavily regulating the 
markets. Second, unions become incorporated into a strong market economy, and lastly, 
centre-left parties are often part of an all-party government. 
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Elsewhere, Peter Katzenstein 239 places the mechanisms of this propensity within the 
context and conception of class compromise. Indeed, the understanding is that, for an 
economy to remain competitive, it must invest in labour in order to hone the competitive 
edge of internal economies before it can acquire the courage to compete in external 
markets; however, in exchange, that gesture of benevolence must be returned by an 
amenable and productive workforce. This manner of compromise normally takes the form 
of the welfare state. This argument has been proven by Dani Rodrik, who has illustrated the 
strong correlation between economic performance in the OECD and the state’s public 
expenditure. In summary, exposure to new market forces is important240. These forces give 
rise to a new form of political and economic consciousness, which ultimately culminates in 
the state’s dedication of resources to causes that are redistributive in nature. Although the 
collaboration of the peasants with the urban middle class in the case of Germany resulted in 
fascist ideologies, Scandinavia presented a totally different case, as the collaboration of the 
middle class with the working class begot a social democratic outcome. In South Africa, the 
continued exposure of the post-apartheid economy to world markets resulted in a 
redistributive state, albeit a lighter version to the social democratic experience that 
emerged in Mauritius (see Chapter 6).  
What made the political mobilisation of the divergent social groups possible was the 
failure of liberal solutions to solving the economic crisis. Luebbert241 noted the following 
concerning liberal societies:  
Liberals’ reluctance to stabilise commodity markets at prices peasants found 
acceptable, their fixation with a return to the gold standard and the consequent 
deflations, their embrace of urban, secular, sometimes anticlerical cultures, and 
the liberal ineffectiveness that derived from division within the urban liberal 
community all alienated peasants. 
Hence, independent smallholders have a tendency to resort to rebellion and assert their 
political interests wherever they are exposed to the market without protection. Depending 
on how class alliances were configured, independent smallholders either rejected liberal 
economics but supported liberal politics (hence social democracy), or shunned both the 
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liberal economies and politics alike. In any case, the role of peasants was pivotal in 
determining the political outcomes of interwar Europe242. 
2.7.3. Class Power, Civil Society and State Arrangements 
Whilst neo-Marxist theories and theories of industrial society provide adequate 
understanding of the rise of social democracies, a comparative study of the welfare state 
has revealed that the rise of various types of welfare states can be ascribed to the strength 
of organisation of their working class243. This logic ascribes the successful consolidation of a 
social democratic welfare state to the size, organisational coherence, encompassing form of 
the working class, and the openers of working class parties to forge cross-class political 
alliances in a bid to gain political power. Given its focus on the provenance of the working 
class in relations and history, this turns out to be a balance-of-class power model that levels 
relations in unequal societies244. This balance-of-class power has had its efficacy proven to 
be of value within the perimeters of Europe, yet it loses relevance outside, even though it 
still remains theoretically sound. In this regard, Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 
provide incisive accounts of the trajectories of social inclusion and democracy that have 
been aligned to the balance of power in Latin America245. 
In the global South, this theory is difficult to apply given the complex revolution of 
class formations and the timings and modalities of working class incorporation. 
Nonetheless, it provides very important revelations: that the continued repressive nature of 
the agricultural élite and landlords towards subordinate classes hinder democratic 
consolidation and that social and redistributive outcomes are contingent on the size and 
encompassing nature of the working class. This is true in the case of Mauritius, where the 
working class collaboration with marginalised small landholders acted against the 
passiveness of the state and the business élite on issue of social redistributive reform. After 
many years of relentlessly fighting the socially unjust capitalist mode of accumulation, the 
pressure of the working class and the small landholding collaborators culminated in a social 
welfare state that submitted to the universal provision of social protection as the years 
went by. In the case of South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) has demonstrated 
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close affinity with COSATU in the labour federation and the South Africa Communist Party 
(SACP). This is so even though the party has evolved as a party with considerable sympathy 
for neoliberal economic policies, combined with a number of welfare benefits to alleviate 
poverty and correct the injustices of the past. 
What should also be of importance to the discourse is the quest to discover how the 
forces of the balance-of-power model apply in late developers. The historical characters are 
no longer exclusively the industrial working class, but rural lower class, even though they are 
not aligned with the working class. According to Sandbrook et al246, this modification is 
important to grasp, for it explains why social democracies at the global periphery focus 
more on social insurance schemes and accelerated social development. The prevalence of 
the rural lower classes has been crucial in explaining why social democracies on the global 
periphery have remained submissive to social insurance, with limited examples of “state-
orchestrated tripartite class compromise”, which remains the defining character of the 
European social democratic welfare state. Crucial also to the feasibility and sustainability of 
social democracy at the global periphery is the relative autonomy of the lower classes. In 
the context of the European welfare state, however, the working classes have forged 
relations with the state without compromising their independence. The developing world, 
on the other hand, has displayed a contrary path. For instance, in South Africa, COSATU’s 
close affinity with the ANC has put its independence under scrutiny, so much so that it has 
prompted the argument that its lack of efficacy to push for broad-based egalitarian causes is 
being compounded by its resistance to sever ties with the Tripartite Alliance (see Chapter 6). 
Due to the “overdevelopment” of the state, lower class mobilisation has made way for 
state-led corporatism and even repression247. This is rife in most Latin American countries 
and countries such as India, where selective incorporation is commonplace, whilst in the 
East Asian context development was preceded by state repression of the working class. It is 
only in exceptional cases, such as in Mauritius, where the working class has retained relative 
autonomy from government, as many are able to mobilise outside the exclusive corporate 
and political structures to push for pro-welfare causes (see Chapter 5). 
                                                          
246
 Sandbrook, Richard, Op. Cit, p. 183 
247
 Loc cit 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
85 
 
 
 
The ultimate result is that, in either context, continuous calls for social democratic 
reforms dwindle with time. It thus leaves this responsibility to civil society, whose efficacy is 
dependent on their vibrancy, and the quality and depth of their cause. The role of civil 
society in forging the social democratic discourse in the developing South has proven to be a 
sine qua non. Indeed, the South American, Central America and Caribbean experience 
attests to the significant role played by civil society in determining the pace and quality of 
democratic consolidation in the countries in the aforementioned regions. This is not always 
a welcomed proposition; however, as studies conducted by Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens248 show that the density of civil society is not quite the determinant of the 
democratic outcome, but rather the empowerment of previously marginalised classes. This, 
in turn, makes the working class crucial to the subject. In this case, civil society as the 
cornerstone of democracy becomes an indispensable force that creates platforms of 
dialogue for subordinate groups to self-organise and associate. It results in increasing the 
chances that these groups will turn out to be coherent political actors with an accorded 
voice to express their interests249.  
In the event that the relationship between civil society, the formation of the working 
class and democratic consolidation is established, social democracy is more likely to emerge 
strongly. The fact that Scandinavian countries have demonstrated greater associational life 
testifies to the close relationship between social democracy and civil society. This 
relationship exists in two forms: Firstly, the character of civil society serves as a determinant 
of the form of the cross-class associations to ensue. The more determined, organised, and 
uncompromising civil society become about grassroots interests, the greater the likelihood 
for its effectiveness. The Swedish experience shows that the rapid proliferation of civil 
society, such as the temperance movements, the free churches, the labour movement and 
co-operatives in the 19th century, attests to that reality. The fact that most of these 
voluntary associations preceded mass organisations (such as political parties and labour 
confederations) gave the working class in Sweden time to self-organise and become 
independent actors before the advent of electoral politics. Also a trend applicable to the 
entire Europe, self-organisation and the attainment of autonomy of the working class 
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served as preconditions for the rise of social democracy. For countries with a strong liberal 
inclination, however (such as France and England), the mobilisation of the subordinate 
classes resulted in the weakening of the power of the trade unions (as in Switzerland and 
France) or their splintering (England). This consequently served as fertile grounds for liberal 
parties to incorporate sections of the working class in the early stages of electoral politics.  
Secondly, civil society has a natural inclination to facilitate inter-class relations. This, 
in the tradition of Gramsci Antonio250, plays the role of reducing distrust, speculation and 
distributional conflicts, provided that dense and horizontally-linked civil society structures 
have taken form. The ultimate result is that it shapes the political behaviour of actors. 
Sandbrook et al assert that, “where civil society has emerged as a key arena of debating and 
reconciling differences, organised powers are likely to resort to power politics or even 
coercion”. 
The final, yet critical, piece of the configuration is the state. In any organised society, 
the state is the most superior institution enjoying the prerogative to regulate relations 
between society and state, but also to regulate relations in society. By virtue of defining 
institutional rules of political life and mediating relations between social groups, nation-
states are equipped to determine which interests are represented and the manner in which 
they become coordinated251. This makes the state an important part of any process of class 
compromise. For these class configurations and structural conditions to yield dividends of 
social enlightenment requires the state to be capacitated, in possession of infrastructure, 
and having the bureaucratic ability to accumulate profits and also to be able to make social 
investments. Such a state, according to Sandbrook et al, requires the Weberian autonomy of 
the bureaucracy and the embeddedness espoused by Peter Evans’s assessment of the 
emergence of developmental states in East Asia252. Effective bureaucracies are more likely 
to capacitate the state to intervene in social and economic activities without frightening off 
important economic actors.  
In the European context, statehood followed a long historical odyssey that included 
the development of legal codes, administrative techniques and other authoritative powers 
                                                          
250
 Cited in Sandbrook, Richard, Op. Cit, 180 
251
 Ibid, p. 185 
252
 Loc cit 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
87 
 
 
 
to acquire revenue over time. Citizens eventually surrendered their autonomy to take total 
control of their individual resources (through tax) to the state in exchange for citizens’ 
rights. The external development of the state in some parts of the developing world 
prevented these dynamics between the state and social forces. Colonialism not only passed 
on state machines destined for extraction rather than development, but equally left a legacy 
of a ruling sect, who would enjoy the privilege to “privatise” and inherit state powers. In 
essence, historical factors of state formation in the global South prevented the laying of the 
foundations for the differentiated, professionalised, rule-bound and autonomous 
institutions required by the modern state253. This is the case even though colonialism in 
itself can be commended for integrating the subjected territories into the world economy, 
which in turn played the role of forming specific state-building paths at the periphery. This is 
evident in the influence of the Japanese on South Korea, and the existence of vibrant 
traditional legal institutions in formerly directly ruled colonies of Britain. Indeed, the colonial 
legacy is highly evident in Mauritius and South Africa, with social and development 
outcomes attributable to the strong character of the states. Both countries show the 
utilisation of state institutions by the subordinate classes, or that advocates for social 
change wield a significant amount of influence for broad-reaching social reforms. 
2.7.4. Significant Historical Periods and Players: Political Parties and Ideology 
It would be inadequate to focus only on the factors that enabled the emergence of the 
capitalistic mode of accumulation, how state-building took form, and the calibre of civil 
society within the broader scheme of social democratic transitions without looking at the 
role of political parties. Intense mobilisation of subordinate classes is no guarantor of social 
democratic outcomes per se, as they are quite susceptible to inciting populist politics254. 
Political parties are critical for fusing ideological interests combined with coherently setting 
out programmes of action. Kohli illustrates how the Communist Party of India, more than 
any other political party, was able to tackle social problems such as poverty effectively 
because of its organisational quality, policy coherence and class base255. Yet left-of-centre 
political parties remain scarce in the developing world. However, whenever they are in 
                                                          
253
 Loc cit 
254
 Ibid, p. 186  
255
 Kohli, Atul.: The State and Development in the Third World, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987, 
pp. 144-168 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
88 
 
 
 
existence they tend to display oligarchic tendencies256. The ANC is one such organisation 
which has enabled non-consultative elements to reign supreme, resulting in the party 
abandoning its social democratic mandate as neoliberal political ideologies took over (as 
discussed in Chapter 6). The case of Mauritius, on the other hand, shows a political 
landscape characterised by intensified left-of-centre political competition given the 
multiplicity of parties that espouse social democratic politics. Enabling this outcome is, of 
course, the superior organisation of the lower classes and the redistributive expectations 
firmly entrenched in the social fabric of the island. Due to this pressure, even moderate 
political parties would concede to adopting distributive politics for the sake of making short-
term political gains. 
2.8. Concluding Remarks 
South Africa and Mauritius were poised to erect welfare states under colonial rule because 
of the exposure of their economies to external capitalist forces. On their own, the market 
could not have initiated social reforms, nor was the state pressured to spearhead such 
initiatives because of their collaboration with liberal economic forces. Certainly, it was the 
market’s turning a blind eye to the social infirmities afflicting the under-classes that inspired 
bottom-up resistance to develop and challenge the status quo. These incidents in South 
Africa and Mauritius became the critical turning points that paved the way for substantive 
social reforms.  
The mobilised resistance of the subordinate classes against the aloofness of the 
ruling élite unfolded in two forms: In Mauritius the workers did not singlehandedly pursue 
the pro-poor agenda since they opted to lead a multi-class broad-based movement that 
collectively challenged the complacency of the ruling élite in the social sphere. In South 
Africa, on the other hand, the workers were removed from society and they pressed for the 
state’s consideration of the plight of the workers without making a case for reform of the 
wider societal beneficence. The inclusive approach of the workers in Mauritius led to the 
subordinate classes developing into a formidable political force and eventually taking up the 
reins of state power, as opposed to being co-opted within the apparatus of the state as they 
did in South Africa. The consequences of these political configurations on social policy 
outcomes are telling: The uncompromised independence of organised workers paved 
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Mauritius’s path towards a sustainable social democratic welfare regime, which remains 
jealously guarded to date because of the balance of forces which remains tilted to the side 
of the broad-based movement that transcends class divisions. In South Africa, however, the 
bottom-up pressure created by the workers did not spawn bottom-up social reforms 
because the power of the workers had been compromised by their assimilation into the 
upper apparatus of state power. This particular weakness resulted in the creation of a liberal 
welfare state that kept state expenditure to a bare minimum, the remnants of which are yet 
to be relinquished by post-apartheid South Africa’s social development framework because 
political configurations remain swayed in favour of the ruling classes. 
Chapter III: State-Building and the Making of the Racially ‘Exclusive’ 
Welfare State in South Africa 
3.1. Introduction 
The development of the welfare state in South Africa during the first half of the 20th century 
occurred in a manner that was compelling – quite unique on the African continent257. The 
period of early frontier settlement of the Dutch sailors at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652 
emerged with a system that was highly dependent on familial ties and the doctrines of the 
protestant ethic dominant in the structures of the Dutch Reformed Church. It can be 
ascertained that, at this juncture of early social formation, the notion of the state serving as 
a safeguard against dire dispossession by the economically marginalised was quite unripe as 
a concept. However, it came to pass that, as the British annexed the Cape of Good Hope in 
1795, a new system of mitigating social exclusion was introduced into the socioeconomic 
landscape of the frontier. This change of political control introduced the British system of 
addressing dispossession in most parts of the Cape Colony, with the focus falling on 
rudimentary poor relief258.  
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The aftermath of this arrangement was the perpetuation of a class aristocracy that 
would displace the African majority in the process. This was premeditated in such a way that 
the displacement of Africans would in the process advance a capitalist economic order that 
would secure white interests in class and racial domination. It precipitated not only a 
peculiar form of social enclave intent on making stark socioeconomic class distinctions 
between the Europeans and the Africans, but also between different European settler 
communities themselves.  
The aim of this chapter is to establish how the coalescence of the interests of big 
capital, the mobilisation of social forces, and the ideological standpoints of the dominant 
political parties sowed the seeds for (a) the racial orientation of the 20th century welfare 
state, and (b) the pension-focused social development paradigm that prevailed under a 
neoliberal economic framework. It is hard not to speak of the abovementioned factors in 
the same breath when giving an account of the rise of capitalism and the state-led welfare 
approach in South Africa. Certainly it is as a consequence of these mutually cross-pollinating 
strands that the foundations of a welfare system characterised mainly by an old-age pension 
scheme were laid. This certainly opened space for pensions to serve as a political 
engineering tool to be exploited by the political élite in order to advance their narrow self-
interests. Eventually I argue that South Africa did not have social forces that were as 
powerfully organised to mobilise for a more comprehensive welfare system as in Mauritius, 
owed to the absence of similar levels of cohesion across ethno-class divisions. Due to this 
historic fragmentation, social welfare focused only on the group that mattered initially, i.e. 
the Afrikaners, as they were needed to advance the interests of English capital. Mining 
therefore carried the cost of this social awakening, co-opting workers in an effort to 
maintain long-term political stability. This stability became threatened as a result of the 
political marginalisation of blacks, causing the state to make concessions for blacks, albeit 
with racial differentials that still favoured whites.  
I have divided this chapter into four sections. In Section I I illustrate the capitalist 
economic take-off in South Africa at the turn of the 20th century as one that was based on 
mining. In this part I show that the predominance of mining capital in the South African 
economic scene displaced the Afrikaner peasantry in the rural areas, resulting in divergent 
developmental outcomes between the two settler communities, i.e. the English and the 
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Afrikaners. As a result, the poor white problem, which afflicted Afrikaners, is illustrated as a 
symptom of each group’s relation with industrially-inclined capital, whilst also being located 
within the general context of race relations of South Africa. Section II illustrates a critical 
juncture marked by the accession of capital to be socially responsive following workers’ 
mobilisation against unremitting economic marginalisation by the former. Indeed, the 
pervasiveness of the poor white problem provided a subliminal effect that helped detonate 
the uprising by those workers at the lower end of the pecking order against authority. 
Section III shows the configurations of class interests between capital, labour and the 
state, which connived to advance elitist interests at the exclusion of social causes. I further 
demonstrate that the incorporation of the workers within the formal structures of state 
power compromised their mobilising capacity to push extensive welfare reforms to 
dominate the policy centre stage. Lastly, Section IV puts into perspective the type of welfare 
state that followed these dynamics. It shows that it was a welfare state that remained 
beholden to a minimalist approach as a means to alleviate economic marginalisation, whilst 
market forces were trusted with the role of filling the holes. The reasons for the liberal 
approach and focus on pensions are ascribed to (a) the poor white vote holding sway and 
(b) an élite compromise intended mainly to keep political agitators at bay. As racially 
exclusive as the welfare state was, it was the latter that provided a stronger impetus to have 
pensions extended to black people in 1944 and beyond.  
Section I: Conditioning the Structural Properties of Capitalism the Divergent 
Development Outcomes within the White Society 
3.2. In the Beginning: Capital Accumulation and Competing Settlers’ Interests  
On the eve of the 20th century, South Africa had already developed into an industrial 
economy centred on its vast mineral deposits. The discovery of diamond deposits in 
Kimberley in 1866 marked the official commencement of the industrial revolution in South 
Africa, whilst the discovery of gold in the mining town of the Witwatersrand in 1886 became 
the symbol of the revolution259. Prior to the 1880s, the economy was in the hands of the 
Dutch settlers and was based on settler farming, which subsequently replaced the natives’ 
subsistence agriculture. Agriculture became the lynchpin of the economy and wool was its 
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chief product260. Be that as it may, the agricultural sector only became truly market-oriented 
in the 1880s261. The discovery of gold was followed by the mining sector replacing the 
agricultural sector as the main driver of the economy, owing to the soaring global demand 
for that commodity. Also, thanks to the foreign capital that poured in, two years after the 
discovery of gold, the mining sector was able to record annual returns of £1 300 000262. At 
the turn of the 20th century, mining had cemented its role as the dominant pillar of the 
economy. At the heart of all these developments is that, compared to Mauritius’s sugar-
dependent economy, South Africa’s entry into world markets was late and was not 
facilitated by its agricultural performance. Instead, the country’s outward market 
orientation was driven by its mineral resources and the mechanisms put in place to 
guarantee its success. The terms for the structural properties of capital accumulation in 
South Africa were laid out at this stage and they were conditioned to be socially aloof. The 
foreign-controlled mining sector employed laissez faire orthodoxy of economic control over 
initiatives that sought to advance the notion of collective goods. 
Mining was in the hands of the English settlers, whilst the agricultural sector was 
under the control of the Afrikaners263. What followed saw the rise to dominance of mining 
over agricultural capital, thus tabling the terms upon which the success of either settler 
community would be defined. The English were the captains of industry, and they were 
acquainted with the innermost workings of the mining industry. The skills set boasted by 
this particular segment of the white population certainly catapulted them into the echelons 
of economic power. The Afrikaners, on the other hand, were found wanting. They were 
either unskilled or possessed skills that were deemed irrelevant to the mining-based 
economy. Their modicum of training meant that the only avenues available for them other 
than agriculture were the lower levels of the state bureaucracy, education, the legal 
profession and the church264. Unable to keep up with the pace of this rapidly expanding 
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industry, the Afrikaners were placed at the backwater of the new economic establishment, 
rather than being on a par with their English counterparts.  
Exacerbating the slow pace of skills acquisition within the Afrikaner community was 
the reluctance of the Chamber of Mines to offer skills training programmes to the erstwhile 
rural white community, opting instead to import skilled workers from Northern England and 
Cornwall to work in the mines265. Even attempts made by the Republican Government in 
1897 to offer Afrikaners employment and important skills through the Brickfields project 
could not make do. Sadly, there are no figures depicting precisely the degree of Afrikaners’ 
involvement in the mainstream economy for the years prior to the First World War 
(WWI)266. However, there seems to be a general agreement that few entered the modern 
economy in any capacity and fewer attained entrepreneurial or managerial positions prior 
to the turn of the 1900s267.  
One must mention at this stage that the absence of Afrikaners within the realm of 
the mineral-based economy was not of any concern to them. Their lack of interest to follow 
on the footsteps of the 100 000 mainly uitlanders (foreigners) who flocked from the Cape 
Province to the mineral centres of the Witwatersrand and other parts of the Transvaal in 
pursuit of wealth had its roots firmly embedded in the ideals of Afrikaner Calvinism, as well 
as those of lekker lewe (good life)268. These two doctrines were the dominant themes in the 
history of Afrikaner civilisation. Afrikaner civilisation espoused individual freedom and the 
refusal to pledge allegiance to a foreign power. Other themes included belief in 
selectiveness and predestination, as well as that material achievement was perceived to be 
attainable through adopting an industrious culture. These were the dominant ideological 
underpinnings that underscored, justified and validated their embarking on the Great Trek 
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that took place between 1835 and 1840269. This was certainly a valuable part of the 
Afrikaner history in South Africa that an ordinary Boer was unwilling to trade even for sheer 
economic incentives270.  
It was this form of contentment with their primitive economic methods and their 
contained social disposition that, at the turn of the twentieth century, proved to be to their 
detriment. As a consequence of their passiveness within the sphere of the economy, 
poverty would haunt Afrikaners like a plague, so much so that their plight grew in renown as 
the poor white problem. Although the problem of poor whites received official 
acknowledgement in 1902, the problem was first recorded in the annals of the Dutch 
Reformed Church (DRC) following the discovery of gold in 1886271. It would thereafter be 
brought under the spotlight at a church conference that followed in 1893 to discuss the 
same issue272. 
The harsh economic developments ushered in by the change in disposition of the 
economy caused what can be dubbed the proletarianisation of the peasantry. Capitalism did 
not only put the livelihood of the Afrikaners under threat (through displacing the 
agricultural sector), it also precipitated urbanisation, which was being aggravated by 
pushing Afrikaners off their land. The emergence of capitalism also introduced a land tenure 
system that promoted private ownership of property. Perpetuated by Roman Dutch Law, 
which was effective in the Boer Republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State), land became 
too expensive for many rural dwellers to afford. Moreover, the subdivision of farms 
enforced by the same law ushered in a quasi-feudal system in which the property-owning 
rural farmers would rent out part of their land for labour273. It was at this juncture that the 
rural society was divided into classes of the landed and landless men. Moreover, it was this 
system of quasi-feudal development that marked the intermediary stage in the process of 
class formation, which ultimately saw a number of ‘bywoners’ thrown off the farms as the 
development of this phase was eased in by the penetration of the capitalist mode of 
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production entailing agricultural production on a mass scale. It can be said that it enabled 
wealthier property owners to extend their land ownership at the expense of poorer owners 
and non-owners. This new system that prioritised the privatisation of land ownership ended 
up restructuring farm production to conform to profitable lines274.  
The period between the turn of the 20th century and the early 1920s was marked by 
a rapid pace of industrialisation. Seeking job opportunities in the mining town to 
compensate for the loss of income from deagrarianisation proved to be the only viable 
option275. But at the heart of the matter was that the dismantling of the landed class in 
South Africa resulted in their emasculation and further reducing their power to inform social 
reform advocacy. This, of course, contrasts starkly with the Mauritian case, as the repealing 
of laws that prohibited the underclass from having rights to land ownership resulted in their 
empowerment and consequently taking the lead in applying pressure on the state for 
dragging its heels in championing social reforms (see Chapter 4).  
3.2.1. The Problem of Poor White-ism and White Civilisation 
The persistence of poverty amongst the rural whites constituted a direct assault on the 
concept of white civilisation. At the onset one must make two important distinctions that 
underlie the analysis of capitalism within the wider scheme of race relations in South Africa. 
First, white civilisation should be distinguished from white supremacy, even though the two 
were mutually reinforcing. White civilisation denoted the validation of white-ism as a higher 
class above that of blacks. In other words, it was a system of social ownership, one which 
reinforced the supremacy of the controlling or dominant group over the marginalised black 
majority. Frederick Johnstone conceived white supremacy to be a representative of a 
system of power that transcended the social, political and economic planes of the 
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country276. As such, whites imposed their superiority on blacks, whilst blacks would in turn 
be compelled to accept their marginalised status and thus invariably were expected to be 
subservient to the entire power structure.  
The poor white problem became an indisputable reality, with figures showing that 
hundreds of thousands of whites in the rural areas had their livelihoods compromised due 
to an absence of income and the dismantling of the kinship structure to provide material 
support. In reality, the big fuss over the economic despondency of poor whites concerned 
the question of the notion of whites as a superior race, since the plight of the latter had 
rendered them indistinguishable in status from ‘inferior’ blacks. The creation of the Union 
Government in 1910 culminated in the passing of colour bar laws, which sought to 
guarantee high wages for whites on the basis of skin colour, whilst black workers were not 
entitled protection of any kind. This resulted in the cost of unskilled white labour becoming 
17.5 times higher than that of blacks. Mining houses therefore were prompted to flout 
labour laws by showing preference for black workers over their unskilled white counterparts 
in a bid to minimise production costs277.  
In the next section I depict the labour unrest of organised unskilled white workers in 
the mines in 1922. It was certainly a response to the nonchalant attitude of mining capital, 
and certainly one that marked the defining moment that pushed the state to put the pro-
poor white agenda on the policy centre stage. Indeed, the labour unrest marked a critical 
juncture as it exposed the holes in the system, their implications for state legitimacy, and 
finally elicited the response of the ruling classes to fill these gaps.  
Section II: Critical Junctures and Workers’ Resistance to Economic Marginalisation 
3.3. Workers’ Resistance to Capital and the Quest for a Social Consciousness 
It was the mining houses’ decision to lay off 2 000 unskilled white mineworkers in the Rand 
which ended up triggering the violent industrial mass action in 1922 in which 153 people 
died at the hands of the police. This brutal onslaught on those who challenged the status 
quo was repeated in Marikana in 2012, because the ANC government, just like the SAP 
government under Smuts, was intent on protecting its mining interests (see Chapter 6). But 
                                                          
276
 Johnstone, Frederick, Op. Cit, 1970, p. 124 
277
 Ibid, p. 135 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
97 
 
 
 
what it did most was lay bare the grievances of the white mineworkers, which presented 
itself as the final opportunity to be exploited by opposition parties to depose the sitting 
government in the general elections of 1924. Indeed, no period during South Africa’s early 
phase of capitalist-based economy presented a critical juncture moment better than that 
elicited by the industrial action of 1922. It was not only a blatant demonstration of the 
resilience of those who dared challenge the status quo, it also ushered in a series of changes 
in the state’s policy outlook, cutting across social, political and economic planes.  
Chief amongst these was a political alliance of the Labour Party and the National 
Party which resolved to overlook contrasting ideological backgrounds with the goal of 
unseating the South African Party-led government for its sympathetic stance towards 
mining interests278. That the NP and the LP would ignore their differences for political 
expediency was a culmination of a chain of events that served as the telltale signs of 
political victory if properly taken advantage of. From the Van Ryn Deep Strike in 1917, to 
that fateful industrial action in 1922, the new coalition partners would use to their own 
advantage the failure of the State to attend to the structural weaknesses of the system of 
production. Certainly, the 1922 labour onslaught served as the final straw. With Smuts 
already unpopular for his anglophile, thus pro-capital, attitude in Afrikaner quarters, his 
handling of the riot helped create a political constituency opposing his administration. 
In a desperate attempt to wipe off the humiliation of poor white-ism, the Pact 
Government under Hertzog enacted tighter mining legislation, which became known as the 
civilised labour policy. Hertzog defined civilised labour as “all work done by people whose 
standards of living generally recognised as decent from a white person’s point of view”. In 
contrast, it referred to the “work performed by persons whose goal is restricted to the mere 
necessities of life in accordance with the ideas of undeveloped and savage people”. These 
pieces of legislation were the Industrial Conciliation Act (or Wages Act) of 1924 – passed just 
before the end of Smuts’s tenure – and the Jobs Reservation Act of 1926, passed under the 
Pact. These new rules were all designed to enforce stricter compliance by the mining houses 
by way of providing job and higher wage guarantees for unskilled white workers in the 
mining industry. These dynamics are captured in Figure 3.1 below. 
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FIGURE 3.1: AVERAGE BLACK AND WHITE WAGES PROPORTIONAL TO AVERAGE ALLOWABLE WAGE 
Source: Davies, Robert, Op. Cit, p. 52 
 
FIGURE 3.2: AVERAGE WAGES OF BLACK AND WHITE MINEWORKERS PROPORTIONAL TO SURPLUS 
CONTRIBUTION 
Source: Davies, Robert, Op. Cit, p. 53 
As shown in Figure 3.2, this pattern of exploitation persisted throughout the epoch 
of mining-based industrialisation in South Africa under white minority rule. Such was the 
case even though the surplus contribution of black mineworkers dwarfed that of white 
mineworkers quite considerably. The term civilised labour policy was eventually phased out 
after the NP and LP broke ties in 1933. Nevertheless, the provision of statutory safeguards 
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of privilege for poor unskilled whites was retained under the ‘cost of living’ principle of the 
Fusion period, ending up begetting the South African United Party (UP) (see next section)279.  
Against the background of the active class confrontations between the labouring 
classes and those at the upper echelons of economic power, civilised labour policy, which 
laid out the blueprint for social policy, cannot be measured as a victory for the subordinate 
classes. In the next section I argue that such levels of ‘generosity’ under the Pact were 
inevitable. I also shed light on how this false victory of the working class facilitated the 
establishment of a liberal welfare paradigm, and not a social democratic one as typified by 
Mauritius’s social development trajectory. The rise of the organised working classes to the 
mainstream political platform in the early 1920s culminated in the configuration of a class 
alliance between the labouring forces and the political ruling classes to define future policy 
outcomes in the social security arena. 
Section III: Configurations of Class Interests, Political Ideologies and Conditioning 
of the State 
3.4. Capitalism and the Political Class Struggle 
The Pact had the knock-on effect of having labour used as a proxy to advance Afrikaner 
ambitions as that of an aspirant capitalist class within the white social formation. Under the 
Pact government, attempts would be made to challenge the dominance of mining – the 
archetypical representation of English wealth – through state-driven manufacturing280. In 
this sense the National Party/Labour Party coalition of 1924 comes to mind for its 
precipitation of close class configurations between the state and organised labour. The NP 
was founded in 1914, with the rural areas being its stronghold. It was also a party of the 
affluent agricultural class from the Cape, whose wealth was derived from the success of the 
fruit industry and wine production. Whilst the political support base for the party was 
largely the rural poor, the agricultural élite and petty bourgeoisie within the party were at 
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the helm. The LP, on the other hand, was a party of workers, comprising members of the 
craft unions and the proletarianised unskilled workers who made up the bulk of the party’s 
support base. But even in that case it was the élite-oriented craft union members who 
steered the ship of the Labour Party. In other words, what appeared at face value to be a 
class alliance turned out to be the opposite. The NP/LP coalition was nothing but an élite 
clique that resorted to political class divisions in order to advance their quest to claim their 
share of the success of the economy. In the same vein, the calling off of the NP/LP coalition 
following disagreements over the gold standard, as well as the NP’s intolerance of some 
social democratic quarters within the LP, attested to this capitalist-orientated mission. The 
NP consequently jumped ship to join the mining-leaning SAP, which resulted in the 
formation of Fusion.  
Certainly, the changing make-up of the state opens an inquest into the implications 
of these transformations for social policy. Undoubtedly, the close relationship between 
labour and the state served as one of those colossal factors that compromised South 
Africa’s path towards possible social democratic outcomes. In Mauritius, the working class 
ended up assuming political power, thus defining the ideological orientation of the state to 
be favourable to the plight of the poor. In South Africa, however, the white working class 
served as an invaluable tool intended to win support for the NP/LP alliance, only to lose 
significance after the ruling élite consolidated power. The state’s new social consciousness 
reflected in the civilised labour policy was a gesture of generosity conveniently engineered 
to convince organised labour and the poor white society at large that the Pact government 
sympathised with the marginalised. This tactic is echoed in the ANC’s power-grasping tactics 
today, which rely on the party’s commitment to social grants as proof to the left within the 
Tripartite Alliance that it has not abandoned its obligation to champion social justice (see 
Chapter 6).  
The abrupt fall from grace of the workers within the formal structures of power after 
the Pact assumed control in 1924 was the bone of contention here. The answer to this 
inquest lies in the fact that 90 per cent of unskilled workers were members of the 
Mynwerkers Unie (Mineworkers Unions/MWU) – the South African Trades and Labour 
Council’s (SAT&LC) largest affiliate – and from whom the Labour Party derived a large 
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following281. The workers were a labour aristocracy who put workers’ interests above broad-
reaching egalitarian reforms for the benefit of the whole spectrum of white society. And 
since the leadership of the workers was being steered by the ideologues of the elitist Labour 
Party, there was a disjuncture of interests caused by the distance between those in the 
upper echelons of power and the rank and file. Hence, the leadership was unable to escape 
the trappings and spoils of power to lead ordinary members at the forefront of the working 
class struggle. This hierarchical wedge certainly resulted in the absence of bottom-up 
pressure to keep the state in check, as in Mauritius (as shown in Chapter 4). Instead, the 
workers were tamed to toe the party political line of their comrades in the Pact government 
(LP and NP) for the purposes of ensuring a successful launch of national capital. As a result 
there was a sharp decline in industrial unions, from 113 000 to 67 000 between 1919 and 
1926282, as well as a decline in strike activity to only six between 1923 and 1929 compared 
to 37 between 1919 and 1922283. All these changes in industrial activity underscore the 
premise that the workers’ close association with the state helped complete an axis of 
capitalist promotion, much like COSATU and the whole of the Tripartite Alliance have done 
in modern-day South Africa (see Chapter 6). 
The success of Afrikaner capitalism was closely tied to that of mining, since it 
provided the necessary capital for the expansion of industry. After all, Afrikaners did not 
have the capital required to kick-start industrialisation on a large scale284. Therefore the 
incessant pursuit of economic dominance by the Afrikaner bourgeois classes became 
advanced in the political terrain. Put simply, the contest for political control by the élite 
inevitably became a contest for economic control. As Stanley Trapido notes on the 
intersections between economic and political interests within the white Afrikaner social 
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formation, “Afrikaner economic [...] structures have tended to bolster, reinforce and even 
add momentum, to the drive for political power and vice versa”285. By contrast, the 
economic empowerment of the underclass in Mauritius emanated out of the quest to push 
a socio-political cause that would give voice to the marginalised and eventually map out the 
country’s social welfare future. The emergence of the liberal welfare state in South Africa 
mirrored the élite establishment on both sides of the politico-economic spectrum being 
ambivalent to the notion of the welfare state. The ascension to political power by Afrikaners 
and their eventual sizeable stake in the economy did not precipitate a sweeping egalitarian 
epiphany, but a minimalist one instead. This was the case even though the NP and the 
Afrikaner political ruling classes enjoyed significant rural-based support. Big capital, not the 
broader rural Afrikaner society, wielded a greater degree of influence on public policy 
outcomes.  
In the next section I demonstrate that the workers were again dragged into the 
political fray to settle scores after the 1930s, albeit along ethno-political lines. I argue that 
these alignments marked their final journey towards being fully incorporated into the 
apparatus of state power, consequently rendering their cause a redundant one.     
3.4.1. The Assault of Afrikaner Christian-Nationalism on Labour 
After the termination of Fusion in the early 1930s, the LP left with its vast union support 
base of Afrikaner workers. It was during this time that the feelings of being ignored and 
being out of place amongst unskilled workers reached their peak. The Herenigde Nationale 
Pary or Re-United National Party (HNP/V) saw an opportunity in the desolation of Afrikaner 
workers to use for their narrow political goals286. The strategy of the HNP/V for winning the 
1948 general elections was that of exploiting the notion of Christian-Nationalism to wean 
the MWU from the Trades and Labour Council, and by implication from the Labour Party. In 
this case, the NP took a swipe at the state of industrial relations in the mining sector by 
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downplaying class divisions amongst Afrikaner workers and promoting divinely defined 
cultural attributes. The object was “to make the Afrikaner worker part and parcel of the life 
of the volk [Afrikaner Nation] and to prevent Afrikaner workers developing as a class distinct 
from other classes”287. In the end, the weakening of the working class added to the 
weakness to mobilise for more comprehensive welfare than in Mauritius, where their 
strengthening increased prospects for extensive social reforms (see Chapter 4). 
The strategy worked, resulting in the NP winning the 1948 elections against (mainly) 
Smuts’s SAP by a very close margin of five per cent288. Although the political realignments of 
the 1920s marked the official incorporation of labour into the formal echelons of power, in 
1948 the resurgence to power by the NP sealed it. Similarly, the NP was intent on dislodging 
the organised white working class from activism and further making prospects of social 
advocacy becoming ever more remote than previously. The 1970s marked the peak of this 
strategy, with 190 000 workers being members of unions aligned to the NP289. As shown 
also in Chapter 6, the ANC would adopt a similar approach of consolidating control upon 
assumption of power. This was done by not only curtailing the social function of the working 
class through a more assertive method of co-option; worse, it successfully pitted civil society 
against each other in a bid to dampen the social egalitarian project. This was indeed the 
method of divide and rule creeping into the economic spectrum of South Africa, albeit 
manifested in a subtle and tolerated fashion within the guarded terrain of dominance in a 
pseudo-democracy.  
The emergence of the welfare state depicted in the next section mirrored the above-
mentioned class contestations over the control of the economy. This ultimately ushered in 
an élite compromise underpinned by the adoption of pensions to mellow the over-
dominance of economic imperatives, unlike the more developed welfare systems such as 
that of Mauritius.  
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Section IV: The Rise of the Liberal Welfare State: Pensions and White Civilisation 
3.5. Pensions and the White Society 
In a similar turn to Mauritius’s experience, the development of South Africa’s welfare state 
started off on a non-contributory note. Prior to that, occupational insurance was mainly the 
preserve of war veterans who fought in the Boer and the First World Wars, workers in the 
state-owned South African Railways and Harbours, and a small proportion of civil servants 
who made personal contributions to their pensions funds290. Apart from these occupational 
arrangements, poor relief based on the British model was commonplace and administered 
by churches. The nature of poor relief comprised indoor relief (i.e. in almshouses) and 
outdoor relief (i.e. grants in cash or in kind)291.  
However, under the Pact Government, the State became modernist and more 
programmatic in its approach. It assumed more responsibility in the sector of social 
development by passing the necessary legislation aimed at bolstering the social contract 
and eventually rolling out non-contributory social assistance programmes to mitigate the 
dispossession of poor whites. These steps were the outcome of the Pienaar Commission, 
which was appointed by the Pact Government in 1926 to look into the feasibility of 
introducing a “comprehensive social security and assistance system for South Africa”292. 
Known also as the Commission on Old Age Pensions and National Insurance, it emphasised 
in its first report the urgency to introduce state support in the form of means-tested non-
contributory old-age and invalidity pensions. The commission as a result flagged the 
inadequacy of poor-relief measures to fight the prevailing problem of white un-civilisation293 
(viz. the reduction of white society’s socioeconomic status to the level of Africans or worse).  
The breakdown of the traditional family structure of ‘civilised’ communities was 
already becoming ever more widespread, leaving a vast number of elderly people virtually 
without any means of support. Thus the decision by government to issue non-contributory 
pensions on a means-tested basis following the recommendations of the Pienaar 
Commission was hardly surprising. Certainly, the conditions that necessitated the State to 
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focus on pensions under the provisions of the Old Age Pensions Act in 1928 are the same 
conditions that made the post-apartheid government led by the ANC rely on pensions as 
government’s foremost instrument of keeping the scourge of poverty at bay (see Chapter 
6). After all, at the time the NP/LP coalition assumed political power, the economy was 
recovering from a three-year recession, with unemployment still on the rise and poverty 
commonplace. This reality was first highlighted by the Economic and Wage Commission of 
1925 and was reiterated by the Pienaar Commission, which found that about four per cent 
of the white and coloured population were unemployed, and that the majority of the 
100 000 to 150 000 poor whites were deemed unfit to work294. Thus the piecemeal 
arrangements that had long characterised government’s approach were to be replaced by a 
more organised and sequenced grants or pensions approach. This went on to lay the roots 
for the modern welfare state in South Africa295. 
 I contend that what sparked social reforms in South Africa, unlike in Mauritius, was 
not the stark socioeconomic disparities that existed between the haves and the have-nots, 
neither did egalitarian outcomes follow the plight of the marginalised reaching 
unacceptable proportions. Instead, what became the impetus for this social responsiveness 
were the unacceptable socioeconomic disparities that existed between the European settler 
communities, since the whole notion of white supremacy and white civilisation was being 
stripped of their integrity. This made room for the notion of white living standards to be 
politicised, which consequently made pensions one of the most important hallmarks of 
political engineering through which aspirants to political office could gain political favour. 
The transferability of the Pact Government’s civilised labour policy to the social 
development sphere comes into play here. Just as the civilised labour policy protected 
whites from the problem of unemployment, it was also intended to transcend the sphere of 
social development by having old-age pensions as one of its important components. In 
essence, the civilised labour policy was used as the basis to exclude blacks from being 
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entitled government support to mitigate the harsh realities of poverty. After all, it was the 
same policy that became pivotal in portraying the 1924 coalition as the true champion of 
the poor in the elections of that year. Therefore, to continue with the same momentum and 
to bolster its image in the eyes of Afrikaner beneficiaries, the notion of the old-age pensions 
was propagated as the ideal force through which the government could alleviate the 
problem of poor whites. These schemes also served the purpose of scoring easy political 
points that would come as a result of the relentless efforts to ensure that the white 
population enjoyed a ‘civilised’ standard of living.  
Political votes as the pushing force behind the social responsiveness of the State play 
a factor in this case. The Carnegie Commission of 1932 was candid in its observations 
concerning the prevalence of the poor white problem. It revealed the prevailing culture of 
dependence on pensions, since it had “grown to such an extent that it may almost be called 
a national malady”296. The Commission attributed the State’s reliance on pensions to 
contain the prevalence of poverty to the electoral power of “white indigents” in both the 
rural and urban areas297. The circumstances in South Africa were different to those of 
countries that underwent similar developmental experiences, such as Chile, Argentina and 
Brazil. In these countries the State’s concentration on contributory schemes and the neglect 
of non-contributory ones was a result of the industrial and electoral power being wielded by 
the working class and the poor, who had neither298. Conversely, the poor whites in both the 
rural and urban areas of South Africa, unlike blacks and Indians, who were excluded from 
the pensions roll, were politically significant and they had the leverage to offset the power 
of the urban working class299.  
The National Party was explicit in its determination to safeguard white civilisation 
through social spending, having remarked concerning the poor white problem that300: 
[i]t is a question which not only concerns the poor; it affects the whole white 
civilisation of this country. It confronts us with the question whether we the 
descendants of the staunch old pioneers, will maintain their civilisation and hand 
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it over to our children .... It may be asked whether there is poverty only in South 
Africa and whether other countries do not suffer from the same thing. There are 
poor people everywhere, but the circumstances in South Africa are unique ... . In 
this country, there is a small number of white against the natives, a few civilised 
people against uncivilised hordes, and for that reason it is important that not a 
single white person should go under... . There is no greater problem than this, 
because the existence of the European civilisation in this country hinges on it. 
This statement invoked a favourable appeal to the white segment of the population, 
especially those in favour of the NP in several Cape constituencies where there were 
concentrations of coloured voters. As soon as the Pact Government came into power in 
1924 (with the NP winning 64 seats and the LP winning 18 seats, against 53 won by the 
South African Party and one seat by an independent candidate), the notion of welfare was 
quickly exploited to perpetuate a particular racial hierarchy through the dimension of lifting 
up the white (and more ambiguous coloured) people, while in the process displacing 
Africans. It is for this reason that, when the subject of old-age pensions emerged on the 
politicking platform of South Africa, especially taking cognisance of the political significance 
of both white and coloured voters, that the notion of pensions for the elderly became 
gradually assimilated into civilised labour policy. As seen by Leila Patel in a similar light, 
“[w]elfare state policies and programmes [mainly pensions] have shielded white workers 
from the negative effects of the market economy ... . Under [white minority rule], state 
welfare expenditure for whites has represented an important economic and political 
stabiliser in government efforts to maintain white support”301. 
The reasons behind the government’s exclusion of blacks were mainly based on the 
fact that they were a politically insignificant group; hence, universal suffrage was only the 
preserve of whites and coloureds in the Cape Province. Be that as it may, government 
justified the racially exclusive welfare approach on the basis that fiscally it was untenable to 
put Africans on the pension payroll, because they were too expensive to be looked after by 
the State302. The State saw this as a step towards preserving kinship-based welfare 
arrangements, since providing welfare benefits was deemed detrimental to the whole 
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purpose of retaining the family-based and communal system of welfare in the Reserves303. 
In line with this assertion, and also corresponding to the findings of Carnegie, Tiffany 
Willoughby-Herard’s comments revealed that the “... poor white study suggests that 
racialisation of poor whites was essential to the consolidation of grand apartheid and was 
linked to the racialisation of Africans, Indians, Chinese and Mixed Race Persons”304.  
If the welfare state in South Africa was exclusively based on the grounds of racial 
supremacy doctrines and the quest to perpetuate white civilisation, what then explains the 
preferential treatment of coloureds over Africans and Indians, especially when it came to 
universal suffrage? The case for Indians is easier to settle, since the Pact Government 
planned to repatriate them back to India, as they were not considered bona fide citizens of 
South Africa305. As for coloureds, their political significance was based on the grounds that 
they were considered to be an appendage of white supremacy since, by virtue of their white 
lineage (and European ways of life), they were useful in perpetuating a particular social and 
political order without the need to grant them parliamentary representation. Indeed, in the 
Cape Province, a large proportion of coloureds were members of predominantly white trade 
unions, which provided an added boost to electioneering. It was for this reason that Hertzog 
launched an abortive attempt to extend the Cape Coloured franchise in the South African 
Republics, namely the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (OFS). But even with his pro-
coloured attitude it is not clear why he never championed for revisions of their pensions to 
be equal to those of whites306. 
In the light of this reality, one is tempted to imagine the type of welfare state that 
might have emerged had South Africa been a non-racial society during this period. Two 
possible scenarios stand out. The first is that the South African welfare trajectory would not 
have taken shape beyond the rudimentary British poor relief system previously relied upon 
to contain social exclusion within the South African social formation. After all, even though 
poverty may have been a reality of the day, there would not have been the need to protect 
the supremacy of one civilisation at the expense of one perceived to be inferior. Hindsight 
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shows that, whilst government came to the knowledge of the existence of poverty at the 
turn of the 20th century, it was the exploitation of the notion of white supremacy that 
became expedient to advancing the narrow self-interests of the political ruling classes. The 
second is that had there been mass mobilisation led by the landed small-scale agricultural 
classes that transcended racial boundaries, perhaps a pension-based welfare system would 
have emerged in the social development scene of South Africa, as it did in Mauritius. 
However, I doubt it would have started on a generous note like that reserved for whites 
under white minority rule. One must bear in mind that the emergence of the welfare state 
in 20th century South Africa came about as a result of an élite compromise in which the 
mining houses sponsored social expenditure in exchange for long-term political stability. 
However, that compromise was balanced out by the political ruling classes by not going over 
the top with a financially excessive welfare regime that embraced other social security 
offerings with the same level of financial commitment allotted to pensions. Expedient as the 
white vote was in the introduction of pensions, it was not effective enough to call for an 
expansive outlook beyond the liberal welfare state offerings. In the next section I 
demonstrate that political ideologies reigned supreme, all because they were a function of 
the capital accumulation project.  
3.5.1. Pensions as an Outcome of Political Ideologies and Capital Accumulation 
Convergence 
The ideological orientation of the political ruling classes in the early phases of welfare state 
formation had a colossal effect on the welfare outcomes. The NP, unlike the Labour Party in 
Mauritius, did not subscribe to the Fabian doctrines of fairness and equity in the social 
domain being carried out through state-funded handouts. Instead, the NP understood that 
egalitarianism was better carried out through economic forces and not conspicuously by the 
state. It is not surprising that NP ideologues considered social benefits a vice that was 
preventing Afrikaners from shedding their poor white status within the context of the 
economy. In essence, the NP ideologues were never in favour of the State taking the leading 
role in the provision of welfare benefits, but rather were for a capitalist-controlled 
economy. As I have argued in the previous sections, Afrikaners were not any less capitalistic 
than their English counterparts. What they lacked was the capital required to get early 
Afrikaner capitalist accumulation off the ground to the same extent as that of the English. 
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Speaking at the 1939 Ekonomiese Volkskongres (Peoples’ Economic Congress) to 
contemplate strategies to arrest the pattern of unemployment and poverty amongst 
Afrikaners, the chairman told the Kongres that307:  
[In the past] we also accepted that the masses who were unable quickly and easily 
to adjust to capitalism would sink into poor whiteism. Sympathetically we belittled 
them and distanced ourselves from them, at best philanthropically offering them 
“alms” or poor relief from the state. And meanwhile this adjustment process [to 
foreign capitalism] was destroying our volk by denationalising its economic leaders 
and proletarianising its producing masses. But in the awakening of consciousness, 
the volk have perceived this too and the new national economic movement sets 
for itself the goal of reversing this process; no longer to tolerate the destruction of 
the Afrikaner volk in an attempt to adapt to a foreign capitalist system, but to 
mobilise the volk to capture this foreign system and transform and adapt it to our 
national character. 
Indeed, it was at the same congress that the record was set straight in terms of what it 
meant to be an Afrikaner in the broader scheme of capital accumulation in South Africa. The 
congress culminated in the establishment of the Reddingsdaadbond, also known as the 
Rescue Act Alliance or the RDB. Unlike the secretive Afrikaner Broederbond (or the Afrikaner 
Brotherhood – AB), which clandestinely set out to perform the task of inculcating in the 
minds of Afrikaners the anti-imperialist and pro-Christian-Nationalist capitalist rhetoric, the 
RDB was the key driver for pursuing the Afrikaner economic enterprise, which had a less 
antagonistic stance towards the notion of social responsibility. As suggested by Janis van der 
Westhuizen, an aggressive sense of the Afrikaner Economic Renaissance developed as a 
result of the RDB308, although in a much more inclusive form than its successor, Black 
Economic Empowerment, which emerged in post-apartheid South Africa.  
Indeed, it completed the long-awaited epiphany of the Afrikaners’ conception of 
their role in the South African economic sphere as leaders at the forefront of enterprise and 
commerce, as opposed to being amateurs on the sidelines of the economic Establishment. 
With its protagonist stance towards collective social responsibility, however, the notion of 
commercial enterprise was prioritised above all endeavours with the understanding that, as 
the Afrikaner emerged from the economic backwaters, handouts would no longer be 
relevant, nor deemed necessary.  
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3.5.2. Refusing to Retreat: The Resistance of Pensions against Retrenchments 
Despite the popularity of pensions and the passing of welfare legislation in 1928, South 
Africa’s welfare regime, unlike that of Mauritius, was far from coming anywhere close to 
social democracy (see section on the working class for reasons). Certain welfare 
responsibilities except for pensions were still considered to be the responsibility of the 
church and other charitable organisations, such as the Afrikaans Christian Women’s 
Association (ACVV), which had been looking after the poor in the Cape Province309. The 
reason for this less protagonist stance towards the notion of the welfare state is agreement 
with the withdrawal tone of the Carnegie Commission, which poured cold water on the 
government for “pushing money” into the pockets of the poor instead of letting them figure 
out ways to earn a living. The commissioners, Professor R.W. Wilcocks of Stellenbosch 
University and Ernest Gideon Malherbe, espoused convictions that explicitly echoed the 
NP’s position on this issue. They charged that state paternalism was the culprit behind the 
poor white problem and, as its solution, they advised in favour of vocational training 
opportunities to be made available to the unskilled and unemployed white workforce. 
Hence, in his Psychology Report, Wilcocks cautioned against the negative implications of 
‘state handouts’ on incentives to work, whilst in his Education Report, Malherbe emphasised 
the importance of free education to meet the skills shortage310. The outcome of adopting 
these recommendations is what I conceive as the differential vertical distribution of social 
welfare benefits. By this I mean that both the State and local communities (or the church in 
this regard) adopted an array of measures to try to ameliorate poverty amongst the 
dispossessed, albeit that the latter entity operated under the auspices of the State and its 
various institutions. Hence, in this case, the Treasury was tasked with managing and 
dispersing the pension scheme, whilst the Department of Social Welfare was responsible for 
the entire offerings of the welfare sector311. This outcome certainly laid bare the fact that 
pensions were given more priority, whilst other aspects of social development were deemed 
less significant. That old-age pensions were defined in separate terms as other offerings of 
the general welfare policy continues to be echoed in South Africa’s welfare regime, even in 
modern times (see Chapter 6). 
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Certainly no period in the social security history of the South African welfare state 
during the first half of the 20th century shows the political significance of old-age pensions 
better than in the time of the 1929 Great Depression312. Indeed, the downturn in the 
economy coincided with the introduction of these types of social assistance programmes 
within the social development sector of the Union. However, the South African welfare state 
felt the severe after-shocks of the bleak economic climate at least two years after the 
abovementioned challenge surfaced on the economic radar. The State was then faced with 
the challenging dilemma of either scrapping these measures by substituting them with an 
alternative social assistance programme, or by simply exercising fiscal austerity measures 
that entailed budget rollbacks and the exercising of more discretion. Both options carried 
varying repercussions. But it was clear that heeding the former option would have 
constituted a case of political suicide for the political élite in the Pact Government, given the 
prevailing problem of white poverty that persisted during that era. It was clear at this stage 
of South African history that the Old-Age Pensions scheme had been assimilated into the 
social fabric of the Union so much so that it had almost reached a point of no return.  
Even against the background of this reality, government was under the impression 
that there was a public backlash against the pension scheme313. It remains unclear why the 
government harboured perceptions of the public being antagonistic towards the old-age 
pension scheme. But it can be assumed that, given the economic climate of the day, those 
with tax-paying power felt the most severe pinch, as the source of revenue relied heavily on 
their shoulders and those of the State. Hence the government lamented this issue of fiscal 
turbulence, with pensions costing the government more than £1 000 000 a year314. It was 
also the decision by the Ministry of Finance to keep public finances under a tight rein that 
discouraged the implementation of the Sickness and Unemployment Insurance as per the 
recommendations of the Pienaar Commission315. This new approach prompted the passing 
of the 1931 Old Age Pension Amendment Act, which made provision for pensions to be paid 
under a stricter regime, with pension payments made as per the pensioner’s individual 
circumstances, instead of the previously standardised means-test approach. Those 
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considered relatively well-to-do and with children to look after their wellbeing were 
removed from the list of eligible beneficiaries. As such, the pensioners appearing on the 
payroll declined steeply, with the number for coloured pensioners contracting from 96 to 21 
per cent, compared to that for white pensioners, which declined from 90 to 65 per cent316.  
It was MPs of opposition parties that supposedly saved the old-age pension scheme 
from getting wiped off government’s key list of intervention mechanisms. MPs capitalised 
on the abrupt anti-welfare approach, raising concerns about government’s anti-pensions 
approach as being equivalent to abandoning the right-based element of pensions, as well as 
reducing it to the level of poor relief. This is why, as soon as the economy began to show 
signs of recovery after the 1929 recession, opposition MPs intensified their pressure on 
government to relax its restrictions and ultimately reinstate the scheme to its generous 
original form. The accord proved successful as, by 1937, benefits increased for women over 
60 years of age to £42 per year for whites and £21 per year for coloured pensioners317.  
As shown in Appendix 3A and 3B, the number of pension beneficiaries saw a sharp 
increase, an incident met by increased public expenditure between 1936 and 1939. During 
the same period, the number of white and coloured beneficiaries increased by 55 and 44 
per cent respectively, with a commensurate total expenditure budget increased by 90 per 
cent. Indeed, during this period, the Department’s expenditure was dominated by this form 
of social security system (£2.2 million), earmarked for the assistance of farmers (£2 million), 
employment creation and unemployment expenditure combined (£3 million), child welfare 
£0.4 million), together with mental hospital (£0.65 million) and public health (£0.55 
million)318. By this time, both Africans and Indians had not yet begun to feature on the 
public pensions system. All the same, parliamentarians’ defence of the pension scheme 
from retrenchment in South Africa during the 1930s bears a striking resemblance to the 
collaboration of classes (the public and civil society) over half a century later in Mauritius, 
who through demonstrations vented their disapproval of government’s plans to retrench 
the welfare state when the economy was facing uncertainties (see Chapter 5). Only in the 
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latter, those activities took place in a participatory style, in contrast to South Africa, where 
they took form of a representative and closed platform.  
3.5.3. ‘The New Form of the State’: 1944 and the Extensions of Pensions to the 
Wider Society 
The year 1944 marked a turning point in the history of social development in South Africa. It 
was the year which saw the emergence of what Deborah Posel described as “the new form 
of the State’’319. This is because the social security sector was undergoing a sea-change 
because, for the first time ever since the emergence of the welfare state in 1928, blacks and 
Indians were being put on the pension payroll under the provisions of the Pensions Law 
Amendment Act of 1944. However, it was not without racial differentiation, since the 
benefit levels for blacks and Indians were lower than those for whites. Hence, pension levels 
for blacks accounted for less than one tenth of that for whites, accompanied by a stricter 
means-test rule320. Prior to being added to the social security sector in 1944, the State used 
to spend only four per cent of social expenditure on Africans (being £211 000, with 
£3 834 000 for Coloureds and £52 000 for Indians) by providing pensions for the blind as 
well as targeted relief321. Making concessions for special black cases previously was based 
on the reality that state expenditure on blacks was an insignificant amount and covered only 
a tiny proportion of blacks. As such, it did not pose a threat to government’s plans to keep 
the familial welfare structure in the reserves intact. So, when government resolved to 
include all race groups in the welfare budget in 1944 – albeit with a racial bias against blacks 
– the latter had never had it that good. 
I argue that the extension of pensions to Africans marked not only a period of State 
reforms, but sowed the seeds for the perpetual culture of dependence on the pension grant 
in poor black communities being extending beyond the period of white minority rule. The 
exclusion of pensions was previously based on the premise that the communal and kinship 
structure remained intact enough to compensate for the state’s absence in the sector of 
social development. Thus the State maintained that trying to fulfil that role of benevolence 
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would erode the traditional familial arrangements in existence. Urban Africans, on the other 
hand, were excluded on the grounds that it was too complex to apply statutory provisions 
that differentiated between them and their rural counterparts322. But, as Servaas van der 
Berg asserts, the overarching purpose for disqualifying Africans from accessing pensions was 
predicated on the premise that Africans were not accustomed to the civilised lifestyle and 
its consumption patterns for which pensions were intended to serve323. In the light of the 
State’s antagonism to the provision of old-age pension benefits to all ‘citizens’ of South 
Africa since 1928, what inspired the change of mind this time around? 
The change in the system of benevolence within the sector of social security was the 
immediate outcome of the Social Security Committee of 1944. The Committee repudiated 
popular misconceptions in government that there was no cause for alarm regarding the 
state of poverty amongst Africans residing in the urban areas, as well as those residing in 
the rural areas. The views of the Commission echoed those of white liberals, who held the 
belief that the State was not only contractually obligated to look after those whites on the 
margins of society, but also to uphold the moral obligation to mitigate the state of 
dispossession of non-Europeans324. White liberals were hard-pressed to champion this 
cause out of fear that the continued poverty of Africans in the cities – owing to the large 
urban influx of Africans during the 1930s – would spell social and political agitation325. 
Indications already were that the growing militancy and political unrest of African trade 
unions was ascribed to a combination of racially discriminatory policies and the poor 
material conditions of Africans326. Resolving not to cushion their economic predicament – 
along with their marginalised political and civil status – would only serve to inspire further 
political agitation with far-reaching economic proportions.  
It was under the UP Government led by Smuts that pensions were finally extended 
to blacks. The upsurge in public expenditure after this decision is worth putting into 
perspective. In 1929/1930, for instance, the Native Economic Commission showed that 
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blacks benefited R8.3 million compared to the R6.6 million they paid in taxes327. In 1951, the 
Tomlinson Commission, appointed in 1950 to draw a blueprint for homeland policy, also 
showed that social services accrued to blacks was R50.3 million in addition to a share of 
R32.4 million in non-assignable services. That expenditure contrasted starkly with the direct 
taxes of R4.0 million and an additional R15.4 million in other taxes, making the net transfer 
to blacks through the budget total R63.3 million328. There is consensus that accounting for 
this exponential increase in expenditure was commensurate with the increase in the 
number of elderly blacks receiving pensions, even though whites bore 90 per cent of the 
direct tax burden329.  
Indeed, the evidence attesting to the conditions of poverty was preponderant, 
leaving no grounds anymore for the state to restrict Africans from becoming beneficiaries of 
state support. As the Deputy Prime Minster under Jan Smuts, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr put 
forward the moral significance of dispersing these pensions to blacks as a gesture that all 
human persons ought to receive during periods of destitution330. However, given the 
political developments of the day, Hofmeyr reaffirmed the approach of UP’s predecessor, 
the SAP, whenever government was faced with prospects of further political agitation. We 
may recall at this stage that the support of civilised labour policy by the capital-leaning SAP 
was motivated by the latter’s quest to contain further social and political unrest in the 
aftermath of the 1922 Riots so as not to undermine business interests. So, behind the moral 
intonation used to justify the inclusion of blacks lay the real quest to protect the interests of 
English capital, which Smuts sympathised with due to the political allegiance they pledged 
to his party, the UP.  
Against this background, Andreas Sagner contends that one must not downplay the 
significance of pensions in meeting its ‘supposed’ objective of lifting destitute elderly blacks 
out of poverty. Indeed, the impact of state support in the Eastern Cape and rural KwaZulu-
Natal, detailed in Sagner’s study and that of Ardington and Lund respectively, attests to this 
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fact331. Yet what is clear in Sagner’s analysis is that the use of pensions as a tool for social 
control weighed more in significance than it acting as a ‘humanitarian’ panacea. The political 
agitations of the 1930s were a symptom of the white state suffering from a legitimacy crisis. 
Thus pensions were intended to keep political tempers at bay. Unlike whites, blacks could 
not lay claim to state assistance on the basis of rights, but only on the basis of charity. This 
very disparity accounts for the failure of the legitimating intentions of pensions. Hence, 
liberation movements such as the ANC refused to allow the extension of state assistance to 
Africans to deflecting their attention from demanding their political and civil rights332.  
Nevertheless, what followed served to open the floodgates of a public support 
system that would cushion the prevailing levels of poverty within the African society 
irrevocably. The number of Africans receiving pensions continued to soar. In 1958 and 
afterwards, a decade after the formal institutionalisation of apartheid, Africans constituted 
60 per cent of the 347 000 elderly persons placed on the old-age pension roll333. Their share 
of the overall social expenditure budget, however, accounted for 19 per cent of the total 
old-age pensions spending. By 1978, blacks constituted no less than 70 per cent of the 
770 000 pensioners placed on the pensions roll, even though their share of government’s 
overall pension expenditure was 43 per cent334. 
The extension of pensions to blacks, however, was not always embraced fully by the 
National Party after it took over from the UP in 1948. It had on several occasions attempted 
to remove Africans from the social assistance payroll because it wanted to consign the 
responsibility for their welfare to the ‘independent’ states it created in 1951, known 
infamously as the homelands335. Such plans never materialised.  
The Sharpeville killings of 1960 had implications with a spill-over effect into the area 
of social development. The effects of these events were evident in the following two ways: 
The first pertained to the integrity of the policy of apartheid as a whole. It is worth recalling 
at this stage that the Smuts government used pensions and other welfare measures as a 
proxy to demonstrate to the local and international community sympathy to its African 
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‘wards’336. The National Party in the wake of Sharpeville seemed bound to do the same. As 
the apartheid state strengthened its efforts to reinforce the strictures of racial apartness, 
pensions were designed to make the native policy look more respectable in the eyes of the 
world, since such a ‘gesture’ of ‘generosity’ was unique in Sub-Saharan Africa337.  
The second related to the state’s response as pre-emption of further political 
upheaval; hence, the 1960 uprising served as an unequivocal reminder of the militancy of 
trade unions and their disruptive effects on the country’s political stability. Consequently, 
the state resolved to suppress them in a bid to restore the confidence of foreign capital in 
the South African economy; this capital had already begun pulling out of the country, most 
notably in the manufacturing sector. The plan worked and soon apartheid policy reached its 
heyday, characterised by a six per cent GDP growth rate which spanned the remaining years 
of the 1960s and early 1970s. As the economy reached new heights, it facilitated the 
creation of a black middle class who were imported from the homelands to occupy 
(including semi-skilled) positions previously occupied exclusively by whites.  
However, fortunes took a rapid turn during the 1970s, marked by a contracting 
economy (from six to 1.5 per cent) that shed many jobs (from 158 000 to 64 000). Of the 
entire workforce, blacks were the worst affected and, what aggravated their predicament 
was the lack of occupational safety nets such as UIF, because these were only available to 
whites until the early 1980s. This reality left a huge hole in the public welfare system for 
blacks, especially since the state made no arrangements for the scores of unemployed men 
and women. Instead it chose to employ repressive measures to repatriate them back to the 
homelands. This strategy was expedient to containing further political upheaval in the urban 
areas, especially in the aftermath of the 1976 killings. The state also understood the 
usefulness of this strategy in the light of the growing militancy of the African trade unions, 
which had become a strong political force. Their increasingly palpable presence in the 
political mainstream was due largely to the strong ties they had forged with the nationalist 
liberation movements, such as the ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF). Indeed, 
these political changes ushered in revisions that expedited a change in attitude by the 
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government. The end result was acceding to racial parity concerning the dispersion of 
pensions, as shown in the next section below.  
3.5.4. Solidifying the Sea-Change, 1980 to 1993 
If the 1940s marked the defining moment in the social development history of South Africa, 
the 1980s completed that sea-change. For what commenced as a welfare system designed 
to cater for whites (with its distinctive race-determined value of pensions) began treading 
towards equalisation, which was finalised in 1993. But such a move was preceded by the 
state’s goals to legitimise the homeland system and to institute the tricameral parliament in 
1983, which comprised white, Indian and coloured (WIC) chambers. The quest to contain 
further political agitation against the state in the aftermath of the 1976 riots depicted in the 
previous section triggered the state to deport many migrants back to the homelands. And, 
with poverty in the homelands already commonplace, it was clear that a move of this kind 
by the state was bound to compound the existing problem of dispossession.  
Indeed, the prevalence of poverty, coupled with the complacency of the apartheid 
state, called into question the integrity of the apartheid government’s Bantustan policy. 
Firstly, the state’s folding of its arms in the face of such gross social dislocation within the 
territories it created made the system of the homelands look even more bogus. Homeland 
governments were at liberty to spend resources the best way they saw fit, but their coffers 
were at the mercy of funding which came from the purse of the central government338. As a 
result of this sort of leeway, most homelands deviated from the practice set in South Africa 
by choosing not to implement certain types of grants completely, or reducing benefit levels. 
Secondly, the three-chamber parliament gave the impression that the plight of blacks would 
take the backseat in the policy agenda. Thus the state’s decision to prioritise financial 
resources to the homelands was a desperate attempt to prove that blacks were not left out 
in the cold to fend for themselves in terms of having their wellbeing looked after, even in 
the absence of political enfranchisement.  
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The state started showing commitment to equalising the value of pensions for blacks 
and whites, which led to a rapid increase in funds being channelled to the homeland 
areas339. It was uncanny how the state could afford such a costly fiscal commitment. By the 
1980s the NP government had secured white employment, with social security reserved 
mainly as a safety net for the poor whites who – when assessed in the wider South African 
context – were not the poorest. Occupation-based social insurance would then replace 
social security for the majority of whites during their retirement. These changes were made 
possible, since equalisation within the domain of social development in South Africa 
occurred at the expense of whites, with white benefit levels reduced to make up for the 
fiscal burdens that would have otherwise have been incurred by the government340. 
Explaining the incorporation of Indians into the three-chamber parliament was largely the 
low cost nature of this segment of the population, as not many of them were as dependent 
on social services as their black counterparts. As shown on Figure 3.3 below, blacks received 
more than double the government expenditure earmarked for coloureds and Indians 
combined.  
 
FIGURE 3.3: ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE SHARES OF DIFFERENT GROUPS IN PAID TAXES AND RECEIVED 
BENEFITS, 1975 
Source: Servaas van der Berg341 
Figure 3.3 also shows that the contribution of whites towards taxes was greater than the 
benefits they received from government expenditure, yet their benefits beyond pensions 
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remained far more generous than their numbers actually warranted. Indeed, by the mid-
1980s, South Africa was well on course to phasing out racial differentials in the social 
security sector. During this period, for instance, old-age pension benefits for blacks were 
paid bimonthly at a rate of R57.00, while that for whites was R152.00 per month342. Changes 
in the gradual increase of black pension benefits in proportion to the percentage of white 
pension benefit levels are demonstrated on the figure below: 
 
FIGURE 3.4: AVERAGE VALUE OF SOCIAL PENSIONS RECEIVED BY OTHER GROUPS AS PERCENTAGE OF 
WHITE SOCIAL PENSIONS, 1942 TO 1985 
Source: Same as Figure 3.3 
The task of identifying white beneficiaries instead of compromising old-age pensions for any 
other group, say for coloureds or even Indians for instance, was premised on the notion that 
the proportion of the elderly white population that was poor was marginal, as it became 
apparent that such measures were employed in accomplished white areas where resistance 
to reducing white benefit levels was minimal343. Most whites were not poor, so they did not 
complain about being struck off the pension’s payroll, since occupational insurance assumed 
that responsibility. Be that as it may, political leaders embarked on this drive with the 
knowledge that the government ran the risk of stepping on the toes of the same segment of 
the population that it had long placated by dispersing these forms of social assistance. Van 
der Berg argues that the quest for pension equalisation and reduced discrimination in the 
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application of the means tests were made possible through a sharp decline in the real value 
of pensions received by white pensioners. This pursuit would go on to be the precursor to 
changes in many other social programmes as the probability of a strong political opposition 
became greater344.  
This ushered in a watershed development in the pensions sector, as the benefits of 
social old-age pensions were equalised and the discrimination in the application of the 
means test was eliminated. In keeping with the spirit of the transition to democracy, the 
Social Assistance Act of 1992 was passed into law to pave the way for these revisions. Thus 
it removed all racial differentials in the benefit levels of pensions, as well as ensured that 
social assistance was treated as a right for all South Africans to enjoy345. This step occurred 
amid persistent gaps in the coverage of some other social grants, such as the child 
maintenance grants. In these cases one can assume that the reluctance to improve coverage 
to poor blacks would have put the financial viability of the State in serious jeopardy346.  
A large-scale study conducted by Frances Lund in the non-urban areas of KwaZulu-
Natal revealed that almost 30 per cent of households in the deep rural areas received state 
assistance, most of them being non-contributory old-age pensions347. Without pensions, 
many households would have found themselves in a depressive state of economic 
displacement. The results of the 1993 Poverty and Living Standards Survey indicated that 19 
per cent of rural households were headed by pensioners older than 65 years, and half of 
these contained six members or more348. Andrew Donaldson argues that whole families and 
communities were dependent on pensioners, who by virtue of being grant beneficiaries 
“[...] had become wealthy members of poor communities. This makes the presence of a 
pensioner a critical factor in many households’ wellbeing. It is the principal source of cash 
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income for about a quarter of homeland households. In rural areas households with 
pensioners have higher average incomes than other households”349.  
The dominance of pensions within the social security sector of South Africa was 
perpetuated by the culture of dependence on State support. As shown in Appendix 3C, the 
total pension spending for blacks was more than one-tenth of that allotted to whites. 
Likewise, the combined pension spending for the white, Indian and coloured (WIC) cluster 
remained dwarfed by that allotted to blacks, which accounted for than more than one-fifth 
that of the total pension budget. This trend continued up to 1993, with the government’s 
social security expenditure on pensions for the rural and black-populated homeland areas 
being 43 per cent higher than that earmarked for the WIC cluster, as shown in Table 3.2 in 
Appendix 3D. Other grants that showed pre-eminence were the disability grant, followed by 
the child maintenance grant. It is clear here that, even though budgetary commitments 
were devoted to these three major variants of social security, budgetary commitments for 
old-age pensions were certainly exponentially higher than those of any other social grant. 
Why pensions remained the key defining feature of the South African liberal welfare state 
had more to do with the penetration of big capital into the echelons of policy making than 
the options that might possibly have been made available to the ruling élite at the time. Of 
course, they had the political weight. However, we must recall at this stage that big capital 
had always supported the idea of a pension-focused welfare state in the aftermath of the 
Rand Revolt, but that was just how far they were willing to go. Anything less would have 
spelled disaster for the viability of the economy, just as anything beyond their bargain could 
have been to the displeasure of the mining-dominated economy. The pensions-leaning 
developmental welfare framework that ensued after 1994 was premised on the same 
principles and circumstances that informed the liberal welfare state of white South Africa 
(see Chapter 6).  
Even so, the government’s approach remained clear in its emphasis of the mantra of 
minimalism. Similarly to the social security front in the post-apartheid context, 
government’s expenditure on social grants under white minority rule was by no means an 
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indication of government going the social welfare route wholesale. The approach was 
simply one of helping the poor to make ends meet and to keep their heads above the water. 
I echo Jinabhai’s sentiments that the State’s approach was not only that of minimalism, but 
that of individualism as well, with the principle elements being “[...] that every citizen is 
responsible for his own welfare and social adjustment, that of his family and of the 
community. Only where the citizens fails to sustain his independence in these regards, does 
the state come to his assistance in co-operation with private effort”350.  
3.6. Concluding Remarks 
Without the economic unevenness within the imperialist-dominated social formation of 
white South Africa, the welfare state would probably not have seen the light of day. Even so, 
the political convenience of welfare state creation means that welfare state-building did not 
follow altruistic motives of ameliorating social contingencies, but was advanced out of the 
quest to cement ideological notions of white domination and supremacy. Indeed, the most 
striking features of the South African welfare state experience in the first half of the 20th 
century were the pension scheme, as well as the racial differentials of pensions. Due to the 
successes of the South African economy, which centred on mining until the late 1930s, the 
State was able to fund a very generous pension scheme, with most of its generosity accrued 
by whites and coloureds. Even for the white welfare state that it became it fell severely 
below par for standards for a social democracy. It was unreservedly liberal in orientation, 
with pensions resorted to as the antidote for the structural failures of the imperialist-
controlled economy rather than being the moralistic duty of the State. 
Indeed, this chapter set out to ascertain how the structural defects in the economy, 
working class interests and the ideologies that underpinned the political ruling classes 
culminated in the liberal character of social responsiveness. The dominance of mining in the 
economy was not the cause of the social responsiveness, but its appetite for cheap African 
labour was the trigger. Its continued preference for cheap African labour proved threatening 
to the livelihood of white labour, as they were expensive for mining corporations to retain. 
It was at this juncture that politicians saw the political marketability of the civilised white 
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labour policy as an electioneering tool to win the votes of the marginalised white Afrikaners. 
The policy of civilised labour would then transcend the social sphere, also serving as a 
political scaffolding tool to woo the support of white Afrikaners in the open sphere of the 
European social formation outside the labour market. Even in this case the intention 
remained that of not going beyond the minimalistic outlook.  
I contended that this minimalistic outlook probably would have been reversed if the 
organised Afrikaner working class had not relinquished a significant portion of their 
autonomy to the State. The power of the working class to keep the checks and balances 
within the echelons of the state became severely compromised the moment the workers 
became concerned more with the affairs of state than those of the working class. As a 
result, the notion of a social democratic welfare state was prevented from dominating the 
policy discourse in the state apparatus. Indeed, what secured the welfare state was that all 
whites, not just the labouring classes, had the political power to deter the ruling classes 
from abandoning the welfare commitment that was contained in the vote. However, 
without the support of the working class, who had been co-opted into the political ruling 
circles, the voting power of the general public could only yield so many welfare outcomes. 
Hence, organised labour had more power to steer the wheel of social policy on the path of 
comprehensive social responsiveness as opposed to a minimalistic one. This was by virtue of 
the significance of their vote, as well as their proximity to the echelons of political 
realignments in government. Instead, labour was all for protecting its own interests of job 
security and the livelihoods of the labouring classes. It was never at the forefront of leading 
a cross-class mass mobilisation movement, as it defined itself as a labour aristocracy and not 
as part of the broader South African society united behind upholding the common values of 
human dignity. In Mauritius, the opposite occurred, with the working class understanding 
their advocacy for change to encompass the interests of Mauritian society across the class 
spectrum. The incorporation of the organised working classes into the mainstream political 
ruling classes in the 1940s became the final straw that stripped it of its autonomy 
altogether. Not only was labour a part of a ruling clique this time around, it was also further 
out of range of the interests and the plight of the common man.  
The political ideologies also played a peculiar role in the orientation of the white-
serving South African welfare enterprise. Even so one cannot pinpoint one political party as 
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having been more socially democratic than others. Indeed, all the dominant political parties 
within the South African socio-political formation had one striking commonality. They were 
all at the forefront of pursuing the neoliberal project of capitalist accumulation, which 
ended up having a significant impact on the ideological dispositions of these parties. This 
took a gradual course. First they supported the socialist dogma in the 1930s, when they 
were poor, but made a drastic shift towards embracing the neoliberal orthodoxy when 
many graduated to the middle class during the 1960s and 1970s, viz. the heyday of 
apartheid. The NP party stood out amongst the rest and embodied this very drastic shift in 
ideological beliefs. As a party that emerged from very humble beginnings, it found it 
important to rather support the notion of enterprise and industry in the minds of its support 
base, as opposed to being at the forefront of pursuing the socialist project of advancing 
extensive welfare ideals, just like the ANC did after apartheid, as illustrated in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter IV: State-Building and the Emergence of a Social Democratic 
Consensus in Colonial Mauritius, 1598 to 1968 
4.1. Introduction 
The roots of welfare state-building in Mauritius are deeply embedded in its colonial history. 
As Matthew Lange asserts, colonialism had a direct impact on the developmental outcomes 
of nearly all regions of the world351. In Chapter 3, I demonstrated how the liberal welfare 
state in South Africa in the first half of the 20th century was informed by the penetration of 
the imperial interests of global capitalism in the echelons of political power. The concept of 
‘white civilisation’ only followed as the ideological mainstay exploited by the politicians to 
amass votes. For the political élite, it became one salient element of the South African state-
building project, even though it entailed a socio-political contract that involved the state 
and the white segment of the population only.  
In a number of ways it was the very nature of colonialism to remain socially aloof, 
even when the need for intervention for those in economic distress became apparent. In 
the case of Mauritius it was the way in which colonialism took shape that meant that the 
social structure was not conditioned to sympathise with the plight of those at the margins of 
the economic establishment. In what way did colonialism take shape and how did it give 
birth to an unequal society? What impact did this trajectory have on welfare state-building 
in general? And finally, how did this experience have a bearing on the intersections between 
the state, capitalist interests and the advocacy of different social forces in laying the 
foundations for the emergence of a social democratic welfare regime. The forceful handover 
of Ile de France (Mauritius) by the French Colonial Empire to Britain in the early 19th century 
defined the very nature of the newly-named Colony of Mauritius’s response mechanisms to 
poverty. For those members of society not forming part of the colonial fraternity, the 
Mauritian state became one that was socially, politically and economically non-inclusive.  
This chapter seeks to unpack the relationship between state-building and the 
emergence of a social democratic welfare state in Mauritius. It traces the island’s history 
from colonial encounter with the Dutch East India Company until Britain claimed ownership 
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of the territory in 1810. My discussions of the processes that led to a social democratic 
welfare state end in 1968, when Mauritius gained independence. The reason for creating 
this parameter is because I want to give an assessment of the continuation of the social 
democratic route in post-colonial Mauritius in Chapter 5, to flow alongside the same period 
as in Chapter 6, which focuses on the welfare regime in post-apartheid South Africa. I argue 
in this chapter that the rise of social forces to the level of political prominence served to 
counterweigh the powers of the ruling clique in both the political and economic domain to 
accede to grassroots demands for social reforms. This newfound approach was realised 
through a social development path that chiefly prioritised the provision of public pensions.  
This chapter is divided into the following three sections: Section I explores the role of 
colonialism in the economic and political development of Mauritius. The convergence of 
colonial interests of political control and those of big capital emerged as salient elements 
that conditioned the structural properties of capitalism not to be submissive to the notions 
of social accountability and responsiveness. To begin with, colonialism was historically 
“contingent” on either created or dramatically transformed state institutions throughout 
the world. Moreover, due to the relatively high autonomy of the colonial state and a more 
apparent division between the state and social actors, colonialism provided what Robert 
Merton dubbed “strategic research sites”352 – a case that refers to the occurrence of social 
processes with unusual clarity – for the purposes of analysing the impact of society on the 
project of state-building. This section thus contains a dense historical account of the 
relationship between British colonial officers and the French settlers, and how that 
encounter dictated power relations that were seemingly swayed in favour of the 
economically affluent Franco-Mauritians. It thus notes the nature of the colonial society, 
social class hierarchies on the island, and the absence of political representation for the 
Indo-Mauritian majority.  
Section II chronicles the rise of social forces in taking mobilised action against the 
colonial state’s casual attitude towards the notion of social responsiveness to the 
economically marginalised. This section thus puts into perspective collaborations of social 
forces transcending class divisions as configurations that strengthened the campaign of the 
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social reform movement. These developments are tied closely to the cross-class 
collaborations that took to the streets in the late 1930s and early 1940s to confront the 
state for being too passive in its approach to mitigate social dislocation. This active 
confrontation is best described as a broad-based movement that championed the rights of 
those at the margins of society. These dynamics are depicted in in-depth detail in Section III 
to highlight the role of critical junctures with which the path towards sweeping 
constitutional reforms and therefore social democratic welfare outcomes were paved. The 
nature of a welfare paradigm that commenced on the basis of non-contributory social 
assistance as a key mode of intervention is illustrated.  
Section I: The Structural Properties of Capital Accumulation in Mauritius 
4.2. In the Beginning: Colonial Rule and the Creation of a Socially Stratified Society 
As a territory without indigenous inhabitants, Mauritius is a country that reflected its 
peculiar encounter with three different colonial masters. It is said that it was first spotted by 
Portuguese sailors on their voyage to the East to pursue the spice trade. However, they 
were not interested in setting up a colonial outpost there. It was then discovered in 1598 by 
the Dutch sailors, who established a small settlement353. The Dutch were attracted to the 
island’s vast forests, since they offered prospects of creating a timber-based economy 
earmarked for the market in Europe. Concurrently kick-starting spice plantations became 
one of the goals. However, that ambition proved abortive due to the lack of labourers to 
work in the plantations. The absence of favourable weather conditions proved to be yet 
another discouraging factor354.  
The Dutch abandoned the island in 1710 without having made a meaningful 
contribution on the island’s economic landscape, except bringing the Dodo bird to 
extinction and clearing the vast forests. It was under French rule, which commenced in 
1720, that Mauritius began to jump out of economic despondency, as the French made an 
effort to transform the island into a sugar plantation economy. To meet the demands of the 
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sugar economy, the French East India Company began a massive importation of Malagasy 
and African slaves to work in the plantations355.  
The French control of Mauritius spanned ten years short of a century before the 
British annexation in 1810. Unlike the island’s first colonial masters, it was not the economic 
offerings of the island they were mainly after. Instead, Britain viewed Mauritius as a 
strategic geopolitical location through which to advance its military ambitions on that side 
of the planet. The goal was to restrict France from having a formidable presence in the 
Indian Ocean, as well as to challenge her presence in India356. However, upon its arrival, 
Britain was tactful enough to exercise sensitivity to the local context. At the time of the 
annexation, the Franco settlers had demonstrated competence in the economic 
management side of things, especially concerning everything to do with the sugar 
plantations. Therefore the Colonial Office in London deemed it fitting that a de jure colonial 
pact established between the British administrators and the French settlers be sealed so as 
to avoid compromising the economic viability of the island. As such, the French legal system 
was retained, along with its cultural heritage357. Thus, the Roman Catholic Church was 
spared and French was retained as the social lingua franca of the island as a sign of Britain’s 
commitment to cordial coexistence with the French settlers358.  
Whilst the British treaded carefully so as not to step on the toes of the Franco-
Mauritians, their tolerance for each other was based on the fact that their relationship was 
to yield mutually beneficial gains within the realm of the economy. Whilst the Colonial 
Government sought to maintain the economic sustainability of the island, submitting 
somewhat to the British Empire by the French settlers came with the perks of a protected 
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market and guaranteed adequate labour supply359. Although Mauritius experienced 
economic success under French rule, it was under the British that that success was 
heightened. The proportion of acres earmarked for sugar production was increased fivefold 
during the first two decades of British control. As a result, Mauritius became the largest 
sugar producer in the world. Between 1855 and 1859, its proportion of sugar cane 
accounted for 9.4 per cent of the world sugar cane footprint, and its production accounted 
for 7.4 per cent of that of the world (see Appendix 4A)360. This success was matched by the 
efforts of the colonial state to reduce tariffs and investment in infrastructure, especially in 
the sector of road construction and transportation361. 
The major intervention made by the Colonial Government in the economy of the 
island was the abolition of slavery in 1835, in keeping with the anti-slavery laws that were 
passed in Britain in that same year. The Colonial Government was determined to rectify this 
particular aspect of the social class structure on the island. At the top of the food chain were 
the Franco-Mauritians, who constituted nine per cent of the population as the owners and 
controllers of the economy. In the middle were the Créoles of African and European 
heritage, who accounted for 19 per cent of the population. They were freed from slavery 
just before the outbreak of the French Revolution and thus tipped for economic success in 
commerce and the civil service, since they gained access to “élite educational institutions” 
early in the 19th century362. Essentially, this culminated in them modelling their lifestyle on 
that of the Franco-Mauritians. At the bottom of the economic scale were the African slaves, 
who comprised 72 per cent of the population363. 
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After the abolition of slavery, many of the African Créoles tried to shed the haunting 
memories of slavery by leaving the sugar estates to become artisans in Port Louis or 
establishing new fishing villages in the Mauritian coastal areas364. This situation caused 
labour shortages, forcing the Colonial Government to introduce the indentured labour 
system, whereby 300 000 and 1 000 workers were imported from India and China 
respectively. The process took place between 1835 and 1920, with the overwhelming 
majority of them arriving between 1843 and 1865365. Notwithstanding Britain’s intervention 
in the labour supply chain, indentured labours remained subjected to conditions that were 
akin to an institutionalised system of oppression. Apart from the working and living 
conditions the labourers had to put up with, they were also contractually bound to the 
sugar estates, which imposed punitive measures of a jail sentence on those who breached 
their contracts366. The disturbing treatment of the workers prompted Hugh Tinker367 and 
Marina Carter368 to suggest that the indentured labour system was none other than a 
subtle, yet flagrant, reincarnation of slavery.  
The colonial agreement struck between the British colonial administrators and the 
French sugar barons in Mauritius defined the foundations upon which the structural 
properties of capitalism would conceive its role within the entire Mauritian social formation. 
In other words, because the sugar plantocracy had a vice-like grip on the economy, the 
process of capital accumulation ignored with impunity the duty to put in place measures for 
relieving the plight of the subordinate classes through the material distribution of resources.  
It was the human rights movement in the labour sector during the mid-19th century 
that precipitated the formal recognition of the plight of the workers by the state. The 
workers, although unorganised, garnered the strength to challenge the capitalist system 
because of (a) labour shortages on the estates, which strengthened the leverage of workers 
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over employers, and (b) the government was able to yield to labours’ demands for 
protection against subordination. According to the new laws that were passed, indentured 
labourers were no longer contractually bound to be restricted to the estates. Furthermore, 
they were granted access to the legal institutions of the colony, even though there was an 
absence of legal frameworks that protected the workers’ cause for favourable working and 
living conditions. Over 10 per cent of the Indian workers filed legal charges against their 
employers between 1890 and 1896, and almost 71 per cent of these cases resulted in 
successful convictions369.  
Just after the extension of rights to the Indo-Mauritians, fortunes turned on the 
sugar plantocracy. Mauritius sugar exports faced severe competition due to the soaring 
growth in the production of sugar during the mid-1800s370. The externally integrated sugar-
based economy propelled the sugar estates in Mauritius to minimise costs and increase 
efficiency so as to remain profitable. These developments triggered reforms in the legal 
system, which forbade landownership by Indo-Mauritians. These revisions in the system of 
land tenure ushered in le grand morcellement (viz. the great division), as the plantocracy 
sold large portions of their land to Indo-Mauritians of a higher social class standing. This 
category of people was the sidars (overseers), job contractors and money lenders. The sugar 
barons were particular eager about this process, as they could not wait to put on the market 
land that was non-productive and non-cultivated. Secondly, the Franco-Mauritians’ choice 
of selling to the Indo-Mauritians was inspired by the strategy to keep them on the land so 
that they may offer a form of labour guarantee to the estates371.  
Consequently, the tables turned in Mauritius as the previously displaced lower 
classes participated in the production process not only as labourers, but also as small-scale 
farmers who contributed to the overall crop output372. This translated into the erstwhile 
lower classes having the chance for upward social mobility and the mobilising capacity to 
call into question the integrity of the economy as far as the material interests of the working 
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poor were concerned. The transfer of land culminated in a significant proportion of the 
island’s population moving from estates to rural settlements, which saw the creation of 150 
villages of small land owners across the island373. As a result, the farms owned by Indo-
Mauritians amounted to approximately 15 000 in the 1920s – an amount of land which 
comprised 46 per cent of the island’s total area under sugar cane cultivation374. In contrast, 
mineral-based capitalism in South Africa destroyed rural society by displacing the 
agricultural society and imposing laws that expropriated land, rather than promoting its 
ownership. Many were forced to seek employment in the urban areas, further reducing the 
prospects of mobilisation across class divisions. 
All the same, the role of the colonial state in recognising the socioeconomic plight of 
the lower classes and in being proactive about it remained absent. It is shown in the next 
discussion that the widened social distance between the colonial state and grassroots social 
realities played a factor in contributing to the government’s passive outlook. 
4.2.1. The Distant Colonial State 
The root causes for the colonial state’s lack of a pro-active approach in social welfare were 
embedded in the intentions of the Mauritian state. Motivated by the desire to pursue 
British military ambitions, the colonial control resembled that employed in other colonies, 
i.e. advancing economic interests at the expense of material priorities. Hence: 
...to the English mercantilist the economic development of colonies means the 
development of colonial natural resources for the exclusive benefit of the 
people of the metropolitan country. Less thought was given to way to 
promoting the welfare state of colonial peoples375.  
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In Mauritius, the administration became too centralised, thereby creating a 
geographic and organisational distance between the state and its subjects376. Judging from 
Matthew Lange’s comparison of British colonialism in Sierra Leone and Mauritius, the 
presence of local chiefs who then acted as intermediaries in Sierra Leone shortened the 
distance between the colonial administration and its citizens. This method enabled the 
colonial government to channel resources in a manner that met the specific needs of the 
society377. For Mauritius, being the only former British colony in sub-Saharan Africa to have 
been ruled directly378, the absence of intermediaries due to the lack of an indigenous society 
meant that the colonial state may not have had a full picture of the scale of social 
challenges. The citizens also were without channels that they could use to convey their 
frustrations. This certainly had a negative impact on the relationship between the state and 
the citizens. As one British Colonial official lamented379: 
The administration of Mauritius is over centralised. There is District 
Administration, no District Health Service. Generally speaking, magistrates, 
doctors, teachers, engineers, and labour inspectors do not live among the people 
they administer ... . The administration is consequently largely out of touch with 
the people. 
In contrast to the French, the Belgians and the Portuguese, Britain was not rigid in its 
method of exerting control to the extent that it followed the one-size-fits-all direct style of 
rule adopted by the other colonial empires. Where the British were unlikely to be 
confronted with resistance, as in Singapore and Japan, they opted for the direct route of 
colonialism. Conversely, in extreme cases like Nigeria and Uganda, an indirect approach was 
opted for because the colonial officials were faced with strong resistance from the locals. 
Unlike the indirect and bureaucratically independent alternative, direct and bureaucratically 
dependent rule increased the prospects of state-led development, since bureaucratic 
control predisposes an effective administration380. As a result, state-led development 
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precedes the ‘natural cause’ of providing those public goods that are relevant to enhancing 
economic production (education, health care, sanitation, roads, law and order). For Grier, 
flexibility, decentralisation and understanding the local context are only achieved when the 
economy is successful and when it is placed at the forefront with regard to the dispersion of 
public goods381. 
Capital accumulation in Mauritius did not seek to disperse resources with fairness; 
instead it was poised to reinforce inequality. The colonial attitude did not speak of 
development and social wellbeing in the same light. In fact, the two were regarded as two 
disparate entities that stood little chance of reaching a common ground in the apparatus of 
policy-making (see section on the emergence of pensions below). 
In South Africa, the welfare state was used as a trump card by the ruling élite to 
settle political scores. Secondly, such initiatives were endorsed by capital, which gained 
from the political calm that followed the welfare measures. In Mauritius, capital and the 
state did not see the bigger picture because: (1) the franchise was only extended to a 
wealthy few who were immune to the negative impact of the policies chosen by those 
incumbents they elected to power concerning the poor. Had the profile of the electorate 
been more diverse and dominated by the lower classes, there would have been pressure on 
the ruling élite to embark on a more socially responsive pathway; and (2) the ruling 
incumbents could not foresee their mobilisation as a cross-class mass movement 
meticulously organised and united with one voice in the quest to advance the cause of the 
economically marginalised. Different results would have emerged if social forces were 
separate entities jostling to outsmart each other. The following discussion further reaffirms 
my assertion that capitalism in Mauritius commanded a significant degree of authority over 
the colonial state, and consequently came to be at odds with the notion of social justice.  
4.2.2. Left to its Own Devices: The Hegemony of Capitalism over the Colonial State 
The colonial agreement struck between the French settlers and British colonial 
administrators had the far-reaching implication of drawing the line of demarcation 
according to which Britain would consolidate its sphere of control. I have established in the 
previous discussions that the colonial government’s turf of authority was in administration, 
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whilst the French settlers exerted influence in the realm of the economy. I contend that the 
terms of this colonial pact marked a turning point in Mauritius, which was followed by the 
execution of capitalist interests in the absence of the vertical and horizontal oversight of the 
colonial government. The former provides the legal framework upon which to base 
sanctions against those sugar estates not complying with the laws. Likewise, the latter 
should serve as a complementary law-enforcement mechanism entailing regular 
government inspections in order to ensure that the business community complies with the 
standards that have been laid down by the state. Giving in entirely to the conditionalities of 
big capital by the colonial government culminated in the emergence of a bifurcated state. 
According to Mamdani, such a state is characterised by the incompatible use of systems of 
governance in tandem, with the colonial and more dominant one presiding over the 
subservient traditional system of the chiefs382. This method of maintaining control 
compromised the ability of the colonial government to monitor the capitalist accumulation 
project vis-à-vis the broader spectrum of society. 
Similar contradictions prevailed in Mauritius, marked by a division of labour between 
the Franco economic élite and British colonial administrators. Certainly, this bifurcated 
system was perpetuated by British laissez faire economic traditions, thus enabling French 
capital, especially the plantocracy, to hold sway. Inevitably the stranglehold of the 
plantocracy on the economy became so strong that the colonial state ended up being 
subordinated to the power of the capitalist élite as opposed to the situation being the other 
way round.  
Apparent in Mauritius’s colonial experience is the reality that the opposite of what 
transpired in other bifurcated systems occurred. Of course, the administrative aspects of 
Mauritius were directly ruled from Whitehall through governors. However, one can purport 
that the Franco Mauritians – as the custodians of power within Mauritian society at the 
point of British annexation – assumed roles similar to the ones of traditional leaders in those 
indirectly controlled colonies. The only difference is that the Francos were the ones calling 
the shots without being answerable to the colonial government.  
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These power dynamics also impacted on social welfare policies. The Chamber of 
Agriculture in Mauritius is said to have served as a de facto government, with the Franco-
Mauritians at the apex of shaping state policy heavily influenced by business. In essence, the 
Chamber of Agriculture became the “shadow government” of the Colony of Mauritius and it 
consistently succeeded in pestering the colonial state into doing its bidding, except on 
several occasions when their requests faced opposition from the Colonial Office in 
London383. Even with a possible counterweight from London, the colonial under-secretary in 
Mauritius, Arthur Dawe, cautioned against the plantocracy’s unrivalled policy influence. This 
influence remained intact throughout the 20th century, when the grassroots democratic 
movement called for changes in the plantations:  
My instinct is that if we are to avoid storms we ought to set our political course a 
few points to the left. The situation of the working classes is deplorable. The white 
planters are excessively ancien regime. For them the Bastille seems not to have 
fallen. They have, under the present constitution, an over-weighted political 
power. They have their representation in London and underscored the technique 
of making things uncomfortable for the Governor unless he moulds his policy 
generally to conform with their views and commercial interests384. 
In South Africa, the economy and social sphere may have been dominated by imperial 
capital, but its power was kept in check by the vote of the lower white classes. They 
essentially pressured the government to find reasons to guide the economy along the path 
of redistribution. In Mauritius, the lower classes had no vote and the plantocracy, along with 
the well-off Créoles of mixed heritage, were preoccupied with protecting their interests of 
dominating the politico-economic landscape. 
This disproportionate economic influence of the plantocracy within the realm of 
policy-making must be viewed against the backdrop of the type of colonial rule that was 
imposed on Mauritius by Great Britain. Certainly, this type of rule engendered a particular 
type of outlook on the notion of a socially responsive state by the settler community. 
Mauritius was a directly ruled colonial outpost with most of its policy direction orchestrated 
and formulated in the Colonial Office in Whitehall in London (See Section 4.2 & 4.4 below). 
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The status quo became one which refused to embrace change and map out new policy 
directions that responded to the local context.  
Certainly the role of colonial administrators was that of ensuring that the island 
retains its functional viability by setting up rules and regulations that allowed the private 
agricultural enterprise to thrive. The institutions that were tasked to formulate and enforce 
these rules were concerned mostly with the affairs of economic management and thus 
seldom brought themselves down to the level of society. These elite caucuses were nothing 
more than talk shops which simply passed laws that favoured private business interests.  
The power relations that existed between the colonial administrators and the business 
class no doubt speaks to the core of the white settler society’s outlook on the notion of the 
welfare state. To put it bluntly, there was no push for welfare state-building to take place in 
the formative years of industrialisation. This dynamic was also compounded by the fact that 
white settler society, which uniformly had an affluent social class standing, were the only 
claimants to the franchise. The rest of the poor non-white settler community became a 
politically disempowered class, and were thus excluded from political participation. Had the 
franchise been extended to all groups, the entire body politic of Mauritius would have been 
altered much earlier on in the industrialisation process to espouse pro-poor egalitarian 
ideals.  
To highlight the impact of political reforms on early welfare awakening in an industrial 
economy, Mauritius’s politically-empowered white settler society must be put in 
comparative perspective with its counterpart, South Africa, during early industrial take-off. 
Similar to Mauritius, qualification for the franchise in South Africa was also based on race. 
Like the Indo-Mauritians in Mauritius, the larger black majority in South Africa were 
excluded from participating in the main political mainstreams. However, the white social 
formation of South Africa was starkly different to that of Mauritius before and around the 
turn of the 20th century. As Chapter 3 shows, two societies were in existence within the 
white social formation following early settlement in South Africa. Certainly, the white social 
formation in that country was defined not only on the basis of ethnic identity, but also on 
the basis of social class divisions. This differs starkly to the white social formation during the 
period of early white settlement in Mauritius. In that country, divisions centred 
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predominantly on the basis of spheres of control for each group in the white social 
formation within the wider scheme of the economy, with the Franco-Mauritian plantocracy 
engaged in economic activity, while the British colonial administrators handled the whole 
institutional framework that enabled production to happen sustainably.  
Compared to their Afrikaner counterparts, the English settler community in South 
Africa were affluent due to their control of the economy. This reality turned the social polity 
to centre on equal access to economic opportunity and the role of the state in alleviating 
the plight of those on the margins of society. Unlike in Mauritius, where there was no push 
for the social and political discourse to centre on redistribution, among the white settler 
community in South Africa, the political environment became utterly focused on those 
issues.  And because all whites had the franchise, the notion of the welfare state easily 
turned into a tool of political expediency to advance the sectional interests of the political 
elite. The emergence of the welfare state that protected whites against social risks followed 
this active political process, whereby the role of private charitable organisations would be 
replaced by the state. In Mauritius, on the other hand, charitable organisations, dominated 
by the Roman Catholic Church, filled a major welfare hole as the state largely played an 
absent role.   
In the next section I look at configurations of social forces, their mobilisation, and 
how their dissatisfaction with the economic establishment kicked off a national 
conversation about creating an inclusive economy that was sensitive to the needs of the 
marginalised in Mauritius. 
Section II: Configurations of Actors: The Rise of the Grassroots Movement and 
Calls for a Socially Responsive State in Mauritius 
4.3. The Rise of Cross-Class Mass Collaborations 
To counter the unrelenting attitude of the economic élite towards the lower classes, 
mobilising the social forces across the social class divide in Mauritius became a sacrosanct 
strategy that set the country on the course towards the adoption of a more social 
democratic welfare regime. The general perception amongst the lower classes at the turn of 
the 20th century was that, if there was to be any change in their living and working 
conditions, the political system would have to undergo reforms. The British colonial 
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administrators created the Council of Government at the time of seizing control of the 
island, and they picked a handful of wealthy Créoles and Franco-Mauritians to represent the 
interests of Mauritian high society385. The Council served as a legislature comprised of ten 
elected representatives who were elected on the basis of a very exclusive franchise. In 
addition to this ten, the governor elected nine more members and eight colonial officials386.  
“Franco-Mauritians could therefore influence colonial policy, while subordinate 
groups – particularly in rural areas – were unable to press their interests upon the Colonial 
Administration”387. Hugh Tinker noted that “Indo-Mauritians have found no way of 
becoming fully integrated Mauritians ... . Although forming the majority, they have not yet 
shed the status of marginal man ... . The Indo-Mauritians remained ‘strangers in Mauritius’, 
outsiders, accepted on sufferance”388. The only form of recourse available to the Indo-
Mauritians on the sugar estates was the legal system, which convicted sugar barons for the 
maltreatment of their workers (see previous section). These convictions never culminated in 
the establishment of mandatory or legally binding living and working standards.  
 Having access to the state therefore was deemed important for the subordinate 
classes. This is because such a platform was believed to be the only way to have a say in 
matters that concerned their material wellbeing, as well as informing the responsive 
mechanisms of the state in that regard. I doubt that the colonial state would have remained 
as distant to the lower classes had the franchise been extended to the lower classes just as 
it was to poor whites in South Africa, who – by virtue of having been an electoral majority – 
held the key to political office.  
The mobilisation of social actors in the villages and workers in the sugar estates was 
critical to the emergence of a grassroots democratic movement challenging the status quo. 
The discontent of the working poor was borne out of the recognition that only through an 
inclusive political framework can there be an overhaul in the manner in which the state 
relates to capital – not just as a passive overseer and accomplice in the capital accumulation 
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project, but as the guardian of equity – and in turn, how capital responds to the plight of the 
lower classes. Such was the nature of these new configurations of power that they went on 
to layout the foundations upon which the socio-political fabric of Mauritius would conceive, 
embrace and guard jealously the notion of the State being obligated to live out its 
responsibility of being responsive to the poor.  
By virtue of wealth having begun to change hands, reaching the palms of the Indo-
Mauritian community by the mid-19th century, a significant portion of them experienced a 
degree of social mobility that graduated them into the middle class.389. That was also 
enhanced by the fact that they were small sugar producers who invested heavily in the 
education of their children. Many of their offspring went on to become doctors, lawyers and 
mill and estate owners, flanked with considerable political influence390.  
Out of these land transfers that took place in the mid-1800s, a large number of 
Mauritians moved from the estates to settle in rural areas, ultimately causing over 150 
villages of small landowners to emerge across the island391. Of paramount importance about 
the villages that mushroomed out of the economic restructuring of Mauritius was the way in 
which the lower classes forged stronger community bonds among themselves, which 
translated, in turn, into inhabitants participating in broad-based developmental activities392. 
In the words of Jean Benoist: “Different from other plantation societies with their 
characteristically weak integration of peasant communities, the Mauritian villages were 
extremely well organised due to familial structures and numerous and well-organised 
voluntary associations ... . Rare were individuals that were not members of several 
associations“393. Implicit in Benoist’s assertions is that the social restructuring of the Indo-
Mauritians into more communally tight associations not only opened the platform for 
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participating in the economy, but spawned a stronger effect of strengthening them as a 
group. Moreover, the Indians especially had always established the value of forging 
communal ties amongst themselves wherever they established a settlement as a group. The 
agrarian experience amongst the Indo-Mauritians culminated in the strengthening of their 
group identity. This contrasts with that of the white Afrikaner agrarian classes in South 
Africa, who preferred distance and independence over interdependence and tight communal 
associations, and who did not embrace the concept of a racial or class-inclusive identity (see 
in Chapter 3).  
The close association between the Indo-Mauritians in the villages promoted the 
creation of numerous local associations, such as the baitka, which sought to promote the 
Hindu cultural heritage in the rural areas. Other social groups had an explicitly religious and 
social welfare tone. One such association was Arya Samaj, which was founded in 1875 in 
India but had enjoyed a significant following in Mauritius, having opened 116 branches by 
1952 with 5 000 members who paid dues. It also enjoyed a regular following of 30 000394. 
What is significant about these cultural associations is that they became an essential part of 
the social restitution struggle of the Indo-Mauritians. Hence, they provided the much 
needed “weight” and “strength” in the creation of the pro-poor political party formations 
that challenged the state for its lack of responsiveness to the plight of the economically 
dispossessed in the latter part of the 1930s (see the next section)395.  
Of course the emergence of Afrikaner self-help groups in the late 1930s may qualify 
to be classified as cultural movements that kept the white Afrikaner community together. 
However, unlike the baitka and Arya Samaj in Mauritius, they fell short of serving as 
catalysts for a culturally-focused social class activism that championed the political cause of 
only white Afrikaners. The reason behind the limitations of the ones of the Afrikaners is that 
they were élite-driven projects that were intent on uplifting the status of the white 
Afrikaner society through Afrikaner-bred capitalistic ventures. The ones in Mauritius, on the 
other hand, were grassroots projects that were prone to social activism and were on the 
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receiving end of the support of the middle classes to add to their political weight and 
impetus. It is clear that the vast majority of the lower classes, who were already 
participating in well-organised broad-based developmental activities in the villages, trusted 
the middle class with the responsibility of championing their cause. Indeed, the 
collaboration between the poor and the middle class became expedient for effective 
mobilisation against the state’s non-existent role in the social sphere due to its overly-
centralised form of governance, as described earlier in this chapter. Later on in this chapter 
it is shown that these mobilisations culminated in powerful political forces that relentlessly 
fought against the state’s palpable absence within the area of social welfare. 
In the following section I demonstrate how the configuration of social forces in 
Mauritius consolidated their political presence to propagate tirelessly the notion of fairness 
and equity. It also demonstrates how the mere antagonism of the state and capital towards 
the notion of social responsiveness inspired a period of critical junctures. The social forces 
across the social class spectrum of Mauritius formed a political movement that was 
determined to keep the progressive struggle afoot.  
Section III: The Role of Critical Junctures in the Quest for Welfare Reforms in 
Mauritius 
4.4. The Organisational Strength of the Social Democratic Movement 
Although the Indo-Mauritian small producers may have competed alongside their large 
Franco-Mauritian producers in market terms, they identified closely with the Indian workers 
because of ethnicity396. As I already hinted in the previous section, the collaboration of 
various social classes became the precondition that enabled the reform movement to 
develop as a powerful group. I do accept that an element of shared ethnicity was at play in 
keeping the spirit of unity together, but Ulriksen overlooks the economic expediency of the 
middle classes’ determination to garner the support of the poor Indo-Mauritians in seeking 
to reform the political landscape. The economy was experiencing the aftershocks of the 
1929 depression and the small producers, owing to a similar fate to that of the Franco-
Mauritian producers, were struggling to stay afloat. However, the situation of the Indo-
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Mauritian producers was particularly concerning because they could not sell directly to the 
preferred mills since they were being marginalised by the bigger sugar producers397.  
Meanwhile, the workers on the estates were being severely affected by the effects 
of the depression, which impacted negatively on their wages. Similarly, the Creole workers 
in the urban areas had economic frustrations similar to those of the workers on the estates. 
These two groups – the rural farm labourers and the urban workers – could be rallied to 
create mass support for the founding of a political movement championing the interests of 
the working poor398. On their own, the workers, however, were fragmented and poorly 
organised, therefore lacking the capacity to get the colonial government to act or have their 
interests receive the attention of the ruling élite. A Creole doctor by the name of Maurice 
Curé masterminded this mobilisation, thus crossing ethnic and class divisions. With his 
experience in the main political circles – having served in the Council of Government in Port 
Louis – he became instrumental in this regard, with his efforts culminating in the 
establishment of the Mauritian Labour Party (MLP) in 1936399. Indeed, the Labour Party 
became the vanguard of the workers and was founded on a strong social democratic ethos. 
The emergence of the Labour Party in championing progressive causes to the benefit 
of the lower classes is reminiscent of the rise of the Labour Party (LP) in South Africa. The 
latter emerged in the political radar to champion mainly the interests of the élite skilled 
workers, but later accommodated the politically destitute poor Afrikaners, who came from 
the rural areas and who would then form the party’s majority support base. As I discussed 
earlier in Chapter 3, the workers’ mobilisation against economic marginalisation triggered 
the ruling élite to consider the plight of the working poor and consequently the broader 
poor white society as a whole. The Mauritius Labour Party also followed suit; they first 
pulled no punches in making a case for constitutional reforms, being highly critical of the 
colonial government for “subservience to the capitalist class”400. Secondly, the Labour Party 
called for the repeal of the 1922 Labour Ordinance on the grounds that it was still holding 
onto the penal clauses of the 1878 Labour Ordinance. The 1922 ordinance legalised the 
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punishment of workers, servants and labourers in the event of cessation of work duties 
after the staging of industrial action401. The Labour Party argued that “legislation [ought] to 
be introduced in Mauritius to ensure the working classes the right to association by trade 
unions, old-age pensions and other measures recommended” as per the standards of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO)402. Thirdly, the Labour Party made the call for better 
wages and living conditions, as well as means of support to provide for old age. The idea 
was that it would have a ripple effect of being of benefit to the families whose livelihoods 
depended on the workers403.  
However, it was the call for social reforms that triggered support across both the 
lower and middle classes. The labour movement in Mauritius, unlike that in South Africa in 
the first quarter of the 20th century, did not define itself as a ‘labour aristocracy’ by focusing 
attention solely on worker’s issues, but also looked at issues of interest to other groups.  
The 1929 depression proved critical in this regard. The living conditions continued to 
deteriorate further, whilst the prices for basic commodities were also spiralling out of 
control. Even some estates acknowledged that some of the labouring poor were 
“underpaid” and “underfed”. The poor relief measures employed by the colonial 
government to mitigate the effects of the depression were considered grossly 
inadequate404. In the views of the subordinate classes, the inadequacy of poor-relief 
measures was tantamount to refusal by the colonial government to act responsibly.  
Like the Rand Revolt which broke out in 1922 to mark a period of significant change 
in South Africa, the violent industrial action embarked upon by the workers on the estates in 
1937 evoked the same effect. It resulted in the death of five workers – four at the hands of 
the managers in the factories and one at the hands of the police. Mauritius had reached a 
moment of political reckoning, with the workers leading the discourse on social justice. The 
1938 stevedores’ strike405 and the 1943 strike406 illustrated their determination in this 
regard (see next section). Although no evidence linked the Labour Party to the incitement of 
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violence, there were some indications that the influence of the LP did have a bearing on all 
these violent activities. The demonstrators who incited violence were members of the 
General Workers Union (GWU) and Amalgamated Labourers Association (ALA), which 
supported the inception of the Labour Party in 1937. Other unions that also were able to 
trace their origins to the LP were the Engineering and Technical Workers’ Union (ETWA), the 
Mauritius Agricultural Labourer’s Association (MALA) and the Indian cultural association. It 
is said that these workers’ associations were the brainchild of the core leadership of the 
Labour Party, which was determined to bridge the ethnic chasm dividing the Indo-
Mauritians and the Creoles in the war against social injustice407.  
Whilst industrial action marked a significant moment of setting on course the social 
justice discourse in Mauritius, Matthew Lange highlights the role of critical junctures in 
determining the island’s developmental trajectories. Lange argues that the period after 
WWII marked a period of increasing state-society relations in Mauritius, since colonial 
administrators shifted focus from the maintenance of law to human wellbeing408. His 
assertions seem to insinuate that these changes were applicable not only to the area of 
development policy, but also to other aspects relating to it, such as social policy. Like Grier 
referred to in previous sections, he fails to acknowledge that colonialism put the notion of 
social policy and development on separate domains; they were yet to be seen as 
interlocking areas that could not be divorced to operate on separate planes as colonial 
policy intended. 
There is no denying that the post-WWII period was characterised by major 
improvements in the quality of life for the people in the British dominions, especially in such 
areas as health care and the eradication of malaria. However, these policies and the budgets 
that accompanied them were agreed upon by the colonial officials and the technocrats from 
Whitehall. As such they were not the outcome of internal policy reform processes taking 
place within the British dominions themselves. Moreover, the Colonial Office in London 
stated in explicit terms that finances were not to be channelled to the provision of pensions. 
That condition, as in all British dominions, meant that Mauritius was expected to finance 
further improvements in social welfare from locally sourced funds and not from the coffers 
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of Whitehall. What ushered in social reforms was not solely the change in the colonial 
attitudes towards social responsiveness in the colonies after the Second World War, as 
Matthew Lange seems to suggest. Instead, it was also owing to the rise of social policy 
discourse within the colonial state in Mauritius through the relentless campaigns of a cross-
class movement comprised of the working class, proletarianised small landholders, and 
middle-class small planters. They articulated their grievances through riots and industrial 
demonstrations in the quest to challenge the ruling élite to be more responsive to the plight 
of the poor. From there onwards, the struggle towards social reforms became a very long 
one. Cross-class collaborations championed these reforms, forcing or prompting a change in 
attitude by the colonial government. These dynamics are depicted in the next section. 
4.4.1. The Long Road towards Achieving Social and Political Reforms, 1937 to 
1945 
The 1937 industrial action prompted action on the part of the state to appoint the procurer-
general, Mr Charles Hooper, to head a commission of inquiry tasked with investigating the 
causes of the riots. Based on its findings, the Commission presented a very candid report 
that highlighted the negative impact the complacency of the colonial government had in 
addressing the subject of workers’ rights on the estates and the debilitating state of 
wellbeing across the broader spectrum of Mauritian society409. The committee thus 
concluded that reforming industrial relations should be viewed as a sine qua non and that 
the state should do so urgently. On the issue of societal wellbeing, the committee 
recommended the introduction of pensions and sickness insurance and that expert advice 
be sought to investigate the possibility, on the condition that the reforms “apply to all 
sections of the population and not merely to persons employed in the sugar industry”410.  
 Despite these recommendations, then Governor Jack refused to implement them, 
maintaining that social security was a luxury that the colony could not afford411. The Labour 
Party also contended in 1939 that allowing for political and social reforms to take place in 
Mauritius would be in accordance with British libertarian traditions, which championed the 
extension of equity to coloured workers within the Empire. Yet these sentiments failed to 
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get the sympathy of the new governor, Sir Bede Clifford, who replaced Governor Jack in 
1937 after serving as the governor of Barbados412.  
Whilst local colonial officials were sympathetic to the provision of welfare, these 
officials were unsure how local Mauritian capital would react. Ormsby-Gore therefore 
related that “we may have some trouble with the more conservative planters etc, but a 
more progressive labour policy in Mauritius as elsewhere is a policy which I desire to see 
carried out by the Governor”413.  
 The governor, Clifford, instituted more equitable employment relations as a means 
to achieve greater social stability. He created the Department of Labour in 1938 and 
appointed Edward Twining as its director, along with labour inspectors to help fulfil its 
functions414. Representative committees were created in accordance with the objectives of 
the Department, and they comprised small planters and large estates so that there was 
clear communication flow of government framework to the respective owners. This ushered 
in the passing of the 1938 Labour Ordinance, which set minimum standards for wages and 
working conditions, as well as the establishment of an Industrial Association Ordinance. 
Significantly, the latter marked the repeal of laws that outlawed union formation in 
Mauritius415. 
However, in a bid to avoid the pressure from the left, Clifford nominated only 
wealthy mill owners and affluent merchants when the secretary of state proposed that he 
appoints two more members to the Legislative Council. It was only when one of his 
preferred candidates died that he appointed Seewoosagur Ramgoolam to the Council, who 
subscribed to the social democratic ethos he learnt from the Fabian Society during the time 
he was studying medicine in London416. Likewise his humble background had the effect of 
predisposing him to fight for the cause of the poor. Clifford appointed him because he 
believed him to be less of an agitator, pragmatic and an Anglophile417.  
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The devil was in the detail, since Ramgoolam was more loyal to the progressive 
cause than any of Clifford’s earlier nominees and he became one of the key drivers of 
Mauritius’s social reforms agenda418. Hence, upon his arrival from the United Kingdom (UK), 
Ramgoolam went on to found the newspaper called Advance, which was intent on 
highlighting the plight of the lower classes. When he was elected to the Council in 1940 he 
exploited his position to chant progressive rhetoric and the need to improve the conditions 
of the downtrodden. He was already indicating the need for welfare-oriented policy, 
charging that the government take seriously the issue of education, health and welfare 
generally. Eventually, his presence in the Council was accompanied by positive changes in 
the 1940s, as the colonial government started softening its stance on the subject of social 
legislation (see following sections). Ultimately, his joining of the Labour Party in 1950 united 
the Hindu élite and the Creole and Hindu working classes and made the party truly a cross-
class collaboration movement419.  
Clifford’s continued antagonism precipitated another industrial action the following 
year, in 1938. Although considered peaceful, the state declared a state of emergency and 
banishing some within the key echelons of the Labour Party’s leadership, such as Emmanuel 
Anquetil, to the island of Rodriguez. Twining was appointed to head a commission 
investigating the causes of the riots and, in his reply, he reiterated Hooper’s sentiments that 
government’s disdain towards alleviating the plight of the workers, even against the 
background of the 1938 Ordinance, was a cause for concern420. Twining also did not hold 
back to state that the “breakdown” in the system of old age remained one of the major 
factors that put the colony on the brink of social dislocation if the colonial government did 
not make swift intervention to address adequately the issue.  
However, Twining’s report ended up blighting prospects of a socially inclusive 
framework seeing the light of day because of its support of a contributory social security 
and not a tax-funded one. It argued that it was unfair “that the full responsibility of 
providing for the aged should be transferred entirely from the family to the tax payer”421. 
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The report thus called for prioritisation of old-age pensions and health insurance to 
commence at the cost of £22 000 p.a. and £60 000 p.a. respectively422. Prospects of 
introducing Unemployment Insurance were not explored as they were considered at the 
outset to be financially unsustainable. These proposals were in sync with the British 
approach which favoured the contributory format. The Labour Advisor Orde-Brown’s 
revised his less protagonist stance after his visit to Mauritius in 1941 wherein he bemoaned 
the inadequacy of the poor relief measures relied upon to meet the poor halfway. But many 
in the Colonial Office remained obstinate desiring for Mauritius not to emulate the 
Beveridge model since it was not an ‘advanced’ colony to be financially prepared to 
undertake such measures423. 
Against the background of the Twining Report, the only commissioner in the 
Committee who was coloured, Dr E Millien, levelled heavy criticism against the Committee 
for not exploring all avenues important to make such recommendations. He argued that the 
Committee was biased against the lower classes from the outset, since the process allowed 
for submissions from the sugar estates but not from the working classes. The second most 
damning rebuttal showed that Twining was in possession of reports detailing the non-
contributory old-age pension schemes of South Africa and Barbados, but refused to circulate 
it to the commissioners for consideration. On the other hand, he opted to circulate the one 
that detailed the British social insurance system instead. Dr Millen himself happened to 
have been in possession of the reports424. 
It is not clear why Twining kept the reports to himself. By drawing parallels to the 
development of the welfare state in South Africa during the first half of the 20th century 
(illustrated in Chapter 3), we may cast some light on this issue. Firstly, after studying the two 
reports, Twining might have discovered that non-contributory social assistance for the poor 
was affordable and that Mauritius did not have to explore contributory social insurance 
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before embarking on the tax-funded, more publicly-oriented model. Secondly, since the 
South African model was tax financed, Twining probably believed it was going to be too 
costly for the tax payer in Mauritius. But in reality, Twining would have been protecting the 
interests of the sugar capitalists in that regard, because in retrospect a tax-funded system in 
Mauritius meant that the wealthy plantocracy was going to have to incur most of the tax 
burden. After all, the South African welfare experience set a precedent for the business 
sector in Mauritius since (I suspect) it was demonstrated in the South African report that 
getting business on board was possible as long as there was evidence showing that they 
would benefit from footing part of the bill. The issue in the case of Mauritius was not 
whether business was willing to cooperate, but instead whether there existed the political 
will to get big capital to play its part in the cause of economic redistribution. In short, whilst 
the political ruling classes in South Africa were able to get business to make an élite 
compromise, the colonial government in Mauritius was determined to protect big capital 
from assuming that responsibility.  
The governor who was appointed to replace Clifford in 1943, Donald Mackenzie-
Kennedy425, followed in the footsteps of his predecessor by towing back and forth on the 
subject of social assistance. He would nonetheless be confronted on his arrival by the 
violent industrial action of 1943, which claimed the lives of three protestors at the hands of 
the police. Not only was this an indication of a brutal onslaught on the daring lower classes, 
but the case of Mauritius seems to confirm the premise that where capital seems to wield a 
great degree of influence, the state machinery is usually deployed to carry out acts of 
repression against those who challenge the status quo. The Mauritian industrial 
development experience also has a striking resemblance to South Africa’s. The bloody 
revolts in South Africa in the gold mines in 1922 and in the platinum belt of South Africa at 
Marikana in 2012 demonstrate the often unholy alliance between the state and capital and 
the complexity of incorporating labour into policy processes (see Chapters 3 and 6 
respectively).  
Nonetheless, Mackenzie-Kennedy’s presence within the area of social reforms was 
overshadowed by post-WWII shifts in the attitude of the British government. The reality of 
poverty in the colonies was no longer a subject of petty political bickering in the Commons 
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of Westminster; it was instead growing into a reality that potentially could compromise the 
integrity of the colonial project as a whole. The British government created grants or 
exchequer loans under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1945 to help improve 
educational and health provision in the colonies, as well help eliminate malaria426. This piece 
of legislation served as an amendment of those that preceded it, such as the Colonial 
Development Act of 1940 (and a sequence of twenty-two others that preceded it) and the 
Atlantic Charter of 1942. It revealed an acceptance both within the Colonial Office and the 
Treasury that the principle of territorial self-sufficiency for colonial governments’ recurrent 
expenditure had to be abandoned427. These financial measures, which started pouring into 
the coffers of the colonies after WWII, ensured that the “British state expenditure would be 
directed towards the promotion of welfare to pre-empt social unrest and the promotion of 
investment to make any political possibility for self-government economically 
permissible”428.  
No colony had the authority to use the grants in any form other than the way they 
had been designed by Whitehall. For Mauritius, which had been engrossed in the debate on 
the possibility of introducing the old-age pension system for nine years, the chances of the 
state footing the social assistance bill came to naught429. Nonetheless, in other areas of 
benevolence, the colonial state in Mauritius began to make strides to shorten the social 
distance between the administration and the poor in the rural areas. The pendulum in the 
approach shifted from one of social aloofness to embeddedness underpinned by strong 
state-society synergies, whilst the institutional structures of the colony ensured that private 
business interests remained intact. Within a few years the colonial government appointed 
100 village and district councils, which got the communities to participate in policy matters. 
The state started to become familiarised with local circumstances, inevitably filling the 
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structural holes between the state and society that enhanced developmental outcomes430. 
The community began to have a bigger say in the establishment of and maintenance of 
collective goods, whilst the state in turn became compelled to listen to its subjects and take 
note.431 
Government ventured to expand its battery of social welfare programmes, 
concentrating on health, education and programmes geared towards the alleviation of 
poverty. These were dominated mainly by the introduction of emergency employment 
programmes, the provision of milk to school pupils and decentralising the administration of 
public assistance432. Yet pensions had not yet entered the social welfare landscape of 
Mauritius, despite the Fabian Colonial Bureau campaigning in 1943 to have non-
contributory and contributory pensions recognised as of “particular importance433.  
However, as shown in the previous section, the decentralisation of public 
administration replaced the old, socially aloof, centralised method. This system emphasised 
societal participation as its hallmark, ensuring greater access even to social security after 
pensions were introduced in 1950. The government was able to achieve its social mandate 
by improving its bureaucratic capacity, which expedited state revenue collection. For 
instance, because of this coordination capacity, in 1947 alone the Mauritian state managed 
to collect 17 per cent of the colony’s gross national product (GNP). This amount expanded 
to over 25 per cent of GNP in 1967, following the introduction of corporate and personal 
income taxes in 1950434. Matthew Lange has drawn a model that depicted the reality of this 
newfound approach of decentralised public administration in Mauritius, as well as its 
ultimate impact on outcomes on the social development landscape. 
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FIGURE 4.1: A CAUSAL CHAIN SHOWING COLONIAL STATE-BUILDING AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITIUS 
Source: Ibid, p. 403 
The integration of strong associations and the increased state-society nexus into the new 
development framework as illustrated in Figure 4.2 provided a fertile ground to plant social 
democratic traditions deep within the socio-political fabric of Mauritius. The effects of these 
networks in sowing the seeds of social democracy existed on two different levels of analysis. 
First of all, these networks served the purpose of being the Colonial State’s key channel of 
communication, as they engaged the local population on matters that concerned the 
beneficence of the broader spectrum of society, namely the construction of irrigation, river 
canalisation, draining marshes, and the application of insecticides to the internal surfaces of 
buildings in a bid to prevent the spread of water- and insect-borne diseases. Hence the 
proportion of deaths caused by malaria were reduced significantly, from 23 per cent in 1945 
to zero in 1956, whilst the deaths caused by infectious and parasitic diseases were reduced 
significantly, from 4 053 in 1948 to 187 in 1967.435 
 These networks went on to offer a strong political backing to the centre-left 
movement436. Indeed, the reformist measures of the colonial state came at the instruction 
of the higher colonial office in London, not at the behest of the mass movement, which had 
protested for social inclusion before. However, there is no escaping the fact that the 
introduction of pro-poor programmes served to cement the confidence of the lower classes 
in the Labour Party. Furthermore, they reaffirmed its relevance not only as a reliable 
champion of the poor that delivers on its promises. The Labour Party was urban-based, but 
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these dense associational networks in the rural areas became instrumental in mobilising the 
rural support required to garner patronage across class lines on the island.  
 In the next discussion we see these dynamics being played out in the political 
landscape when the political voting platform was opened to nearly all subordinate classes. 
The following discussion reveals that, whilst the colonial state began to embrace the notion 
of a welfare-based approach towards development, only once an influential centre-left 
movement emerged to shape government policy did the kind of path dependence emerge 
that would lead to the development of a more social democratic order. So far, the cross-
class movement, community-based cultural associations, and a decentralised system of 
development were instrumental in contributing to this path dependence. 
4.2. Democratising the State and Paving the Path of Social Democracy, 1945 to 
1967 
Reforms in the social security sector in Mauritius reached a high point after the Colonial 
Office began focusing on broad-based development. Thanks to Mackenzie-Kennedy for 
attaching importance to constitutional reforms, the political landscape was headed towards 
a significant overhaul towards being inclusive. Mackenzie-Kennedy changed the name of the 
Council of Government to Legislative Council. He also wasted no time in extending the 
franchise to literate adult men and women in 1947, whilst universal franchise was extended 
in 1959. In 1947 the colonial state had begun reverting back to informal development and 
non-programmatic welfare framework, with social assistance scrapped from its agenda437. 
These weaknesses added to the competitive streak of the Mauritius Labour Party, which 
campaigned vigorously for a progressive framework that encompassed, amongst other 
things, the significance of the old-age pension scheme for the majority poor. With the 
voters’ roll having increased from 12 000 to a staggering 70 000, the MLP was able to garner 
the most support, which as a result reduced the representation of the Franco-Mauritian 
settler community in the Legislative Council to only one438. The political landscape of 
Mauritius was changed irrevocably in 1948, when the Labour Party rose to political 
prominence, whilst those used to calling the shots had virtually no say on matters 
concerning governance. 
                                                          
437
 Seekings, Jeremy, Op. Cit, 2011, p. 172 
438
 Hazareesingh, K, Op. Cit, p. 117 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
 
 
 
 Mackenzie-Kennedy was replaced in 1949 by Governor Hilary Blood, who gave in to 
pressure from the members of the Legislative Council to debate the motion seeking to have 
the non-contributory social insurance introduced439. It was passed and came into law in 
1950, making provision for the extension of old-age pensions at Rs 12/month with the 
application of a means test to all men and women from the age of 65440. Policymakers had 
initially planned to revise the non-contributory social assistance method by introducing a 
contributory one. However, with the progressive caucus disproportionately skewed in 
favour of the MLP, there was no chance of retracting this initiative. Table 4.1 below shows 
that, by 1967, the social security sector received the lion’s share of the government’s public 
expenditure budget, at over Rs 30 million, whereas that for its close rival, education, stood 
at slightly over Rs 28 million441. These measures were dominated mainly by pensions and 
outdoor relief, at the cost of 10 per cent of the government’s recurrent expenditure or the 
equivalent of two per cent of GDP. Meanwhile, additional cash benefits aimed at the poor 
were introduced in the 1960s442. By contrast, in 1947 the government budget earmarked for 
social security paled in comparison, at Rs 0.6 million when paralleled with that for the other 
sectors, such as education and health, which were at Rs 4.6 million combined443.  
Explaining the spending was the soaring increase in social security beneficiaries 
between 1950 and 1959, standing at 1 600 per cent compared to the increase in school 
attendance (140 per cent) and reduction in mortality (140 per cent) and death rates (200 
per cent)444. Also contributing to this upward trend of increase in social security spending 
was the elimination of the affluence test in 1958, which made accessibility to pensions a 
right for all elderly citizens who, by reason of age and not assets, were eligible for a 
government pension payout. Hence, the number of social security beneficiaries doubled 
from 22 082 in 1950 to 48 815 in 1959, with 26 000 of that number placed on the pension 
payroll445 representing a 65 per cent increase from the 17 000 of 1953446.   
                                                          
439
 Seekings, Jeremy, Op. Cit, 2011, p. 172 
440
 Loc cit 
441
 About 2 per cent of GDP was spent on public assistance including pensions. It is said that these measures 
were modest, but they at least paved the path for future developments in the social security sector.  
442
 Ulriksen, Marianne, Op. Cit, 2009, p. 183; and Seekings, Jeremy, Op. Cit, 2011, p. 158 
443
 Lange, Matthew, Op. Cit, 2003, p. 415 
444
 Lange, Matthew, Op. Cit, 2003, p. 414 
445
 Seekings, Jeremy, Op. Cit, 2011, p.  
446
 Colony of Mauritius, Annual Colonial Report, 1953, Port Louis: Government Printers, 1953, p. 84 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
158 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.1: SOCIAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN MAURITIUS, 1947 TO 1968 
 
Source: Lange, Matthew, Op. Cit, 2003, p. 415447 
 Even with such improvements in the social security sector, some groups in the 
Legislative Council sought to reverse these welfare reforms by charging that there ought to 
be a reversion to the contributory scheme as initially promised. Social democratic 
supporters, led by F.S. Chadien within the Legislative Council, argued on normative grounds 
that it was the responsibility of the state to look after the vulnerable elderly, since they had 
contributed to the building of the economy over the years: 
The old age pensioner has throughout the years paid taxes on commodities he had 
consumed as everyone else had. He had paid taxes on tea, sugar, tobacco, 
matches, rice, pulse, dried fish, rum, calico, khakhi, everything he had consumed 
and used to be able to live as useful member of our society. One way or another 
he has contributed to the national budget. The Old Age Pension scheme being 
financed out of public funds is contributory one. The applicant for Old Age Pension 
has already paid in his contributions448. 
 
The Labour Party continued to remain steadfast to social democratic traditions and they 
were unwavering in their conviction that the provision of pensions was the most effective 
strategy to bridge the social divide. The Labour Party’s remarks in the Legislative Assembly 
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in 1950 (following the passing of the pension legislation) demonstrate that the party 
understood the provision of state-funded pensions to be the primary marker of the state’s 
commitment to social democracy. Hence the Labour Party related on that occasion that 
“[t]he fact that we have unanimously passed such a measure of the old age pension is no 
doubt that we are all progressive in this country”449. However, the social policies in 
Mauritius did not receive much attention until after the island obtained its independence in 
1968. The political élite in Mauritius, including those within the Labour Party, were 
preoccupied with the prospect of power being handed over from Britain in 1968450.  
The period was also characterised by the emergence of new political formations The 
Creoles and the Franco-Mauritian alike had begun harbouring fears of the Hindu hegemony, 
charging that the Hindu-dominated Labour Party was determined to create a Hindu state in 
Mauritius. The Creoles feared that they would not have access to opportunities when Britain 
relinquished control of the island, whilst the Franco-Mauritians were of the view that MLP 
was going to have an anti-capitalist outlook. Indeed, it was fear of subversion that helped 
the Creoles and the Franco-Mauritians to find common ground and they ended up forming 
the Parti Mauricien (PMSD), which opposed the idea of political independence from 
Britain451. Inevitably, the PMSD became the party of capital, just as the SAP of General 
Smuts was in South Africa. 
However, the fear of subversion held by the Creoles and the Franco-Mauritians was 
not without reason. The consolidation of democracy in Mauritius in the late 1940s did 
encourage changes in the social class landscape, with various ethnic groups dominating 
specific areas of specialisation in the economy. Still remaining at the top were the Franco-
Mauritians, followed by the middle-class Creoles, the Chinese and Muslims dominating 
trade, and Indo-Mauritians remaining at the bottom. Nevertheless, Indians began having a 
significant presence in the economy, although never reaching the level of the Franco-
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Mauritians452. As Benedict Burton contends, “economically and occupationally Mauritius 
appears to be undergoing a change … to a society which is economically stratified with each 
group pursuing a whole range of occupations”453. The strides owing to Indians’ dominance 
of the civil service afforded them a standard of living higher than that of their counterparts 
in their native India454. Thus the rise of the Indo-Mauritians – however marginal it may have 
been as a phenomenon – was enough to cause much agitation amongst the Franco-
Mauritians and (especially) the Creoles. The latter were convinced that the rise of Indo-
Mauritians to political prominence would condemn them to economic marginalisation455. 
The 1967 elections helped to dispel these myths. Both parties, the LP and PMSD, 
were not able to gain an outright majority456. It provided an opportune moment to create a 
government of national unity by forging coalitions between the Hindu-based MLP and the 
party of capital457. Instead of this trust coming at the cost of displacing social reforms, as it 
did in post-apartheid South Africa, it rather cemented the social democratic welfare 
consensus for post-colonial Mauritius (see Chapter 5). The MLP contended that close 
cooperation with the PMSD was expedient for the quest for national harmony and for 
fostering the spirit of national reconstruction. But it is clear here that the MLP’s actions 
were not out of character, given the large number of middle class members in its ranks who 
tossed the party’s ideological direction somewhat to the right of the ideological spectrum, 
just as the National Party in South Africa became more neo-liberal by the 1990s. In the next 
chapter I argue that this specific development – the adoption of market-friendly policy 
choices – was crucial in setting the tone for private-public partnerships towards the 
upholding of the social democratic ethos during the post-colonial period. 
4.3. Conclusion  
The journey towards welfare state development in Mauritius was not smooth sailing, with 
the colonial state making sufficient interventions upon the realisation of the appalling social 
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and economic conditions of the lower classes. If anything, the colonial state’s response was 
characterised by antagonism ascribed to the following reasons: (a) the British poor laws 
were highly restrictive in the area of social responsiveness and, (b) whilst the British colonial 
administrators consolidated their political presence in Mauritius, the Franco-Mauritian élite 
held the power to control government policy and the nature of its responsive mechanisms. 
This exacerbated the plight of the lower classes because neither party in power appeared to 
pay attention to their grievances. 
However, the progressive struggle in Mauritius became pioneered by the working 
poor, who mobilised a cross-class coalition to stand united against the state’s lack of 
intervention to resolve the situation of poor wages and working conditions. Unlike their 
South African counterparts during the early phases of welfare state development, the 
working classes in Mauritius did not adopt the workerist attitude that sought to protect the 
interests of the working poor and neglected the plight of the poor. In Mauritius, the workers 
had a genuine sense of solidarity with the general poor, since the working poor understood 
that their struggle would be half-won if it did not reflect the plight of the broader spectrum 
of Mauritian society as well. The source of this consensus was the solidarity in the villages, 
as well as the alliance between the small-scale farmers, the working class and the middle 
class, which was absent in South Africa. Moreover, in South Africa, communicating the 
struggle of the working classes so as to encompass those of the broader poor white society 
was non-existent. As a result, the South African welfare state was initially limited to whites. 
Ultimately garnering the support of the middle classes, who felt equally marginalised 
by the wealthy plantocracy, the middle class rallied behind the workers and led the social 
responsiveness struggle, which tried to get the state to act through violent resistance. 
Together they formed one cross-class mass mobilisation with the determination to address 
the issues around equity and fairness guided by the values of social democracy. This 
culminated in the establishment of the Mauritius Labour Party, which, through its 
connections with its sister party in the United Kingdom, garnered the courage and resilience 
to continue fighting for the progressive cause. 
What the lower classes wanted in Mauritius were constitutional reforms to correct 
the inequalities of the global capitalist system in which Mauritius was embedded. Matthew 
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Lange458 and Jeremy Seekings459 attribute the emergence of the welfare state in Mauritius 
to the change in the colonial stance towards the notion of welfare during the post-1945 era, 
as well as the relentless spirit of the social democratic movement in Mauritius. Whilst the 
colonial government kicked off the welfare agenda upon receipt of funds from Whitehall in 
1945, the idea of a programmatic welfare approach was abruptly scrapped from the agenda 
by 1947. This means that the extension of the franchise in 1947, which invariably catapulted 
the social democratic movement into the Legislative Council, became the saving grace of the 
welfare state that was on the verge of being retrenched. The Labour Party bolstered the 
progressive caucus in the apparatus of government. It ensured not only the restoration of a 
welfare ethos in the Mauritian social fabric, but made sure that the welfare state became 
synonymous with non-contributory social assistance and universal old-age pensions in 
particular. These virtues laid the foundations upon which the post-colonial welfare 
paradigm would be modelled spanning through time into the 21st century. As shown in 
Chapter 5, the pragmatism of the Labour Party, its forward-looking approach, and its 
determination to foster public-private synergies after independence ensured that the 
ideological orientation of the welfare state remained true to form. 
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Chapter V: Retaining the Social Democratic Welfare Consensus in 
Post-Colonial Mauritius, 1968 – 2013 
 
“And they (the political parties in Mauritius) seem to recognise that, at the end of the day, 
they will be left with what they started with: an agricultural colony, created by empire in an 
empty island and always meant to be part of something larger, now given a thing called 
independence and set adrift, abandoned imperial barracoon, incapable of economic or 
cultural autonomy. They (the Mauritians) have such confidence in their rights, their votes, 
the power of their opinions.” 
 – Vidiadhar Surajprasad Naipaul460 
5.1. Introduction 
At the time of its independence in 1968, Mauritius exhibited the features of a nation not 
poised for a smooth transition from colonial rule. As shown in Chapter 4, the violence that 
erupted in that country in 1967 was a succinct reminder that Mauritius was a deeply divided 
society that espoused divergent views on whether or not the island should be granted 
independence from Britain. However, it became clear that the politics of independence 
were a cover up of the deep-seated divisions that had been simmering within the Mauritian 
social landscape. Indeed, the real bone of contention was the disproportionate distribution 
of the country’s wealth, which had been based along ethnic lines. The violence became a 
demonstration of this discontentment, with those who had always sat on the margins of 
society (and the political sidelines) resorting to violence as a way of venting their 
frustrations. Compounding this grim reality was an economy that was in dire straits, with a 
GDP per capita (viz. measure of a country’s average income) that plummeted to $190 in 
1968461, whilst the GDP had been falling annually at a rate of seven per cent462. 
Unemployment was soaring at 20 per cent and it was coupled with a disturbingly high birth 
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rate of three per cent463. Indeed, the high rate of population increase concerned 
policymakers, especially when considering that the island was 720 square miles with over 
900 persons accommodated per square mile464. Mauritius was as such described by James 
Meade as a classical case of a Malthusian economy – one that was characterised by a 
population boom, yet with the lack of economic capacity to absorb its workforce465.  
As an antidote to Mauritius’s lack of social progress, James Meade thus postulated 
that “... the welfare state becomes indispensable if the population at large is to be assured a 
share of the country’s output”466. However desired or highly recommended social progress 
may have been, it was clear that it was unaffordable for this economically fragile island. 
James Meade himself provided evidence that diversifying the economy should be the 
primary preoccupation of the incoming government, since monocrop sugar dependence was 
depriving the country from realising its economic potential467. Nevertheless, even with such 
ambitious goals, Mauritius could not be expected to kick-start and nurse a successful 
industrialisation course given that it was apparently “too small to be a viable nation”468.  
Since then, Mauritius has risen above its challenges and has been hailed by Richard 
Sandbrook469, Richard Kearney470, Thomas Meisenhelder471 and Barbara and Thomas 
Carroll472 as a model for countries on a similar development scale to turn their fortunes. 
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Hence with the absence of natural resources, it has been able to turn the limitations of the 
sugar industry into strength by investing the sugar profits into commercial enterprises. That 
sheer determination has since turned Mauritius into a high middle income country. On the 
social development front Mauritius has also risen to the challenge. It is shown in this 
chapter that the configurations of subordinate class forces which gave life to the reform 
movement during colonial days retained the same momentum after independence and thus 
kept the country’s universal welfare consensus true to its character. As the government 
understands the notion of social justice not as a peripheral aspect of development, but as an 
interlocking component of success which ought to be pursued with as much vigour and 
determination as the quest for growth. Mauritius is consistently ranked first or second in 
Africa in human development indices of the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP)473. Compared to its counterpart South Africa, Mauritius’s social security and welfare 
budget is significantly higher as it currently accounts for 6.7 per cent of the country’s GDP 
while Basic Retirement Pensions represent 33 per cent of the welfare expenditure474. In 
South Africa the government’s overall welfare expenditure as percentage of GDP is 3.5 per 
cent with pensions accounting for 1.3 per cent of GDP (See Chapter 6).  
This chapter aims to assess the forces which enabled a social democratic consensus 
to remain continuous in post-colonial Mauritius. It looks in particular at the precedence of 
the old-age pension scheme within the broader scheme of the social development 
framework of the island and how they remained uncompromised against the background of 
a neoliberal macroeconomic framework. What makes the study of Mauritius’s social 
development trajectory compelling is the fact that its welfare state-building experience was 
emulated by that of post-apartheid South Africa whereby the new government adopted 
policies of the previous dispensation to inform its current social development agenda. 
Indeed Richard Sandbrook et al attest to the common trend which characterises the 
resilience of most social democratic regimes. They make the case that such development 
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experiences do not exist in a vacuum as their mere emergence takes record of those salient 
historical features which conferred them their genetic code475.  
However, Sandbrook et al seem to suggest that welfare regimes are not 
indispensable. What they missed is that there can never be guarantees that the factors 
which enabled social democracy to prevail in the previous dispensation will remain 
unchanged in the new one. Inevitably the context also changes for social groups to create 
welfare regime. There is more to why Mauritius retained (a) its social democracy ethos, and 
(b) its old-age pension scheme to remain being integral to its social development framework 
than just historical antecedents. A strong sense of a national ownership for the notion of the 
welfare state is embedded deeply within the Mauritian social fabric and this culture has 
kept social democratic ethos firmly intact in that country. This chapter therefore argues that 
at each stage of change in the political economy of Mauritius, cross-class collaborations 
arose to serve as counterweight against pressures to rollback the welfare state and its social 
democratic foundations.  
This chapter has been divided into two parts. Section I illustrates the response of the 
ruling élites to Mauritius’s social challenges in the post-colonial period. I argue that the 
embrace of the social democratic traditions of Fabianism by the leadership of the Labour 
Party-led government set Mauritius on a socially conscious development path. Its grassroots 
and mass mobilisation traditions compelled the new incumbents not to lose sight of the 
promises they made to their supporters. I note this period as an important phase of the 
transition from colonial rule which set to serve as critical junctures. This early social 
conditioning of the economy in the post-colonial era was largely attributable to the fact that 
the social democrats in the high echelons of power refused to back down to the power of 
the market forces to embrace neoliberalism in a raw form. Qualifying this transition 
furthermore as a period of critical junctures is that the social democratic movement 
remained relentless to the pursuit of the progressive project even though they were in 
league with the advocates of free market capitalism, the PMSD.  
This significant period of change had a particular bearing in shaping the orientation 
of the post-colonial economy. I therefore argue that the reaffirmation of the progressive 
                                                          
475
 Sandrook, Richard, et al, Op. Cit, 2007, p. 139 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
167 
 
 
 
principles of the Labour Party in government modified the structural properties of capitalism 
to be those which embraced social development as an integral part of a successful 
development trajectory. This approach ensured that the notion of egalitarianism would be 
regarded as necessary instead of having them disdained by the capitalist economic order. I 
also put into perspective the internal ideological battles which played out between the 
radicals and the moderates within the Labour Party after the latter agreed to close ranks 
with the PMSD. It is in this case that I show that much as the political leadership within the 
Labour Party remained committed to the progressive project, the breakaway of the radical 
Marxist faction to form a political party of their own prevented the Labour Party and the 
government from deflection or even being swayed too intensely into the liberal camp. 
Certainly there is a possibility that without the splinter group having taken cause to sever 
ties, the LP would have possibly compromised its egalitarian beliefs by giving the market 
free rein as to function without being conscious of the notion of social accountability.  
In Section II I assess the configurations of the social forces in adding to the shape and 
resistance of the welfare state. Whilst the notion of a social welfare state had always 
remained an élite concept, it was however formulated against the background of the 
societal makeup of post-colonial Mauritius. Ethnicity played a big part in bolstering the 
notion of social welfare even in the face of ambivalent capitalism. However it is the manner 
in which the ethnic attributes of the Mauritian social fabric are sequenced that were able to 
reinforce a social pact which got communities to agree with government on important 
economic decisions. This framework proved to be reciprocal in form since it also kept the 
government to account on those matters deemed to be of importance to the society. The 
working class are factored in here and how together with the state, business and the 
broader spectrum of society complete a peculiar form of corporatism which makes 
consultations on public policy choices more inclusive. But even more compelling about the 
working class in Mauritius, unlike those in South Africa, is the manner in which they have 
not asserted themselves as a labour aristocracy since together with the public they are able 
to mobilise and overturn unpopular policy choices. That organised workers are able to 
mobilise and bring awareness to the public about policy choices has shown to have the 
automatic effect of playing out into the political voting platform. Through the ballot, voters 
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replace governments which are perceived to be non-egalitarian with incumbents whom 
they believe will stay committed to the progressive agenda.  
Section I: The Overlap of Critical Junctures and the Structural Properties of 
Capitalism in Retaining Egalitarian Ethos in Mauritius 
5.2. Keeping social democratic principles intact in Post-Colonial Mauritius 
Although at independence the economy remained inspired by the neoliberal principles of 
free market, Mauritian political ruling classes were determined from the onset not to give 
the market free rein. They were unflinchingly of Fabian orientation and they espoused the 
doctrine that growth is only desirable if it is kept in sync with the national goals of equal 
redistribution of wealth amongst the poor. They understood that Mauritius could only 
proceed forward as a viable nation if the structural defects in the economy (which widened 
the income gap between the rich and the poor) were not corrected476.  
For instance, at the top of the economic chain was the one per cent of households 
who earned 46.7 per cent of the national income whereas the poorest 20 per cent received 
just four per cent477. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam (SSR), the leader of the Labour Party and 
the father of the new nation, was a self-proclaimed socialist and he believed that Mauritius 
ought to pursue the egalitarian cause so that it progresses into a ‘civilised’ nation. 
Mauritius’s economy was performing poorly and unemployment figures were soaring at an 
average of 20 per cent per annum478.  
The recommendations of the Titmus Commission (1960) and those of James Mead 
(1967) study on the social conditions in Mauritius were hanging over the ruling classes in the 
new independent state. Both reports flagged the inadequacy of the social welfare structure 
on the island which they found to be largely dependent on family arrangements despite the 
fact that the old-age pensions scheme looked after the welfare of the island’s elderly. 
However if anything weighted more heavily on the subject of the need for social reforms, it 
was the ethnic riots that rocked the island in the months running to the elections. Indeed 
the haunting memories of the 1967 ethnic riots between the Muslims and Creoles which led 
to the death of 29 people, 2 473 arrests, the burning of 597 houses and the displacement of 
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700 families were still raw in the memory of the new leadership in government479. As a 
result, the Labour Party seemed perfectly poised to reaffirm its Fabian-oriented socialist 
beliefs which consequently bolstered its societal appeal amongst the voters. The leader of 
the Labour Party, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, was therefore not reluctant to assert that: 
Fabian socialism suited my temperament and I have been a Fabian all my life ... . 
I have tried to cultivate the indefatigable patience of the Fabian philosophy and 
the Fabian belief in moderation and conviction in parliamentary reform and the 
concept of the welfare state wherein the state is viewed as the representative 
and trustee, guardian and protector of the people480. 
During its first term in office, the Labour Party government was in a coalition with the 
neoliberal oriented Parti Mauricien led by Gaëtan Duval, who was known commonly as King 
Creole. However Ramgoolam found it fitting to create a government of national unity as sine 
qua non if there was to be reconciliation that washes across the ethnic spectrum of 
Mauritius. The Labour Party was already enjoying the support of the Muslims as well as vast 
Hindu support through the alliance they entered into with the Muslim-dominated Comité 
d’Action Musulman (CAM) and the Hindu-dominated Independence Forward Block (IFB). 
Together they formed what became known as the Independence Alliance which helped 
secure electoral victory for the Labour Party and thus proclaim Mauritius’s independence 
from Britain. With the Parti Mauricien part of Government, the Labour Party was able to 
cement its credibility since having the Creoles on board sent a message of reconciliation as 
well as that of debunking the popular allegations that the Labour Party was only looking 
after the interests of the Hindus.  
 In this coalition Gaëtan Duval’s party also tried to reassert itself as a movement 
which identifies with the subordinate classes and not just acting as a mouthpiece of the 
economic élite. Consequently the Parti Mauricien tried doing what the ANC did in the 
negotiations leading to the democratic elections in 1994. The former party aligned 
themselves with the Mauritian Trade Union Congress (MTUC) sealing that relationship by a 
name change to Parti Mauricien Sociale Democraté (PMSD) in a bid to underplay its 
neoliberal economic roots. The PMSD, unlike the ANC, was unable to convincingly reassert 
itself as a pro-poor movement as it struggled to shed off its image as a party of the capitalist 
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class since it continued to receive significant electoral and financial support from the 
wealthy Creoles and the Franco-Mauritians. The Labour Party was the only political 
movement at the time that could claim sole custodianship of the centre-left ethos of 
redistribution, through which, as in the case of the ANC, it was able to cement its image as a 
symbol of the political and economic liberator of the marginalised.  
So with the awareness of a diverse constituent base to which the coalition 
government had to account and be sensitive to, the Labour Party decided to seal the 
conciliatory tone with actions. It refused to entertain the Hindu appeal for communalism on 
the grounds that the Labour Party was founded as a trans-ethnic movement and as such 
government’s responsiveness ought to know no racial boundaries. Speaking as the leader of 
the MLP, Seewoosagur Ramgoolam contended that the Hindu community was aspirant 
upper class-oriented in character so the Labour Party could run the risk of sliding on a 
slippery slope towards becoming elitist and out of touch.  
Even with such steadfastness, the workers in the General Workers Union (GWU) 
which was allied with the Labour Party remained uncomfortable that the Labour Party could 
be so accommodating to the proponents of capital. After independence, the Labour Party 
entered into a coalition with the PMSD in a bid to allay the fears of capital that it will turn 
out too radical. These alignments confirmed GWU’s fears that the party’s cordial tone 
towards the PMSD was enough to conclude that it had become elitist in character and it was 
no longer championing the interests of the working class. As such they resolved to sever ties 
with the Labour Party by getting into an alliance with the organisation of radical students 
called Club des Étudiants Mauricien (CEM) of Paul Berengér481. This pro-Marxist alliance 
between the students and the workers culminated in the founding of the Militant 
Mouvement Mauricien (MMM) in 1969. The MMM ended up being dominated by the 
Muslims and it was able to garner their support because it did not raise suspicions of being 
supportive to a specific ethnic community at the expense of minority ones482. But equally so 
it was the radicalism of the MMM calling for nationalisation of the sugar estates and 
redistribution of resources which ended up attracting those feeling displaced in the Labour 
Party to find a political home in it.  
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I argue that the rise of the MMM to the political landscape in Mauritius marked a 
significant turning point in cementing the virtues of social democracy within the socio-
political fabric of the island. Previously, no political party had the ability to challenge the 
position of the Labour Party as the sole custodian of centre-left principles. Even after the 
Parti Mauricien changed its name to Parti Mauricie Sociale Democraté (PMSD), and then 
articulated its presence as defender of social democratic principles, the Labour Party’s 
position remained unthreatened since the PMSD was still perceived as being out of touch. 
However, after the MMM merged with the radicalism of Marxism that they so boldly 
purported, it provided the political alternative to the people of Mauritius. This new addition 
to the political scene resulted in the rise of social democratic doctrines on the political scene 
to be used as a trump card by those parties intent on challenging the dominance of the 
Labour Party.  
What added to the impetus of the MMM is that it partly came out of the womb of 
the Labour Party. Hence, in the important by-elections of 1970, less than a year after it was 
incepted, the MMM took everyone by surprise when the candidate they put up won an 
overwhelming victory, gaining 76 per cent of the vote483. In Mauritius, unlike in South Africa, 
social democratic principles were advanced and cemented much earlier in the post-colonial 
period, leaving long-established centre-left parties no chance to bask on the success of the 
political liberation struggle. The ANC, on the other hand had no centre-left challenger after 
the democratic elections, and even though the leftist quarters in the tripartite alliance were 
discontented about the government having gone too far down the neoliberal route, the 
working class remained unwilling to part ways by way of providing a political alternative to 
the ANC.  
I argue that the existence of the willingness of the ultra left faction within the Labour 
Party in Mauritius to form an alternative defender of social democratic values left behind 
the legacy of a competitive multi-party social democratic discourse. On the other hand, in 
South Africa that awakening is yet to make its mark on the political landscape. Indeed the 
tug of war in South Africa over ideology appears at face value to be between the centre left 
in government and centre right political parties whilst it is apparent that the government in 
league with the liberal camp as far as policy execution is concerned. So there is a lack of 
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preponderance of centre-left political parties dominating the policy debate like in Mauritius 
which could have helped a great deal in causing the ANC to stay committed to the neoliberal 
economic fraternity. I address the configurations of these class actors in the context of 
resilience of the social democratic welfare consensus in Mauritius later on in this chapter as 
well as in the case of South Africa for discussions on the welfare consensus of a different 
form illustrated in Chapter 6. 
5.3. Modifying the Structural Conditions of Capital and the Striking of Élite 
Compromise 
When the Labour Party assumed control in 1968 sugar production alone was to Mauritius 
what mining and manufacturing combined were to South Africa at the time the ANC took 
office. Based on this reality Titmus and Abel-Smith related that Mauritians “ate or starved 
according to the price of sugar”484. Indeed sugar accounted for 99 per cent of exports and 
90 per cent of arable land was earmarked for sugar plantations. However what made Titmus 
and Abel-Smith’s analysis on the social implications of the sugar sector to hit the nail on the 
head was the fact that the sugar production absorbed 70 per cent of the Mauritian 
workforce485. By the end of the 1960s however, the Mauritian economy was struggling with 
a GDP of one per cent486. This served blight to the already frail social and economic 
landscape. Therefore the lacklustre performance of a sugar-dominated economy offered 
little prospects of helping the government to achieve its ambitious plans of carrying out its 
social programme.  
As a strategy to diversify the economy and therefore generate revenues required in 
addressing social problems, government pursued industrialisation. It first experimented with 
import substitution industrialisation (ISI) but due to lack of capital and the absence of a 
domestic market, the plan was abandoned. Secondly government tried export-led 
industrialisation which was pursued through the creation of export processing zones 
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(EPZs)487. To realise the latter, government passed the Export Processing Zone Act of 1970 
which set the wheels of Mauritius’s industrial development trajectory in motion. The Act 
declared every part of Mauritius an industrial development zone whereby investors had the 
freedom to establish business ventures wherever they found it convenient and conducive to 
do so488. As a result the firms which focused on export markets were given tax incentives 
intended to advertise Mauritius to foreign investors as an investment destination of choice 
(See Appendix 5A & 5B)489.  
These economic initiatives marked First Phase of Mauritius’s post-colonial 
development trajectory. Hence, in addition to export-led industrialisation, the government 
ventured to focus on high-end tourism. However, it was manufacturing it paid more 
attention to as it deemed it the catalyst to its long-term growth prospects. It had hoped to 
realise that project through the sugar profits Mauritius accrued from its preferential access 
to the European Economic Community (EEC) through the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) sugar protocol of the Lomé Convention. It was at this stage that the Labour Party’s 
socialist convictions – and whether it would be able to achieve those – were put to the test. 
Mauritius post-colonial economic model followed the simple principle of trying to ensure 
that government revenues pour into the welfare budget to meet its social obligations. 
However, by all accounts post-colonial industrial development in Mauritius was at the mercy 
of private investors as there was less capital within the government coffers to get such 
ambitious projects off the ground. Compounding the situation was the haemorrhaging 
capital which was leaving the Mauritian shores at an alarming rate being exacerbated by a 
massive emigration of wealthy and skilled personnel to other countries (See Chapter 4)490. 
Hence the sugar barons had no interest in keeping capital in Mauritius anymore. In the 
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words of Mannick “[t]he sugar barons stopped investing, banks refused loans, overdrafts 
and credits to small businesses and loan owners”491.  
This grim reality rendered the ruling élite to have had little upper hand in all dealings 
with the private sector. Under normal circumstances, as demonstrated in South Africa 
during the negotiations which led to the democratic elections, big business was positioned 
to have the commanding authority over the policy framework. However the leadership of 
the Labour Party demonstrated better resilience and autonomy compared to that of the 
ANC in handling the pressure coming from the private sector to make the economy more 
neoliberal. The issue of timing effect plays a factor here; hence, in the 1970s the Labour 
Party had better control over the economy compared to the ANC in the 1990s when 
globalisation commanded stronger control over the national economies. As it is shown in 
Chapter 6, the ANC relinquished its social democratic convictions in support of a laissez faire 
management. The Labour Party in Mauritius on the other hand became sterner in approach 
and they resolved to take driver’s seat of the economy instead of leaving the market to their 
own devices.  
The leadership of the Labour Party-led government did adopt a pragmatic approach, 
albeit with conditions. About half of the cabinet studied at the Royal Academy in Curépipe 
ahead of taking up legal studies at the London School of Economics (LSE) where they were 
indoctrinated with Fabianism492. They called for the same level of pragmatism from business 
by charging that the welfare state was unavoidable since business had to be responsive to 
local conditions. For instance, one of Ramgoolam’s cabinet ministers promoted a pro-
business outlook but maintained it should be modified to have a social conscience. It 
amounted to what I contend to be the modification of the structural properties of capital as 
one which had a moderate tone instead of a radical one. As a result the Minister of 
Agriculture in Ramgoolam’s first cabinet, Mr Satcam Boolell, was not shy to mention that 
socialism and the liberal virtues of the economy can be reconciled behind the common 
vision of social change: 
I am a socialist, and for me, the class struggle continues: capitalists against 
workers ... . However, for me as for other, the overriding interest of the country 
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comes first. That interest today is to eliminate unemployment, hunger, 
destitution. My conditions is that the large sugar employers, the groups of the 
Mauritius Sugar Producers Association, give a formal guarantee that they will 
employ the unemployed, those who have been laid off since the introduction of 
the wage councils, and that they will start up other projects. I will support the 
coalition if it leads to work for everyone493.  
Even in the Investment Guides of Small Island States embarking on export-led 
industrialisation, namely Jamaica, Barbados, and Zanzibar amongst others, Mauritius 
reiterated the message of growth with social justice the most (see Appendix 5C)494. This 
outlook did not frighten off investors. Instead, that the Labour Party was in a coalition with 
the party of the business élite, the PMSD, did allay fears amongst the business élite about 
the economic future of the country. Economic take off through garment-dominated export-
led industrialisation did win the support of business from the start. Hence in the 1968 
Annual Report, the Mauritian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MCCI) proclaimed that: 
“... it no longer is relevant to ask whether export industries should be set up. The important 
question is how best to achieve this kind of development”495. Public diplomacy, which was 
executed by government and representatives of the private sector through the exchange of 
cordial gestures in public, served as a means to confirm that both government and business 
were on the same page496. Also Gaëtan Duval, the leader of PMSD, regularly accompanied 
SSR on international engagements as a proxy to assure the West that Mauritius was not 
becoming a communist state497.  
Adding impetus to the determination of government to bring Mauritius out of the 
economic doldrums was the quality of its workforce, which was lauded by employers as 
competent and intelligent enough to guarantee business success498. But perhaps what 
became the main force of attraction to investors was the calibre of the public bureaucracy 
which was set to outline Mauritius’s growth objectives to mimic those of the developmental 
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states in the East Asian Pacific499. Like the Mauritian workforce, public officials too were 
both competent and ethical which helped to entrench the tenets of accountability within 
the system. This shows that the colonial legacy of maintaining bureaucratic control 
remained intact in the post-colony. Mauritius ultimately became more developmental than 
patrimonial, flanked by strong institutions of good governance and prudent economic 
choices500. Results show that each of these unique attributes which defined Mauritius post-
colonial development trajectory i.e. a trustworthy leadership, ambitious development 
targets and a competent workforce, paid off. Hence the economy experienced a meteoric 
rise from 1 per cent in the 1960s to about 10 per cent by the end of the 1970s owed mainly 
to foreign investment pouring into the country and the increase in domestic investment501.  
Ramgoolam acceded to calls by the business community to redistribution of wealth 
through tax instead of assets in a bid to win business confidence and bolster the legitimacy 
of government thereof502. This became the élite compromise which bolstered the notion of 
egalitarianism to become firmly embedded within the social and economic planes of 
Mauritius. However, because the power balance was not disproportionately skewed on the 
side of those who controlled the economy, Mauritius’s form of élite compromise took a 
middle-zone approach.  
By this I mean the state did yield to the demands of business by creating an enabling 
environment through the re-investment of sugar profits to enhance the business 
environment. Meanwhile, business kept their end of the bargain by staying committed to 
the social welfare agenda as a signal of a balanced class compromise struck between the 
two entities. In exchange the private sector was expected to help fund the welfare agenda, 
which they probably found it easy a compromise to make because their commitment served 
to guarantee social stability. It was unlike in South Africa where the balance of power was 
less well distributed in favour of business thus retarding the striking of a sustainable class 
compromise. Hence the government of Mauritius’s decision to re-invest sugar profits to 
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fund 50 per cent of the industry503 must have left a lasting impression in the minds of the 
private sector. In turn business was probably left encouraged to meet government half-way 
as an act of reciprocity and as a carrot-and-stick way to encourage further healthy public-
private working synergies. Wolfgang Lutz asserts that what was responsible for Mauritius’s 
success story was the understanding between government and the private sector that 
empowering ordinary people was paramount504. 
The élite compromise brokered in South Africa on the other hand leaned more to the 
right of the ideological divide as it embraced the whole notion of economic redistribution 
only in part (see Chapter 6). Another reason explaining the striking of a progressive variation 
of an élite compromise in Mauritius could be due to the fact that about 50 per cent of the 
exports processing enterprises were locally owned505 so there was less burden of foreign 
dependency506. As a result, the state was afforded autonomy in development policy without 
trampling social fundamentals. This had an effect of fair distribution of power on the 
negotiation table between the ruling élite in government and the economic élite in the 
private sector. Indeed the creation of the even plane did contribute towards the successful 
negotiation of a socially progressive settlement. Unlike in Mauritius, the private sector in 
South Africa was dominated by foreign-owned mining houses which skewed the power 
balance to become unfavourable to government’s goals of sweeping redistribution. The end 
result was the lesser variation of an élite compromise than in Mauritius as the state was 
carved into acquiescence by the overpowering business sector (See Chapter 6). In the next 
section I demonstrate that the government’s pledged allegiance to market forces set it on a 
collision course with the radical working class movement. 
5.3.1. The Bias of the Labour-led Government against Ultra-leftist Social 
Reformers 
In the discussion above it is apparent that Mauritius’s post-colonial welfare state-building is 
greatly indebted to the leadership of the Labour Party who showed the firm determination 
to champion social responsiveness in the face of market forces. Be that as it may, little 
                                                          
503
 Ulriksen, Marianne. S, Op. Cit, 2009, p. 184 
504
 Wolfgang, Lutz, “Lessons from Mauritius in the Global Context, in Wolfgang, Lutz (ed.): Population – 
Development – Environment: Understanding their Interactions in Mauritius, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1994, p. 
384 
505
 Ulriksen, Marianne. S, Op. Cit, 2009, p. 187 
506
 Meisenhelder, Thomas, Op. Cit, 1997, p. 290 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
178 
 
 
 
differentiates the Labour Party from the ANC in South Africa. They both were centre-left in 
orientation but believed in the neoliberal orthodoxy as a means to an end. The only 
difference is that the ANC failed to strike a progressive form of élite compromise with 
capital (See Chapter 6 for reasons). However the Labour Party in Mauritius in the 1970s 
began to water down its egalitarian rhetoric as it began to give market forces more control 
since export-led industrialisation had just begun take off.  
The above should not suggest that once in government the Labour Party started 
drifting away from its progressive traditions. Firstly the type of élite compromise I alluded to 
in the previous section attests to the focus of government in carrying out pro-poor policies. 
Secondly, the imposition of the Sugar Tax on the large estates whilst small planters 
benefited from government’s subsidies is also illustrative of the Labour Party pulling no 
punches in pursuing the social agenda. This is further confirmed by the fact that government 
remained undeterred in the face of mounting pressure of the sugar barons who called for 
retraction of that decision. Indeed it was the Tax which was hailed as the source which kept 
the Mauritian welfare agenda alive in the 1970s, when industrialisation was still in the 
infancy stage507. Hence, it is because of the Tax that the PMSD succumbed to the pressure 
of the sugar barons to pull out of the coalition508.  
 But even with the Labour Party in government, the state could only put up with so 
much anti-capitalist demonstrations since it perceived them distractive to the growth 
agenda. Hence in 1971 when the MMM organised a strike calling for a retraction of 
measures imposing general austerity, the state responded by arresting 50 members of the 
MMM and 6 members of the GWF under the Public Order Act as they were perceived to be 
disruptive509. In writing to the World Bank explaining how Mauritius was handling local 
resistance towards the neoliberal approach, the Minister of Finance, Mr Veersamy 
Ringadoo, flagged the following areas of concern: 
We have made good progress, we have a carefully prepared plan, foreign 
investors are coming, we are moving ahead but we have now to face some wild 
youngsters of ‘Che Guevara’ type who are in a hurry to overthrow the 
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government and seize power by organising strikes and political uprisings. We 
are thus not being given a proper chance to work in peace510. 
In the next section I look at the configurations of class actors as per their role in attempting 
to challenge the ideological orientation of the economy of Mauritius. I also lay out the 
debate within the context of the social development discourse. This is done by illustrating 
how inclusive consultation mechanisms extending beyond tripartite norms have spawned 
cross-class collaborations which have gone to defend a centre-left national welfare 
consensus. 
Section II: Configurations of Class and Ethnic Interests through All-in 
Consultations in Mauritius 
5.4. Breaking with Tradition: A Shift from Tripartite to Broad-Reaching 
Consultation Platforms 
Mauritius’s economy after 1976 experienced fundamental challenges. The impressive 
growth rate it experienced between 1970 and 1975 – owed to preferential access to EEC 
market and prudent economic reforms – had by the end of the 1970s become a thing of the 
past. Sugar prices on the world markets had been severely compromised resulting in 
palpable impact on the competitiveness of Mauritius’s manufacturing industry. As a result, 
the balance of payment declined severely, external debt was on the increase, whilst 
unemployment and inflation remained commonplace511. It has been argued that what 
compounded the budget deficit in Mauritius was its excessive social welfare programme 
with its focus on social security which was only rivalled by education as shown on the social 
expenses budget in Appendix 5D512. However the real culprits were factors which fell 
beyond the control of Mauritius, such as a series of cyclones which hit the island in 1975 and 
1979 as well as soaring oils prices which led to a reduced demand of commodities513. The 
latter caused many economies to revise their spending patterns as well the ideological 
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orientations of their growth strategies514. As a developing country that was highly integrated 
into the global economy Mauritius was not to be exempted from the rule515.  
 The ruling élites reacted by adopting an inclusive approach of consultation which 
represented a break with tripartite methods of traditional corporatism. Government began 
devising ways to tame the resistance of the Mauritian public for the uncomfortable 
economic choices it was preparing to make during the times of economic adjustment (see 
the role of broad-based civil society in retaining the social wage during Adjustment in the 
next discussion). As a result the organised working class, the private sector and Community-
Based Organisations (CBOs) were invited to make inputs on policy choices. Previously mainly 
the business community had access to government through institutionalised mechanism 
which provided guarantees516. The Mauritius Export Processing Zone Association (MEPZA) 
which was created six years after the creation of the export zone enjoyed this prerogative 
and so did the Joint Economic Commission (JEC) which represented the directors of major 
enterprises across the sectors. The latter even understood that “there [was] an unwritten 
law that the JEC meets the government twice a year in December and August”517.  
Likewise the creation of tripartite wage boards underscored the importance of the 
working class in determining economic choices. These mechanisms facilitated wage 
negotiations and labour tribunals. As a result they served to solve disputes around wages 
and conditions of employment without compromising production capacity. To this end, the 
National Remuneration Board (NBR) was tasked with settling minimum wages and industry-
specific working conditions. Similarly other enforcement mechanisms such as the 
Permanent Arbitration Tribunal (PAT) and the Termination of Contracts and Services Board 
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(TCSB) were respectively tasked to impose dispute settlements and a fair system of work 
dismissals518.  
With the new plan to make policy more inclusive, in 1979 the government created 
all-in consultation mechanisms known as civic networks to integrate parties falling outside 
the traditional corporatist norm within the apparatus of policy making519. On the face of it, 
government was keeping in sync with the traditions of transparency and accountability as 
the hallmarks underlying Mauritius as a functioning democracy. Legitimacy is what the 
government sought to achieve and indeed it did succeed in enhancing its image as 
trustworthy with the aim to impose austerity measures. Unlike in South Africa where 
consultations are exclusive to the members of the tripartite arrangements (involving the 
state, labour and the private sector), calls made by the civil society to get the government to 
account and be transparent for its actions are often dismissed by the ANC as a smear 
campaign to discredit its image. This has made policy-making the preserve of those in the 
higher echelons of power with COSATU assuming the self-defeating role of defending 
working class interests in a tripartite alliance which embraces a neoliberal policy framework 
almost through and through. This had resulted in accusations levelled on the government 
for being out of touch and that its poor record of delivery is linked to the poor culture of 
accountability swelling the ranks of the ANC.  
In Mauritius the presence of non-governmental and charitable organisations became 
used by the state as mechanisms to improve policy capacity just like in the aftermath of the 
WWII when the colonial state forged dense ties with the CBOs as way to penetrate the 
society (See Chapter 4). However at the centre of this style of consultation is ethnicity520. 
Research conducted on the social dynamics of Mauritius shows that ethnicity, more than 
class, forms the high water mark of the country’s politics. In as much as the government 
embraced the consultative and inclusive approach, it was its way of taming the ethnically 
charged environment521. Post-colonial Mauritius was the most ethnically divisive period in 
the island’s history. The competition between the Hindus, Muslims and Creoles culminated 
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in violence six weeks prior to independence in 1968, causing the British government to 
dispatch troops from Singapore to come and restore calm522. Given the memories of ethnic 
violence hanging over the new nation, ensuring stability marked a true test of the island’s 
ability to rise above domestic challenges. Certainly the incumbents deemed broad-based 
social inclusion expedient to that cause. In South Africa the ruling élite was also determined 
to get a redistributive paradigm off the ground to avert the possibility of political instability 
in a divided nation where economic marginalisation was synonymous with the majority 
blacks. Using social justice to contain further episodes of ethnic-based violence has seen the 
welfare state in Mauritius avoiding austerity even when poor economic performance during 
the mid-1970s may have called for such interventions. Indications of an ailing economy 
were demonstrated by the worsening balance of payments, high unemployment and 
persistent inflation, amongst others.  
Of course the rise of other competitors on the political platform in 1970 which 
sought to challenge the MLP as the champion of the poor loomed large and it had a 
profound influence on the government’s decision to retain the welfare state. A closer 
examination of Mauritius at the time shows that succumbing to the pressures of the ailing 
economy (through the reduction of the social budget) would have risked having the 
country’s political landscape divided along ethnic lines. Thus, for the government, 
abandoning promises of substantive social equity would have ushered an exodus of the 
remaining ethnic minorities within the Hindu-dominated and ‘élite-oriented’ MLP to help 
bolster the political presence of the radical and more ethnically diverse MMM. 
Mauritius remains an ethnically charged community in that people identify 
themselves first as individuals belonging to a specific group. Even the proliferation of 
community based organisations has an ethnic character. So in other words ethnicity is the 
principal factor which had spawned the charitable organisation movement to exist in the 
broader scheme of the policy making processes. The Hindu-community organisations in the 
rural villages covered in Chapter 4 have entrenched the tradition of having group 
associations serving as channels through which communities can tackle the socioeconomic 
problems confronting the society. 
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Whilst ethnic identification was the sole characteristic defining these organisations 
in the high echelons of policy making level, they were being treated by government not as 
monolithic ethnic associations. Instead they were perceived as social groups which can 
make societal impact transcending narrow ethnic interests. After all Mauritian villages 
displayed a great degree of ethnic diversity, but it was the Indo-Mauritians who were 
dominant in number523. In the end it would make the task of prioritising the interests of one 
group in a fragmented ethno-social setting very difficult especially against the background 
of poor organisation of communities such as African Creoles who rely on the Roman 
Catholic Church for expression of their interests. This helped a great deal in dispensing with 
conflict amongst the ethnic groups as the spirit of trust and cooperation helped forge cross-
ethnic sense of national identity. This outcome was being facilitated by the fact that senior 
government officials, including at ministerial level, reflected the ethnic diversity of the 
island. Moreover, with the exception of African Creoles, all ethnic groups in Mauritius were 
able to achieve success one way or the other. As a result this has helped minority groups to 
accept power sharing “that [may] fall short of being proportional to their numbers”524.  
5.4.1. The Role of Broad-Based Consultations in Sustaining Egalitarian Policies 
during the Period of Structural Adjustment, 1979 to 1985  
The true litmus test of Mauritius’s social democratic welfare consensus came during the era 
of economic adjustments. To say the economy was in distress would be an understatement. 
In 1981, the budget had a deficit of Rs. 983 million and by the end of the financial year, it 
had climbed over the Rs 1 billion mark525. Inflation also peaked at a record high of 42 per 
cent in 1980 with the number of unemployed persons retreating back to 1968 levels of 20 
per cent526. Against this background, Mauritius refused to bow down to the conditionalities 
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which called for the imposition of economic 
adjustment commonly known as the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). The central 
principles underlying these measures were that government spending had to undergo 
severe cuts as they were deemed to be the primary cause of the economic woes of 
developing countries. They also maintained that for the economies in the Third World to get 
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back on shape they would have to be liberalised alongside the selling of parastatals so that 
government’s involvement in the economy may be kept at a bare minimum527.  
However, having Mauritius to rollback the public budget was out of the question. 
Public officials were determined to pursue what they termed a “human-faced” adjustment 
as they feared that rolling back the social wage would spell a “social revolution” in a country 
battling to overcome class and ethnic divisions528. Even with the determination to resist 
conditionalities of the IMF, sacrifices had to be made and because of consultations with 
societal stakeholders the latter eventually saw it as a necessary evil. For instance, the 
budget for social security, education and health care were not tampered with, whilst that 
for food subsidies on rice and flour underwent cuts529.  
Inclusive consultation methods did not provide enough strength to keep the Labour 
Party from not being voted out of power. The effects of the adjustment were too severe for 
the Labour Party to keep its voter confidence intact. For instance, the devaluation of the 
Mauritian Rupee, which came as part of the Adjustments, eroded the purchasing power of 
all Mauritians with the impact felt mostly by the poor530. As a result discontentment were 
rife within the society with accusations levelled at the LP for not doing enough to “sweeten 
the pill” for the low income groups. This opened an opportunity for the MMM in the 1982 
campaign trail to accuse the LP for being more right than left. It contended that it had 
drifted away from championing the cause of the lower classes and that it should take the 
blame for failing to cushion the effects of the Adjustments for the poor531.  
The Labour Party lost the elections which resulted in the Leninist-Marxist MMM 
coming to power in 1982. However, in government the MMM came face-to-face with the 
reality of the economy causing it to continue with the same austerity measures it vilified its 
predecessor for. In addition the broad-based consultative approach of the Labour Party was 
retained thus buttressing them further as salient features shaping the Mauritian social 
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development sector532. For instance, under the MMM government, consultations with 
societal organisations on policy was an élite strategy used to reject the idea of downsizing 
the important aspects of the welfare state in the face of external pressure. Also refusing to 
adopt the SAPs in full proved to have quid pro quo political implications. This is because 
policy guarantees won the incumbents in government the electoral vote. Hence Arthur 
Goldsmith also contends that policymakers in Mauritius “made their economic and social 
gains within a framework of civil rights and open political competition”533. For instance, 
most of MMM’s supporters demanded the retention of the education budget whilst that for 
health was also deemed by the government as a non-negotiable. To that effect the 
government was of the premise that no economy could function well without a physically 
sound workforce534.  
It was during this period of the Adjustments that the old-age pension scheme came 
under the spotlight. Previously the government only made slight reforms in the pension 
structure by passing a two tier pension bill in 1976. It made provisions for private, earnings-
related pensions at the top and the flat rate non-contributory old-age pension scheme a 
bottom one535. Even with these revisions in the method of support the bill did not make any 
provisions for those in the informal sector of the economy536. Indeed no period in the 
history of pensions in Mauritius since it attained its independence depicts the resilience of 
the Basic Retirement Pension (BRP) better than the 1980s. Also it was around this period 
that pensions featured ever more prominently in the progressive caucuses since the end of 
colonial rule. Policymakers understood that there was an unwritten law that regardless of 
bleak economic prospects, pensions were not to be reduced let alone being dispersed on 
means-tested basis. The Minister of Finance under the MMM government reaffirmed this 
principle in 1982 adding that the scheme was a “gesture of gratitude” to the elderly for 
having “toiled during their lifetime to increase the wealth” of Mauritius537. Table 5.1 below 
captures the trends in government’s public expenditure during the Adjustment period. 
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Education received the lion’s share of the social expenditure, followed by Social Security and 
Welfare which in the mid-1980s overtook the one earmarked for the former, albeit by a 
small margin.  
TABLE 5.1: GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE ON SOCIAL WELFARE, 1981/1982 TO 1984/1985  
                                                                                    R. Million 
 1981/1982 1982/1983 1983/1984 1984/1985 
Education 474.9 532.6 531.9 542.5 
Health 235.2 275.6 290.8 312.0 
Social Security and Welfare 377.0 443.5 500.6 548.2 
Housing and Community 
Amenities  
43.8 20.2 25.0 28.5 
Other Community and Social 
Services 
19.4 21.5 22.0 18.0 
Food Subsidies 
(Rice and flour) 
230.0 190.0 100.0 113.8 
1. Total social welfare expenditure  1.380.3 1.483.4 1.470.3 1.563.0 
2. Total social welfare expenditure 
as a percentage of total current 
expenditure 
47.7 46.0 43.3 42.3 
Source: Joynathsing, Mohipnarain, Op. Cit, 1987, p. 139 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
187 
 
 
 
TABLE 5.2: ANNUAL INCREASE IN OLD-AGE PENSIONS PROPORTIONAL TO THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
(CPI), 1978 TO 1985 
Pension Financial year CPI increase (%) Increase in 
BRP (Rs.) 
Increase in BRP 
(%) 
BRP 1978/1979 8.0 100.00 –  
110.00 
10 
BRP 1979/1980 33 110.00 –  
122.00 
10.9 
BRP 1980/1981 26.5 122.00 – 
141.00 
15.6 
BRP 1981/1982 13.4 141.00 – 
158.00 
12 
BRP 1982/1983 7.5 158.00 – 
174.00 
10.1 
BRP 1983/1984 5.6 174.00 – 
184.00 
5.7 
BRP 1984/1985 8.3 184.00 – 
201.00  
9.2 
Source: Government of Mauritius, 1979-1980, 1980-1981, 1981-1982, 1982-1983, 1983-
1984, 1984-1985538 
There are no details demonstrating how much of the Social Security and Welfare budget 
was dedicated towards financing the old-age pension scheme. Nevertheless, Mohipnarain 
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Joynathsing, Deborah Brautigam and Larry Willmore539 echo the sentiment that the social 
security budget was oriented more towards looking after the wellbeing of the elderly, 
especially through the preservation of the old-age pension scheme. In Table 5.2, it is shown 
that yearly increases in the value of pensions since the economy started emitting signs of 
difficulty in 1978 was set to be over a 10 per cent mark on average in keeping with the 
yearly changes in consumer price index (CPI). A cursory look at the precedence of the 
pension scheme in Mauritius during the 1980s makes for an interesting observation. Larry 
Willmore purports that government’s prioritisation of pensions were popular and easier to 
finance compared to other social programmes540. However, one gets a sense that they were 
intended by policymakers to serve as income guarantee with households living with the 
elderly set to benefit in the event that they were experiencing financial risks due to the 
economy having lacked lustre. Chances are high that these social assistance measures 
ended up having the generational ripple effect in the same manner which pensions were 
used after 1994 by the government in South Africa to mitigate the prevalence of household 
poverty as a result of high unemployment levels.  
5.4.2. Broad-based Collaborations and the keeping of the Social Democratic 
Consensus after Structural Adjustments, 1983 to 1995 
Unlike many developing countries that were subjected to the SAPs of the IMF, Mauritius’s 
economy recovered very quickly and by 1985 it was already showing signs of moving on a 
high growth trajectory. With Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) already firmly in place, 
Mauritius underwent the Second Phase of industrialisation which peaked in the late-1980s 
and resulted in a 10 per cent growth rate by the end of the decade. During this period 
Mauritius pursued banking and financial services as the fourth leg of the economy. It also 
fostered regional economic ties with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
and Common Market of East and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean (COMESA). The World 
Bank hailed it as a development miracle whilst the IMF attributed the country’s success to 
the recommendations to set it on a more neoliberal path541.  
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 Open collaborations amongst the working class and community-based organisations 
remained relevant during the post-adjustment phase which acted as bulwarks against the 
retrenchment of the welfare state. The answers to how this dynamic played out is 
connected to the political formations which took place in the 1980s. Soon after taking over 
from the LP’s 13 year-old rule in 1982, the MMM underwent a split with the dissenting 
faction forming the Mauricien Socialist Movement (MSM)542.There were clashes over the 
ideological orientation of the MMM, on whether the party should retain its ultra-Marxist 
tone or adopt a politically realistic and pragmatic approach so that a favourable economic 
climate could prevail. The MSM was therefore formed by those who supported the 
pragmatic orientation of the economy for further liberalisation543.  
The split of MMM led to the elections of 1983, which saw the MSM rising to power 
within a year after its formation. It would go on to retain this position by winning three 
consecutive elections until 1995 when a coalition led by the LP took over. Between 1983 
and 1995 the MSM was not confronted by major social challenges or unrests as the quality 
of life underwent major improvements544. After all the economy was improving significantly 
thanks to the expansion of the EPZs, the Free Ports and of the Offshore Business Activities, 
which received a major investment boost from mainly Hong Kong. Hence of all foreign 
investments in Mauritius’s EPZ sector, those from Hong Kong accounted for 79 per cent in 
1985 and 27 per cent between 1985 and 1990545. It is possible Mauritius captured the 
interests of investors from Hong Kong because of the size of landmass which resembled that 
of the fast growing economies such as Taiwan and Singapore as well as its strategic location 
as a gateway to the rest of the economies in the Indian Ocean. The EPZ expanded at an 
annual rate of 30 per cent, leading to the rise in employment in the EPZs from over 25,000 
workers in 1983 to fewer than 90,000 in 1990 (See Appendix 5E)546. Indeed by the end of 
the decade Mauritius was no longer facing challenges of unemployment, but instead it was 
                                                          
542
 Miles, William, F.S, “The Mauritian Enigma”, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1999, p. 105 
543
 Loc cit 
544
 By the end of the 1980s, infant mortality dropped to below 19, life expectancy was 65/75 whilst public 
budget deficits rates remained between 3 and 4 per cent. Meisenhelder, Thomas, Op. Cit, p. 290 
545
 Darga, Amedée, “Autonomous Economic and Social Development in Democracy: An Appreciation of the 
Mauritian ‘Miracle’”, in Africa Development, Vol. XXI, Nos. 2&3, p. 83 
546
 Loc cit 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
190 
 
 
 
being confronted with the problem of labour shortages prompting government to import 
contact workers mainly China in their thousands.547  
However, as the mid-1990s approached the economy started to contract with a GDP 
plunging from 10 percent to below five per cent levels. High wages, the rise of competitors 
within the global textile and garment manufacturing industry, increasing public debt and 
rising deficit in balance-of-payments, resulted with the closure rate of EPZ firms standing at 
one in five before dipping to 477 in 1995548. The question of the sustainability of the 
universal welfare state including universal pensions resurfaced. The MSM was already 
buying into the recommendations of the WB which suggested that the economy be 
liberalised wholesale alongside the privatisation of social development programmes549. 
Given the declining economy it argued that reforms were inevitable and went on to relate 
that the pioneers of the universal welfare state such as Sweden were conceding to 
pressures of the economies to reform as a way of adjustment550. The government thus 
outlined its plan to “move from its role as a provider of economic opportunity and of public 
services to a facilitator of internationally competitive activity, a guarantor of fair competitive 
practices and a last resort for the most disadvantaged”551.  
These contra-progressive plans provoked cross-class collaborations spearheaded by 
intellectuals and the trade unions who led a nationwide protest against government’s plans 
to impose austerity. The MSM was generally perceived as unsympathetic towards the social 
cause as well as being hostile to open consultations during its time on the website. This was 
despite it being commended for its sound macroeconomic framework, hence the economic 
successes of the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed these strikes served to highlight the MSM as 
a party which was killing the consultative traditions that have kept Mauritius’s pro-poor 
economic framework in place. As a result the MSM lost to the Labour-led coalition in the 
1995 December elections552. In stark contrast, organised labour in South Africa have been 
unable to lead a nationwide cross-class protest against the state’s plans to direct the South 
African economy through the GEAR macroeconomic framework further down the neoliberal 
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path. Explaining the ambivalent disposition of the working class in South Africa is that they 
were already co-opted as part of the ruling clique in the high echelons of state power 
compounded by the absence of another formidable labour federation to serve as an 
alternative champion of the progressive cause. 
5.4.3. Testing Economic Times and the Role of Cross-class Collaborations as the 
Safeguards of the Welfare Consensus, 1995 to 2005  
Upon taking over from the MSM the Labour Party wasted no time allaying the fears 
harboured by the general population that the country was moving more towards adopting 
the principles of neoliberalism wholesale and that it was retrenching the social wage as per 
the recommendations of the World bank. As a result the government moved swiftly to 
complete the Vision 2020 plan, which was still in formulation when the MSM was voted out 
of power. It was finalised and disseminated in 1996 after the Labour Party called in civil 
society and the private sector alike to become part of the policy making process whereby 
the notion of stately responsibility towards the wellbeing of the citizens was 
reemphasised553. In the Vision 2020 document, the government downplayed the dogmatic 
approach of the previous government that economic growth has got to receive first priority 
above the society’s wellbeing. The document therefore reaffirmed the notion that both 
social welfare and economic stability were mutually reinforcing suggesting furthermore that 
one is bound to suffer if the other does not receive equal care.  
The Third Phase of Mauritius’s post-colonial development trajectory followed the 
Vision 2020 document when government announced its plans in 1999 to pursue information 
and communications technology (ICT) as the island’s fifth leg of the economy. It set various 
ambitious plans of turning Mauritius into a Cyber Island in the league of Singapore and 
Taiwan with the long-term hope that the results will translate into further social gains. 
Government has since built a USD$100 million Ebene Cyber-City, a tax free commercial hub 
aimed at multinationals wishing to do business in Mauritius554.  
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At the time of this announcement Mauritius was emitting signs that it was entering 
the 21st century as an economy still struggling to come out of distress. The Mauritian 
garment and textile industry was finding it difficult to compete with cheap Indian and 
Chinese products for European market as the terms of the Multi-fibre agreement, which 
previously allowed it preferential access, were being phased out. The results were far-
reaching with the EPZ sector shedding jobs on a massive scale. For example in the first 
quarter of 2001/2002 financial year, the manufacturing sector laid off 5 600 workers and an 
additional 4 000 workers during the 2002/2003 financial year555. This officially saw the level 
of unemployment rising from naught in 1990 to 5 per cent in 1995 and eventually 10 per 
cent at the turn of the century. Consequently, the Mauritian Labour Party found difficulty 
retaining credibility in the eyes of the electorates as a party that will recuperate the 
economy from its ailing state. The high level of corruption which had marred the Labour-led 
coalition government also dealt a severe blow to the ability to retain voter support base.  
All the above factors allowed the MSM/MMM to win the elections of 2000 with 
plans to reintroduce the subject of welfare reforms. The coalition had concluded that what 
would save the economy from freefall would be cuts in government expenditure, especially 
pensions556. An average Mauritian was living longer than before with a life expectancy 
having been experiencing a steady rise from 72 years in 2005 to 73 years in 2012557. 
However, the real culprit was the ageing problem as an average Mauritian male was 
expected to live another 15 years and females 20 years558. Already costing the economy 3 
per cent of its GDP, the pension scheme was projected by the World Bank in 2003 to double 
to 5.9 per cent in 2020 and increase furthermore by more than 10 per cent in 2050559. 
However current government expenditure on pensions has surpassed the Bank’s projections 
8 years ahead of time. In 2012 pensions accounted for 5.9 per cent of the social security and 
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welfare budget (the Bank’s 2020 estimate)560, and currently it represents more than 6 per 
cent561. 
 
FIGURE 5.1: ACTUAL AND PROJECTED NUMBER OF PENSION BENEFICIARIES AND COST, 2010 TO 2050 
Source: STATS Mauritius (2010)562 
In light of the above Figure 5.1, in 2004 the government announced plans to reform the 
universal old-age pension scheme. The coalition increased the year of eligibility for the Basic 
Retirement Pension from 60 years to 65 years which was to be implemented over a period 
of ten years. Secondly, the government decided to introduce means-tested pensions which 
were restricted to those earning less than Rs 20 000 per month, a far cry from the non-
discriminatory system that had been in place since the colonial days563.  
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FIGURE 5.2: BRP BENEFICIARIES AND AMOUNT PAID, 2008 TO 2012 
Source: STATS Mauritius (2012)564 
These changes in the pension system prompted a reaction from the social alliance which 
was led by the Labour Party. It was able to garner the support of the unions and the civil 
society to rally against retrenchment of the pension scheme565. It certainly raised an 
awareness about the MMM/MSM’s less protagonist stance for the notion of the universal 
welfare state which culminated in the Labour Party being voted back in power during the 
2005 elections. On the other hand Sheila Bunwaree is reluctant to attribute the change in 
government to the public’s disapproval of pension reforms. She then contends that a 
confluence of factors including an ailing economy, rising inflation and budget deficit, and a 
soaring unemployment rate lost peoples’ confidence in the government566. In retrospect, 
reforms in the social sector added to peoples’ frustrations but were merely secondary. 
Scratching beneath the surface, one discovers that Bunwaree made the mistake of 
underestimating the influence pensions wield on the political voting platform; hence, they 
have grown to become ‘public property’567. A 2002 opinion poll conducted by the Centre for 
Applied Social Research (CASR) found that 88 per cent of respondents wished for the 
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government to spend more on social security, whilst 78 per cent proposed that the rich be 
taxed more so that wealth can be redistributed more evenly. However, what is important is 
that voters in Mauritius are sensitive to changes to social policy568. The MMM/MSM welfare 
reforms reeked as a betrayal of the social contract, which has throughout the course of 
history, been defined by the safeguarding of the universal approach. Voting a government 
out of power for not pursuing the progressive cause in Mauritius serves a two pronged 
approach. Firstly it is protective and retributive. Not voting a government out of power after 
imposing the means-tested format would leave a precedent that would redefine the welfare 
consensus that had stood the test of many trying economic times. Indeed the effects would 
be far-reaching. The politicians would eventually feel they have leeway to make minimalist 
policy choices in times of economic instability, not only in the sector of pensions, but across 
the spectrum of the social development framework of Mauritius. In essence the Mauritian 
voter is overtaken by familiarity and fear, rather than rationality and reason, as far as 
pensions are concerned, at least. Leaders who dare challenge the welfare consensus bear 
the consequences of their indiscretion by being replaced with those who promise better 
social reforms. Secondly, it inevitably sends a warning on the new incumbents that “a half-
baked cake cannot be eaten”569. Even the World Bank observed that “many policies are 
decided by polling and part alignment, rather than by technocratic professional work”570. 
Concerning the old age pension scheme within the general context of the welfare discourse 
in Mauritius, the World Bank also observes that: “the government may cut down on the 
welfare state, but it will not cut down on pensions. So they [universal old age pensions] will 
most probably be allowed to exist in their current form, but at the cost of other social 
benefits”571. 
Aware of the above expectations, the Labour Party exploited the coalition 
government’s resolution to rollback pensions as a point of weakness through which to sway 
voters onto their side. Indeed politicians in Mauritius use the pension scheme as a tool of 
political patronage in a much more explicit fashion than in South Africa where its relevance 
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into the political fray is not as overt (See Chapter 6). Hence, addressing Parliament soon 
after the elections as President of the Republic, Navin Ramgoolam launched a scathing 
attack at the previous government for bringing humiliation to the poor people of Mauritius 
by imposing a targeted pension scheme which he pledged to reinstate back to universal 
format572.  
The sentiments of Navin Ramgoolam are echoed across all quarters of his party, the 
Mauritius Labour Party. Another senior member of the MLP, who holds a ministerial 
position, paints the power of the universal approach to rolling out the old age pension. At 
the face of it, it seems as if that government’s retention of the universal old age pensions 
was inspired by normative sentiments to look after the vulnerable senior citizens. However, 
a close observation of the social fabric of Mauritius indicates that politics have been placed 
above the notions of altruism. In simple terms, the government has no intentions to impose 
the means-test rule on the old age pensions scheme because it fears upsetting the voters: 
“I don’t foresee means-testing happening. The opposition have tried that in 2004. 
They have become unpopular. They have sacrificed a lot for this country. The 
elderly deserve a good treat. They worked hard in the sugar cane fields to look 
after us ... No it is immoral ... You never change the winning team. This is a winner 
– the [universal] welfare state – and therefore we have to retain ... That’s all”.573 
The victory of the Labour Party reveals another dynamic which makes Mauritius 
welfare development all the more unique. Although the rate of unionisation in Mauritius 
remains relatively small, at 20 per cent in the EPZ, it nevertheless demonstrates a sizeable 
degree of efficiency in its defence of social justice. Major political parties, especially MMM 
and the LP, have depended on the mobilising powers of the unions to garner cross-class 
demonstrations against less progressive governments. Such has been the case since the 
independence days, and its repetition in the run-up to the 2005 elections reinforced that 
disposition. The absence of monopolised union support, unlike in South Africa has 
strengthened peer competitor and results-driven politics. This has made it all the more 
worthwhile for parties to channel their energies on revealing the weaknesses of successive 
governments regarding social policy with the hope to settle political scores.  
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That level of engagement is only possible in Mauritius than in South Africa because 
the voting culture of the former is more dynamic, vibrant and it attaches importance to 
delivery. Furthermore there is no one-party competition wherein one can easily predict 
voting outcomes. In Mauritius officials are under pressure to prove themselves worthy of 
holding public office. The voters are not perennially loyal to a certain political party so much 
so that voting outcomes are not connected to the party’s illustrious history. The government 
is simply as good as its last tenure and that is always put to the polls for the voters to judge. 
One can draw parallels to South Africa’s political culture. It is clear that until South Africa 
reaches a moment of political reckoning, wherein the electorate attaches importance to the 
party that pitches and delivers the best social plan, a meritocratic political platform will only 
remain the preserve of the Mauritian political landscape as far as social policy is concerned 
(See Chapter 6). 
5.5. Conclusions 
The continuation of the social democratic consensus in Mauritius is credited to the post-
independence leadership, which laid out an economic framework that was in sync with the 
tenets of social justice. The rest of the time after the post-colonial period is attributable to 
the social fabric in Mauritius, where the notion of a progressive economic framework is seen 
as an intricate aspect of the island’s history that the political élite have the responsibility to 
maintain. So a mixture of commitment to historical circumstances and relentless pressures 
of civil society provided the social roadmap upon which the government remains compelled 
to commit to the progressive cause.  
In essence the social democratic consensus was initially an ideology upheld mainly 
by the élite, but it became a conviction that was easily transmissible to the Mauritian public. 
Responsible for this pattern is the open disposition of Mauritius’s policy making approach 
wherein the government is able to assemble a broad range of groups on ways in which it 
can best respond to social challenges. The business sector, government ministries, the 
working class and community based organisations hold the view that the government has 
the mandate to look into the interests of each stakeholder as opposed to just making it an 
exclusive forum where a select group of stakeholders engage in the deliberations. It has 
been conceived that this way no one can cry foul for discrimination. Of course this stands in 
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stark contrast to the traditional corporatist arrangement in South Africa where the mere 
exclusivity of tripartite consultations ensures the lack of access to government by some 
societal stakeholders who are not part of the ruling clique. A culture of lack of accountability 
has been burgeoning in South Africa and so is the absence of a societal push to get the 
government to act on its promises. 
Obviously, in Mauritius these forums are not created to serve as mere formality or 
window dressing, and they are always created in cognisance of the leverage from society, 
which is in the form of votes. For the government it was absolutely important that it keeps 
its word most of the time so that it creates the kind of a consensus and trust amongst the 
societal stakeholders. This was twofold: Firstly, the state wanted to ensure that the business 
sector buys into its vision of a redistributive growth path. This earned it a degree of 
confidence in society to accept unpopular decisions or concede defeat when government 
could not yield to their demands. Secondly, the government used the presence of societal 
pressure to keep under moderation the pressure of international financial institutions to 
adopt adjustment programmes in full. Currently sustaining the welfare consensus is being 
regarded not just as the responsibility of government, but that which private sector needs 
to accept as well. They have bought into the government’s corporate social responsibility 
fund whereby profitable enterprises are to surrender two per cent of profits towards the 
alleviation of poverty574.  
 This chapter also set out to tie the resilience of the old-age pension scheme to the 
internal socio-political dynamics which have kept the social democratic welfare state alive. 
From an assessment of the Mauritian social, political and economic landscape, there is no 
questioning of the fact that it is a relatively well-off society with unemployment levels which 
are very low by Third World standards, especially when compared with those of South 
Africa’s. Poverty levels in Mauritius remain at six per cent575 whereas unemployment hovers 
between 7.9 and 8.1 percent per annum576. What this means is that unlike in South Africa 
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where the pension scheme assumes the overt responsibility of cushioning the scourge of 
poverty, in Mauritius there is no necessity for pensions to compensate for the poor 
performance in the economy. Given the high quality of life which the people of Mauritius 
enjoy, the pension payout generally goes mainly towards looking after the wellbeing of the 
pensioners who in turn do not have to worry about looking after additional members of the 
household. Hence a significant proportion of the population does not depend on 
government handouts to keep their heads above water and neither is government feeling 
pressured to formulate policies on the basis of that.  
Nonetheless, pensions continue to draw a great attention within the progressive 
caucuses, both in government and in the social landscape. This is a compelling reality, 
especially when one is to pin the debate to the universal vs. means-tested format of 
provision. Two issues are very dominant in understanding the welfare state in Mauritius, 
which then puts into perspective the character of the pensions system in that country. First, 
Mauritius is a politically vibrant society. The fact that the political landscape is committed to 
the virtues of democracy keeps the incumbents on their toes. But the fact that the voting 
outcomes are even the more unpredictable is more daunting for underperforming 
governments, as they know the chances of being voted out of power are high. The 
organisation of civil society is wired in such a manner that it makes the political environment 
all the more competitive, as their mere presence has had the direct (and sometimes 
indirect) effects of conscientising the society about government policies and therefore 
helping them to make informed decisions in their choice of leadership. Still on civil society, 
the trade unions have proven to stand out in terms of assuming that responsibility.  
Much as they are not up to the size of those in South Africa, they are nonetheless 
more effective. This is primarily due to the fact that they are not out of touch with the plight 
of the ordinary people like the aristocratic working class in South Africa. This has as a result 
given them the ability to mobilise the society which in turn allows them to compensate for 
the small size of their number. Another factor is that no political party has monopolised the 
allegiance of the working classes. As a result, this gives other unions not aligned to the 
political parties in government a chance to continue the discourse and challenge the 
nonchalance of the government on the social development front.  
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Secondly, the Mauritian society does not take kindly to efforts to regress its social 
programmes to anything short of the universal access they have grown accustomed to. They 
show this not hesitating to use the power of the vote to protect those attributes which they 
cherish. The universal pension scheme has throughout the ages remained the symbol and 
pride of Mauritius as an unperturbed social democracy. Coupled with the fact that the 
populace is not loyal to a specific political party those governments which have tried to 
change this quality have had to bear the brunt for making poorly informed decisions. The 
MMM/MSM coalition which tried to introduce a means-tested pensions system is a case in 
point. It only happened once since the attainment of independence that a government was 
voted out of power on the basis of attempting to retrench the pension scheme. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Mauritian public is sensitive to the progressive discourse 
and the changes which accompany those deliberations.  
To many Mauritians, a targeted-based pension scheme remains a betrayal of history 
and the struggles of yesteryear, which sought to remove class divisions from the 
socioeconomic landscape by way of providing universal pensions. Moreover, one gets the 
sense that the public harbours the fear that allowing policymakers to do as they please will 
have a ripple effect on the concept of the welfare state in Mauritius as a whole. One such 
implication is that it will redefine the national consensus on the character of the welfare 
state so that it becomes accepting of neoliberal ethos which may attempt to penetrate the 
trenches of public policy. Already, universal old-age pensions are widely perceived as a 
symbol of commitment to the progressive cause. Therefore, making it less universal sends 
out a message that government will adopt the neoliberal dogma elsewhere within the 
general design of the welfare framework. Moreover, adopting a meritocratic pattern of 
voting sends a clear message to policymakers in government that the public is not to be 
taken for a ride. 
In 1997, Thomas Meisenhelder questioned whether Mauritius’s successful 
developmental trajectory would translate into social gains577. The evidence is undoubtedly 
compelling. Not only did growth become the primary preoccupation of government, it also 
made improving living standards part-and-parcel of the entire development framework as 
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its interlocking component. Small wonder why Mauritius has earned the epithet, a 
development “superstar”578.  
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Chapter VI: State (Re)-Building and Welfare State Development in 
Post-Apartheid South Africa 
 
“The system is changing and the challenges are changing. One can never respond to new 
challenges by trying to reproduce responses which had their efficacy in a previous 
period”. 
   – Samir Amin579 
“What is left? As far as I know, the ANC is a disciplined force of the left. We seek to create 
a national democratic society informed by the best attributes of a developmental state 
and those of social democracy. In the context of challenges facing our society and the 
realities of the domestic and global balances of forces, I cannot imagine anything more 
left than this”. 
                                                                                        – Joel Netshitenzhe580 
6.1  Introduction 
As shown in Chapter 3, the National Party (NP) government created a welfare state that 
protected against contingencies and economic risks for whites. Concerning the poor black 
majority, the state resolved to play a minimal role against risks, thus forcing blacks to rely on 
kinship arrangements and individual efforts. The introduction of blacks to the pension 
payroll on the eve of 1945, albeit on unequal terms, proved to be instrumental in mitigating 
the prevalence of poverty, especially in the rural areas. The new ANC government thus 
retained the pension scheme unofficially as the foremost instrument of poverty alleviation, 
one which would reinforce the legacy of stately responsibility left behind by the NP 
government.  
According to Tom Lodge, post-1994 South African political restructuring became 
synonymous with increased “social penetration” by the state, as it employed an expansive 
welfare programme to serve as a litmus indicator of state legitimacy amongst black 
voters581. Certainly, the reliance on social assistance by the ANC government to affirm 
political leadership did not come as a surprise. Hence Stephen Devereux emphasises the 
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point that a safety net is “more than a transfer of resources from the ‘haves’ to ‘have-nots’, 
rather it is a ‘relationship of power’”.582  
In view of this reality one is compelled to pose the following question(s): What role 
did the structural makeup of capitalism and societal class configurations play in shaping the 
sort of welfare outcomes that developed in post-apartheid South Africa? Also, what are the 
socio-economic and socio-political factors, historical and present, that underlie the welfare 
establishment? And finally, to what extent does the current social development frameworks’ 
focus on old-age pensions serve as a function of statecraft? This chapter is borne out of the 
intent to answer the abovementioned questions under the auspices of the following aims. 
Firstly, to make clear the connection between historical legacies and the current welfare 
make-up; and secondly, to illustrate the importance of the structural arrangements of the 
economy and the socio-political forces that have moulded South Africa’s modern-day social 
development agenda. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. Section I serves as the essence of the 
chapter. It demonstrates how global capitalist interests controlled every aspect of the South 
African economy and how they subverted the political ideologies that resonated with radical 
ideals of social reconstruction in the new South Africa. Firstly, I show that South Africa’s 
deepened integration in the global economy came at the price of displacing a full-swing pro-
poor cause. In this section I demonstrate that the dominance of foreign economic influence 
conditioned the structural properties of capitalism to underpin welfare policy choices. Also, 
during this period of political transition I argue the overpowering effect of foreign capital 
over the new ruling incumbents initiated a critical juncture moment in the country’s post-
1994 social policy history. This overpowering effect had profound social implications, which 
irrevocably inclined the welfare paradigm to the neoliberal orthodoxy. The external 
economic forces had the upper hand to dictate their own terms in the spectrum of the 
economy and, as a result, the ANC had no option but to succumb to the pressures of the 
foreign investors and ultimately do their bidding. Hence some quarters of the ruling élite 
believed in the Alliance having to move with the times. Socialism had lost it relevance in the 
1990s and many within the Alliance who were thought to be staunch socialists turned out to 
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be capitalists who did not promote the egalitarian agenda through the creation of the 
welfare state. I therefore bring to the fore, in this discussion, the role of bargaining 
corporate structures and BEE as tools which served as functions of capitalism, albeit in 
company with the state, to look after the interests of corporate capital.  
Section II quizzes the role of the left and the working class at large within the larger 
context of the creation of post-apartheid’s social development system. I pay particular 
attention to the interests of the working class the left has sought to protect within the 
capitalistic economic order and how that resulted in closing the space for the voices of the 
unorganised poor over time. I contend that the working class – who are supposed to 
spearhead the pro-poor agenda – seem preoccupied with self-centric goals, whilst those of 
the society as a whole take second priority. Also under scrutiny is COSATU’s membership in 
the Tripartite Alliance and how this partnership has compromised the efficacy of COSATU to 
push for policy changes that have broad-reaching societal impact. Indeed COSATU’s pre-
occupation with the politics of state control has driven a wedge between the workers and 
broad-reaching social forces. That disconnect has compromised prospects of a cross-class 
and broad-based movement challenging the limitations of the South African social 
development paradigm from coming to effect. I outline the role of other domestic non-state 
actors within the context of welfare state development by comparing with Mauritius and in 
the context of the broader scheme of cross-class social mobilisation movement.  
Section III outlines welfare outcomes in post-apartheid South Africa and puts into 
perspective the pensions’ debate within the general developmental welfare. State funded 
old-age pensions are brought into these discussions by explaining their meaning within the 
contemporary South African society, their compensatory function within the overall 
structure of the economy, and tease out the possible opportunities they open up for 
political parties to keep the torch of the social reform movement aflame. It is shown that 
the dominance of these pensions vis-à-vis other welfare offerings serves the function of 
élite interests of tightening the grip on political power.  
This chapter argues that the failure to adopt a comprehensive welfare framework in 
post-apartheid South Africa is due to lack of strength for societal mobilisation pressing for 
substantive social reforms. This drawback is being compounded by labour’s ambivalence to 
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collaborate with mass-based societal groups across the class divide, which has given the 
state free reign to carry out less comprehensive social welfare programmes.  
Section I: The influence of Capitalism  
6.2 Retaining the Structural Properties of Capitalist-Based Economy as the legacy 
of the Minerals Industrial Energy Complex 
International corporate capital’s hold on policy outcomes in South Africa did not begin in 
1994. The South African economy since the end of the 19th century has been of Anglo-Saxon 
orientation. In his book Capitalism vs Capitalism, Michel Albert defines Anglo-Saxon 
Capitalism as an economic system “characterised by extensive market coordination by 
economic actors and relatively neutral patterns of governmental market regulation and at 
maintaining property right institutions without privileging particular social actors”583. Mining 
capital still remains the foundation of South Africa’s economy upon which other industries 
were built and in which the major arteries of its economic life remain dependent upon (See 
Chapter 3). The liberal-orientated economic framework is what remains today, possessing 
the prerogative to exert significant influence in the economic and political domain so much 
so that positive economic prospects rest squarely on how the global environment and 
players respond to the country’s domestic happenings584. 
Unlike in South Africa, the presence of centre-left political proponents across 
virtually all political parties of Mauritius ensured a national democratic consensus that 
guaranteed an outward-looking macroeconomic framework that was pursued in tandem 
with erecting a comprehensive welfare state. Indeed speaking in regard to the contribution 
of the collapse of the Soviet bloc on the global economy and the reasons the ANC shifted 
nationalisation from its policy agenda, the then Minister of Finance, and the current 
Minister in The Presidency for directing the National Planning Commission, Trevor Manuel, 
noted “[t]he collapse of the Soviet Union, the destruction of the Berlin Wall broke the [...] 
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revolutionary romantic illusions of many. That very stark collapse shifted the debate very 
significantly”585.  
Whilst such pragmatic thinking may have suggested that the pro-socialist ANC was 
becoming realistic by integrating socialist ideals with the pressing demands of the global 
economy, unlike in Mauritius, the dominance of the market-focused policy dogma 
culminated in the deflection of ideological thinking away from social democracy into a 
sugar-coated centre-left mode of thinking as to sweeten the pill. The outcome became 
dubbed by Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass as a double class compromise, by which is 
meant a market driven high wages growth-path, particularly for the urban middle class, and 
a redistributive high growth-path which was envisioned to be achieved through taxation and 
job creation for the benefit of the poor who served as an important electoral base586. 
 Explaining the interface between the pro-market strategy and pro-poor social 
fundamentals, Patrick Bond contends that the attempt to pursue an egalitarian cause 
through the RDP was nothing less than an “artificial distinction between the progressive 
micro-social policies” and “sound macroeconomic policy” inevitably creating the myth of 
shoving a social welfare cause in the development sphere alongside a liberal 
macroeconomic outline587. Indeed it is apparent that the ANC’s embrace of liberal and 
market focused ideals, as well as the waning radical socialist ideals as a result, came also in 
the hands of the political élite from other members of the Tripartite Alliance. The future of 
South Africa’s economy certainly laid at the mercies of both global and domestic business 
interests surrounding the Minerals-Energy Complex (MEC). The ANC’s compromised position 
is a stark contrast to Mauritius’s post-colonial settlement presided over by the Mauritian 
Labour Party. This is because in the 1970s, globalisation had not yet begun to wield 
disproportionate degree of influence on the national economies in comparison to the 1990s 
when it was beginning to reach its height (See Chapter 5). 
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6.2.1 Converted: The Pressures of the Minerals-based Economy as initiators of a 
Critical Juncture Period 
Ben Fine and Zavareh Rustomjee’s classic 1996 analysis showed the power the MEC wielded 
in dictating the terms for a social and economic transformation in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Fine and Rustomjee trace the origins of the mining industry from the beginning of the 
20th century588; whilst Renfrew Christie589 shows that the mining industry depended highly 
on the state energy-driven development project. According to Patrick Bond, the MEC 
comprised a key sector of the economy since the 19th century, encompassing gold, coal, 
petrochemicals, electricity generation, processed metal products, mining machinery, and 
other parts related outputs which remained key to the entire sustenance of the economy590. 
In this case, a close relationship between the state and private corporations became pivotal 
for the constant evolution of the economy and the ultimate consolidation of the MEC – 
mainly through vital industrial strategies spanning development of large-scale electricity-
generating capacity and also through a home-grown fuel-chemical industry591.  
The conversion of the ANC and its partners from ultra-socialism to pro-liberalism is at 
first sight inconceivable. But it is clear that the party’s surrender of macroeconomic 
populism to usher in a more conservative spending regime was a consequence of the 
domestic context that was controlled by exogenous economic forces592. The foreign 
dominated economic terrain allowed corporate capital to have a hold on the direction of the 
economy and thus end up defining its role within the social and economic milieu of the 
country593. The so-called American pressure groups had a disproportionate hold on the 
South African economy. Indeed prospects of success for an economy that was in need of 
recuperation from years of being isolated by the international community – from having 
been a political and economic pariah – depended on those possessing the powers of calling 
the shots within the global economic fraternity. Sampie Terreblanche argues that 
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paramount to the strategy of dominance and control (and perhaps even bullying) of the 
South African economic sector was the instillation of fear in the minds of ANC policymakers 
that no country in the world can survive if they do not pledge allegiance to the market 
fundamentalist model594. The ANC’s surrender of economic control to Washington 
Consensus initiated the country’s period of critical juncture. It allowed foreign capital to 
penetrate deeper into the economy and thus altered irrevocably the country’s social plans 
that had been set up by the ruling élite. 
Indeed due to the contemptuous attitude of capital from the West towards the 
Keynesian/statist-approach that was likely to follow regime change, deregulation of the 
economy, fiscal austerity, privatisation of state enterprises and free trade were to be 
somewhat forcefully imposed upon the ANC. This manner of approach suggested that by the 
reason of government opening up their borders for trade it would automatically spawn the 
inevitable result of attracting foreign direct investments, higher growth rates, higher 
employment and a trickledown effect to eradicate economic shortcomings. 
To reconstruct and develop South Africa against the background of capital flight posed 
challenges that required the ANC government to be more pragmatic in its policy stance and 
come to accept that certain ideologies (such as the nationalisation of the economy) are no 
longer practical as they have past the sell-by date. By budging to appease the neoliberal-
promoting Western economic pressure groups, the ANC accepted the National Party’s very 
own Normative Economic Model (NEM) as the framework from which the economy of the 
new South Africa would be modelled upon595. These parameters amounted to the return to 
neoliberal adjustments that informed the NP government’s industrial policy in the 1980s596.  
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The NEM noted the importance of socioeconomic transformation but emphasised that 
privatisation and deregulation of the economy will serve as pre-conditions of dispersing 
economic resources to the broader population597.At this stage, South Africa was bracing 
itself for political change with the appointment of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC), 
composed of the leadership core of the NP as well as the ANC, to serve as the interim 
government until the election of a democratic one in 1994. It was the NEM which served as 
the driving force behind the take up of the $850 million IMF loan by the TEC which was 
envisaged to help antidote the country’s ailing balance of payments. This was the beginning 
of the ANC plummeting deeper into the innermost activities of neoliberal ethos with a 
cohort of its heavyweights sent to receive training at American universities and international 
banks on the legitimacy of neoliberal doctrines and market fundamentalism598.  
The most obvious distinction between South Africa and Mauritius’s social and 
economic trajectories is the amount of assertiveness the latter carried when concerning 
negotiations for radical socioeconomic transformation with business whilst the former shied 
away from radical politics with the fear of frightening off foreign investors. South Africa’s 
ANC allowed itself to be coerced into policy choices that possessed the potential to cast a 
negative precedent of not addressing adequately issues of poverty and deprivation in the 
future. At this stage, it had become clear that market forces were in control and the ANC 
was evidently not steering the country’s economic direction as assertively as it should. This 
is the period which should have seen the full launch of a social democratic welfare state the 
ANC promised the poor in the years leading to democracy. One senior government official 
from the Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation said during an interview he 
gave for this study, that during the negotiations for a political and economic settlement, the 
term “social democracy was deemed a bad term [by the ANC] that was likely to scare the 
market away” 599. Mauritius’s political leadership, on the other hand, stood as the guardians 
and patrons of socioeconomic reforms by going as far to be unshaken in the face of 
international pressure to shed the populist aspects of their macroeconomic endeavours. 
Indeed around the time the ANC was preparing to take up the political reigns, Mauritius had 
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become deeply integrated within the global economic enterprise. As illustrated in Chapter 5 
Mauritius, the pro-poor redistributive agenda had dominated the social fabric of Mauritius 
so much so that cross-class social groups compelled the ruling élite to stand up to capital.  
In Mauritius the political élite was unquestionably acquainted with the complex 
management task of marrying free market economics with progressive policies of social 
redistribution. Conversely, the leadership of the ANC was still by-and-large struggling to find 
a balance between macroeconomic populism and the rapidly expanding free-market 
enterprise. The notion of advancing substantive social equity under a laissez faire economic 
paradigm had been tried and tested since the colonial days in Mauritius. This reality gave 
the new leadership in Mauritius – who had acquired vast public administration experience 
afforded by British colonial administrators – the confidence that such ambitions will not fail.  
The ANC’s command of the economy as a result of the lack of skills set, therefore, was 
miniature in the sense that the leadership was not satisfactorily conversant with the 
intricate details of what the new economic order really entailed600. A fast paced catch-up 
game was required for the ANC leadership core, serving almost as a reminiscence of the 
Afrikaners striving to break even with the fast-paced English industrial capitalists by way of 
losing their sentimental attachment to their primitive and rural-based economic way of life 
from the concluding years of the 19th century until the end of the first half of the 20th 
century. This specific weakness is what disadvantaged the reform ambitions of the new 
leadership as the lack of institutional capacity on the economic front exposed their 
vulnerability to forcefully adopt the interests of private capital601. The ANC, as a result, 
easily came under the thumb of capital. Sampie Terreblanche paints the dynamics 
succinctly:  
The ANC did not at all at the beginning of negotiations in 1990 possess a ready 
institutional capacity on the economic policy front to counter the power and 
resources available to its main opponents [i.e. The corporate sector] ... . It simply 
did not have a set of new progressive ideas and strategies to counter those neo-
liberal ideas so powerfully proposed by the Washington institutions, Western 
governments, local business interests, and the De Klerk regime ... . The more 
                                                          
600
 Padayachee, Vishnu, “Progressive Academic Economists and the Challenge of Development in South Africa’s 
Decade of Liberation”, in Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 25, No. 77, 1998, 439 
601
 Webster, Edward and Adler, Glenn, “Towards a Class Compromise in South Africa’s “Double Transition”: 
Bargained Liberalism and the Consolidation of Democracy”, in Politics & Society, vol. 27, no. 3, 1999, p. 370 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
211 
 
 
 
interventionist, Keynesian ideas and policy recommendations of MERG (Dec 
1993) and RDP (Feb 1994) came too late in the transition process to stop the 
ANC’s steady slide into neoliberalism602. 
A factor accounting for the lack of capacity to manage the economy within the ANC 
has to do with the party’s history in the liberation struggle. Among the exiled supporters of 
the ANC, some skipped the country in sought of an education to ready themselves for 
governance once apartheid has ended, while the majority went on to get involved in the 
armed struggle. However, among the educated class in the ANC, the proportion of those 
who received education in the West constituted a small number compared to those who 
went to get educated in the Soviet Union. I content that this pattern precipitated a 
geopolitical discrepancy of ideology within the party as the neoliberal economic orthodoxy 
of the West became overshadowed by the communist dogma of Eastern Europe. Not only 
was there such an inconsistency of ideological thinking, but the ideological dominance of 
the left within the party became out of sync with the neoliberal ideological shift seeping 
across the entire realm of the global political economic structure.  
This predicament had implications on the left’s acceptance of the entire economic 
structure of South Africa, which had already pledged allegiance to market fundamentalism 
due to it having been long integrated within the global economic enterprise. Secondly, the 
political and economic compromise brokered by the old government and the leadership of 
the ANC during the negotiations period meant that the government in-waiting had no 
choice but to toe the neoliberal economic line. Indeed, there was a quick acknowledgement 
within the top leadership structures in the ANC that the party was not up to the task of 
taking the economy of South Africa into the future. We do notice this reality playing out in 
the succession battles taking place within the ANC just before the general elections of 1994. 
Hence, Nelson Mandela was willing to compromise his preferred successor, the former 
unionist Cyril Ramaphosa, to make way for Thabo Mbeki – Oliver Tambo’s protégé – who 
received training in economics in England.  
As it turned out during President Mandela’s administration, Mbeki was blatantly a 
staunch proponent of neoliberal economics, who mapped out South Africa’s 
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macroeconomic policy to dovetail with his fondness for Washington Consensus. To conclude 
South Africa’s conversion phase, it was Mbeki who hastily replaced the socialist RDP as the 
ANC’s direction policy with the neoliberal GEAR in 1996, albeit without the consent of the 
Alliance partners in the left. Espousing the values of privatisation, free trade and market 
fundamentalism603, GEAR sealed South Africa’s experience of structural adjustments as did 
in Mauritius in the 1980s. The difference is that South Africa under the ANC-led government 
turned its back on its promise to fully champion the social development agenda whereas 
Mauritius embraced social fundamentals in conjunction with economic imperatives. The 
dominance of a market-focused advocacy locally and otherwise, began to swell the ranks of 
the ANC and thus rendered the South African economy too élite-driven a reality to allow 
social democratic ideals to take shape. It is not a surprise then that the left think that “the 
ANC listens more to capital than the working class”, as one unionist said604. So instead of 
spearheading a pro-poor economic framework, focus was placed on redistribution that 
benefited only a few BEE beneficiaries instead of reversing structural defects in the 
economy that perpetuated economic marginalisation for the poor majority. 
6.2.2 Capitalism and the Bourgeois Black Economic Renaissance 
Closely linked to the politics around the erection of a pro-poor paradigm is the advent of the 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policy within the mainstream of the economy. 
Although continuing to attract strong criticism as apartheid in reverse, BEE was intended to 
bring about an economic renaissance for blacks bringing socioeconomic change that 
matched the visions of the ‘national democratic revolution’605. In actual fact, the 
beneficiaries of BEE have come to resemble economically awoken Afrikaners who benefited 
from White South Africa’s affirmative action policies in their lack of embrace for the 
principles of broad-based social reforms. To capture these dynamics, Paul Hoffman asserts: 
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“there is perennially a mismatch between the theatrics of ANC revolutionary rhetoric and its 
more pragmatic policies and practices of government”606.  
In the BEE’s case, a culture of consumerism and accumulation has become the hall-
mark of this process of élite formation with a politically connected few acting as proxies for 
foreign and domestic-based capital continue to cash on. Currently under the spotlight is the 
debate around the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) – that is, BEE 
should renounce its elitist character and broaden its base so that the South African society 
as a whole can stand to accrue benefits accompanying this empowering exercise. How that 
goal is to be achieved is not clear, but it should certainly ignite a discourse about channelling 
resources accrued from BBBEE into the social investment budget as does the Corporate 
Social Responsibility tax in Mauritius. Moreover BBBEE is destined for failure if, like its 
precursor, BEE, remains under the whim of big capital seeking to benefit the politically 
connected few behind the pretext of redistribution. 
In the following discussion I give an assessment of the corporatist structure within 
the scheme of the economy and policy making processes thereof. I argue that the 
corporatist constitutional order impacts at the very core of the perpetuation of capitalist 
interests whilst displacing those of the poor majority. That the state is also playing along is 
given due attention here.  
Section II: Configurations of Class Interests and the Fragmentation of Social 
Mobilisation 
6.3 The Left’s Workerist Outlook and Egalitarian Implications 
The social vs political and workerist vs populist dimension of welfarism and welfare state-
building in South Africa is certainly worth putting into the context of Mauritius’s welfare 
trajectory. As shown in Chapter 4 the domestic politics that helped apply pressure on the 
ruling élite during the years of colonialism in Mauritius were being led by the working class 
and in South Africa during the first quarter of the 20th century (See Chapter 3). However 
there were stark contrasts in the manner in which the working class advanced their pro-
poor causes in both countries which had far-reaching implications on policy outcomes. The 
organised working class in Mauritius, in collaboration with the small-scale farmers, adopted 
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a workerist-populist approach making them more effective in campaigning simultaneously 
for workers’ interests and those of the society at-large. In South Africa on the other hand, 
the unions adopted a solely workerist approach, one which was defined by maintaining job 
insurance for whites against black competition even though their push for state intervention 
ended up becoming beneficial to the general poor as a whole. This is still very much the 
legacy of the working class today, who continue to charge that theirs is the struggle to 
protect workers in the spirit of the broader social transformation of the South African 
society, whereas behind the reformist mask lies labour-related issues which are being 
prioritised above those of the society as a whole.  
Indeed COSATU is firm in its convictions that their mission within the alliance is to 
return the ANC to its working class bias. This means, according to Devan Pillay, that 
COSATU’s relationship with the ruling ANC “depends mainly on whether it continues to see 
benefits accruing from an ANC government – mainly to itself as organised, employed 
workers in permanent jobs, but also to the larger working communities within which it 
lives”607. This trend certainly confirms charges of ‘labour aristocracy’ in the South African 
labour sector – wherein a new class of ‘insiders’ care less about the majority of ‘outsiders’ 
who fall within the social class bracket of the unemployed, poverty stricken, marginalised 
and low-paid informal workers608. . In an interview during the course of this study, one 
senior unionist representing one of COSATU’s affiliate unions conceded that “the working 
class are yet to be truly pro-poor at heart. They have focused too much on the interests of 
the workers. In the process they ended up neglecting broader issues affecting the wider 
society”609. Certainly, refusal to forsake the working class approach deprives COSATU of 
striking a balance of a “popular democratic approach” that appreciates the best of what 
workerist and populist values have to offer. These restrained the emergence of a broad-
based coalition which was so central to the movement for a more social democratic state in 
Mauritius. 
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6.3.1 The working class and the terrain of state power politics 
The entry of the working class into the terrain of state power politics is of significant 
importance to understanding the development of social policy in South Africa. The same 
logic applies to the labour sector in Mauritius who served as the guardians of a universally-
inclined social policy as opposed to looking solely at matters concerning the working class. 
COSATU, along with the South African Communist Party (SACP), enjoys a close affinity to the 
ANC in a political arrangement popularly known as the Tripartite Alliance. COSATU defends 
its closeness to the ruling party, stressing that it offers it the privilege of close proximity to 
the ruling circles, thus ensuring that workers’ interests become protected in the long run610. 
In the same vein COSATU maintains that by not allowing the ANC to fly ‘solo’ it keeps the 
latter from becoming too ensnared by the laissez faire economic thinking of the market. 
This way COSATU remains assured that the socioeconomic transformative ideals of the NDR 
will not be compromised.611. Socialism, they maintain, is the primary motivating force 
behind their political partnership with the ANC (and the SACP) and it is a cause they will 
continue to advance until the government sings along to their (socialist) tune612. COSATU 
has been flirting with the idea of “scaled-down” socialism – as do the pragmatic unions in 
Mauritius – as an understanding that their socialist rhetoric need to accommodate present 
conditions. 
COSATU’s role as the effective voice of reason that champions the egalitarian agenda 
within the Alliance has become questionable since the ANC took up the reigns. It has 
become more useful in securing electoral votes for the ruling party613 whilst its efficacy as 
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the social advocate has become largely ignored. Hence, government’s decision to abruptly 
replace the social-oriented RDP with the neoliberal GEAR without consulting the workers is 
a case in point. It was a move which the left in the Tripartite Alliance begrudgingly dubbed 
the “1996 class project” to emphasise the feeling of betrayal as a result of government’s 
adoption of the neoliberal economic framework. COSATU did not vote with their feet after 
Thabo Mbeki, the chief nurse of the GEAR programme and deputy president of South Africa, 
daringly urged the left to “Just Call [him] a Thatcherite” following that incident614. Nelson 
Mandela stated categorically to the left that government was not for turning and no one 
was forcing the left to stay in the alliance if they felt out of place615.  
COSATU was still adamant that the ANC was the place they called home and that 
they had no intentions of going elsewhere616. This became a missed opportunity for the 
labour federation to break ranks with its partners and press for social reforms by forging ties 
with other social partners outside the ruling circles as in Mauritius617. Instead they would 
form part of a clique which sought to curtail the power of non-governmental organisation 
(NGOs) and civil society not aligned to the ANC. The demise of the Anti-Privatisation Forum 
(APF) in 2002, which COSATU helped form in 2000, was its doing after the ANC coerced the 
labour federation to pull the plug since APF used to be housed in the labour federation’s 
premises. Furthermore, COSATU did not contest the dismal of the regional secretary of the 
Chemical, Paper, Packaging, Wood and Allied Workers’ Union (CEPPWAWU), John Appolis, 
for initiating a referendum amongst its members to choose whether they still wanted to 
remain within the Alliance618. 
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Due to its contempt toward broad-based coalitions the labour federation has not 
been daringly assertive in the social reform front. The labour federation’s support for the 
BIG Coalition619, which called universal basic income grant for all South Africans, does not 
discount the fact that it generally lacks the enthusiasm to collaborate with other 
movements propagating similar causes. In the case of the BIG Coalition COSATU simply 
came to the party because the majority of members were aligned with the ANC620. The 
downside is that all the members of the Coalition were middle class organisations and the 
absence of more broad-based social partnerships which included the support of lower 
classes weakened its campaign to effect broader social reforms. Desirable results could have 
been gained had the BIG Coalition drawn support across the class spectrum of South Africa 
emulating the societal mobilisation traditions of Mauritius. 
6.3.2 Corporatism as the Engine of Private Business Interests  
Without a doubt South Africa’s style of corporatism is reflective of contestations of various 
group interests at the upper echelons of the capitalistic economic establishment, espousing 
disparate views and approaches on the idea of economic redistribution. Noticing the 
importance of reaching a compromise between clashes of interest across the class 
spectrum, government created a tripartite policy-making forum to enable cohesive working 
synergies in the running of the post-apartheid economy. The establishment of the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council Act (NEDLAC), Act 35 of 1995, symbolised a 
corporatist consensus intended to smoothen relations by the state between private 
business and the organised working class to bode well with the spirit of ‘national unity’ and 
‘reconciliation’. These intentions were idealised to facilitate sustainable growth, generate 
social equity and increased participation of all stakeholders within the economy621. Hence 
the overarching responsibility of NEDLAC remains to “promote the formulation of co-
ordinated policy ... (through seeking) ... consensus and concluding agreements on matters 
pertaining to social and economic policies”. 622  
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At face value NEDLAC envisaged to yield favourable policy outcomes that addressed 
the concerns of the society and business in a mutually symbiotic way. Beneath the surface, 
however, it turned out to be a locked-up triple constituency forum that was more inclined 
to articulate pro-business and pro-industrialists interests more than it did pro-poor ones623. 
The arrangement was certainly bound to give power to capital whilst labour’s participation 
was intended to create the impression that the new neoliberal economic establishment was 
open to the views of the left. In keeping with Adam Habib’s traditions, unity and 
reconciliation thus were covert strategies employed to silence dissent from the working 
class. Consequently the latter was forced into acquiescence to stabilise the labour sector for 
the sake of recuperating the ailing economy. In the long run it would ensure that South 
Africa’s competitiveness would be on par with the ones of its counterparts in the First 
World.624  
It is for this reason that the character of South Africa’s political transition under the 
capitalist economic framework has been dubbed by Roger Southall and Roger Tangri as a 
‘bourgeois democracy’, whereby government assumes the mediatory role between labour 
and capital whilst pursuing the interests of a capitalist economy that originated from the 
colonial period.625 In this fashion the seeds for an economic type of corporatism, instead of 
a social one, had long been sown for post-apartheid South Africa’s disconnected economic 
and social formations which became part and parcel of the corporatist establishment (see 
in-depth exploration of these dynamics in Chapter 3). 
Indeed fundamental to the curtailment of corporatism to change the status quo is its 
lack of inclusivity of a broader range of constituency, instead of merely being a forum for 
labour, the state and capital, as Schreiner and Adrienne Bird observed626. In the same vein 
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Daryl Glaser asserts that civic movements have not been allowed a chance to be forceful in 
their endeavours to spawn a participatory type of socialism that would sweep right across 
the social fabric of South Africa627. For instance, Mauritius’s style of corporatism is 
dominated by its societal approach in contrast to the economically centred corporatist 
structure in South Africa. In other words, that country has ventured to move out of the 
traditional confines of a state-business-labour forum to cover a wider scope of stakeholders 
by including civic networks on the deliberation tables. This has made corporatism in 
Mauritius to be more in touch with the grassroots issues instead of serving as a platform in 
which only a select few access the government, which would yield results that sway less in 
the society’s favour. South Africa’s on the other hand has been incapable of balancing the 
capital/society divide or making the rigid corporatist structure more pluralistic in approach 
to reflect the interest of the broader society. That is because such a platform is yet to get 
extended to social groups not forming part of the ruling clique.  
The triple party Alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU has since left COSATU 
seduced into giving up its usual pluralistic and mass-movement based approach – the 
hallmark of its anti-apartheid struggle – to fight against problems that are connected to the 
social and economic terrain. This quest for political relevance, whilst simultaneously wearing 
the facade of a labour federation that champions the interests of the working class and the 
poor at-large, has been named by Eddie Webster as political unionism or social movement 
unionism628. However, Seidman has taken up the task of disambiguating the distinction 
between the broader social unionism and the much narrower and focused political 
unionism. Political unionism is premised to take shape through the support of unions for 
political parties and is restricted to the political and economic frameworks that are in 
existence629. In contrast, social movement unionism is premised to be more in favour of 
defending and safeguarding the integrity of working class organisation whilst allowing the 
establishment of a cross-class alliance in the quest for wholesale social and economic 
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transformation630. In principle, COSATU is an expression of social movement unionism, 
stemming from the anti-apartheid struggle that forged strong alliance with the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) during the latter half of the 1980s. However, and most importantly 
of late, in deeds, COSATU’s path seems removed from the society.  
This tendency has made the marginalisation (instead of the promotion) of civic 
networks in the policy making domain to be commonplace. Whereas the ones of Mauritius 
get to be consulted and be kept abreast of the happenings taking place at every stage of 
policy making, civic networks such as Community-based Organisations (CBOs) in South 
Africa rely on government gazettes to take part in policy making, which is compounded by 
the burden of dealing with technical and legalistic language that further hinders 
participation. Adding to this fundamental shortcoming is that government makes 
announcements after decisions have been made and not at the onset of decision-making 
processes631.  
Labour’s affinity for the ANC and SACP has worsened this pattern of seclusion. Often 
times labour adopts a more tolerant approach to social movements that are less opposed to 
the Tripartite Alliance – hence the formerly operational the Landless Peoples Movement 
(LPM) – than to those that are less cordial such as the now also defunct Anti-Privatisation 
Forum (APF). Indeed the inevitable outcome of this trend within the corporatist structure is 
that it has not only left many social movements very much in the sidelines of participatory 
policy making, but it has added to COSATU’s inability to foster collegial relations with 
unions/organisations outside the Alliance (see next section below). The neat observation 
made by Dinga Sekwebu’s in 1999 still holds true to the current worker-party dynamics 
within the broader corporatist structure of macroeconomic management632: 
COSATU has been unable to successfully link up with and strengthen other 
organisations. There has been no revival of the mass democratic movement ... 
COSATU does not appear to take the emergence of sector networks (for 
example, the rural development network) seriously. [It] also seems 
contemptuous of single-issue coalitions (for example, on debt) and other NGOs 
... . Although always strongly denied, a tendency has developed within COSATU 
to approach issues from a narrow ‘workerist’ perspective. 
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This disengagement has forced other protest movements to challenge social policy with 
success without reliance on COSATU and its connections to the state. However in times past 
it has been revealed that it takes one special kind of a social movement to record such 
turning points633. Within the political mainstream the closure of platforms of participation 
and expression of divergent views has caused COSATU/SACP-affiliated members within the 
corporatist arrangement to form breakaway parties of their own in the quest to better 
represent workers’ interests. Indeed the entry of the Workers’ and Socialist Party (Wasp) on 
the South African political scene in March 2013 was borne out of the premise that 
corporatism should seek to be more inclusive and welcoming of divergent views rather than 
being a formal structure where the élite in the left and right in unison ponder ways in which 
neoliberal capitalism can continue to sugar-coat its failures. It is on this basis that Wasp 
seeks to champion the wellbeing of mainly the mineworkers, and the unemployed and rural 
people as a whole.634 
 However, I contend that what contributed to the failure of corporatism to bridge the 
gulf between capital and society was not only the lack of inclusion of other social actors in 
the policymaking domain. But rather the failure of the state to recognise the power behind 
having a more inclusive societal form of corporatism by giving the broader mass movement 
(outside the parameters of state, labour and capital) a chance to play a role in making 
decisions. Had labour in South Africa not adopted an acute societal disconnect approach, a 
less partisan social pact would have sprung up within the domain of policy making in 
government to provide a much stronger counterweight against interests of private business. 
Indeed Mauritius’s special kind of pluralistic corporatism enabled policymakers to use the 
backing of the broader civic movement as a weapon to defy the conditionalities of 
international financial capital calling for severe cuts in the social expenditure. This is because 
by having civic groups on board helped foster the spirit of social capital by giving 
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policymakers the audacity to stand firm in the face of international economic pressure 
groups. Reporting to Parliament on the impact of international economic landscape on the 
precarious state of the domestic economy, Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan recognised the 
importance of opening the space so that the voice of civil society can be given the due 
consideration in the making of policy, stating that: “the economy requires concerted action 
by organised labour, business, civic leaders and government”635.  
If the absence of substantive social reforms is attributed to state’s lack of interests to 
spearhead such a paradigm, then South Africa needs a powerful civic movement to challenge 
the complacency of the ruling classes. A state-society-business nexus generated better 
egalitarian inclined policy outcomes in Mauritius than state-labour-business forum would 
have done alone.  
I have shown in this section that capitalism has become adept at indirectly silencing 
voices of dissent through the state, albeit also in partnership with labour. The unfortunate 
events that occurred at Marikana in August 2012 – discussed in the next section – show that 
when mass-based mobilisation is marred by political divisions, it becomes less effective in 
conscientising the ruling élite about the need for social reforms.  
6.3.3 Unrelenting Capitalism, Marikana, and the Fragmentation of Broad-Based 
Social Mobilisation 
The lack of unity amongst the working classes hampers mass-based social mobilisation to 
take off because labour is marred by political interests. The Marikana catastrophe in August 
2013, which claimed the lives of 34 miners at the hands of the police, is a case in point here. 
It was a culmination of a fall out between the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and 
the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) over wage disputes636. 
Moreover because of NUM’s association with COSATU and the state, the rise of AMCU to 
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topple the dominance of NUM in the platinum belt became reflective of the compromised 
nature of the state and the labour federation.  
Ideally when working classes champion causes that are aimed at heralding broad-
reaching socioeconomic transformation, it is expected that others in the left would overlook 
political divisions and rally behind their cause. Unfortunately the nature of corporatism in 
South Africa has pushed the detractors of the Tripartite Alliance outside the consultation 
platform whilst those who support the Alliance are welcomed with open arms. Marikana is a 
symptom of the fragmentation of these social configurations which shaded into serving 
certain sectional interests on the scorched political terrain.  
In Mauritius, political divisions have yet to cloud the judgement of the social reform 
movement, and the unions, regardless of who their political affiliates are, remain at the 
forefront of mobilising all sections of the society, collectively throwing their weight behind a 
common cause. That awakening is yet to be realised in South Africa and the bond that binds 
workers and society in Mauritius still remains out of reach, which stalls the path towards 
realising radical social reforms. I contend that for South Africa’s social landscape to achieve 
broad-based mobilisation capacity of the kind of Mauritius, certain conditions need to be 
met. First there needs to be recognition within the working class movement that 
socioeconomic redistribution must sincerely be pursued within the context of the wider 
societal beneficence instead of the ‘workers first and the rest later’ attitude. Secondly, the 
quest to alleviate current socioeconomic challenges in South Africa requires solid synergies 
from a broad-based social coalition which will yield results that attest of a consensus to 
prioritise the wellbeing of all South Africans and not just of the privileged few. It is hoped 
that the breakaway of National Union of Metal Workers (NUMSA) from COSATU will usher 
in such awakening wherein workers and the broad spectrum of the society develop stronger 
societal ties.  
What happened in Marikana has dented the integrity of industrial relations and has 
certainly posed a lot of questions about post-apartheid South Africa’s socioeconomic and 
political order. Moreover, that the state machinery was employed as a repository tool to 
maintain the élite interests is revealing of the growing intolerance of voices of dissent or any 
form of courage garnered to challenge the status quo. Ultimately, the advocates of the social 
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reform struggle not forming part of the political ruling arrangement are pushed furthermore 
away, instilling the spirit of distrust amongst forces, which should, under normal 
circumstances, be propagating similar goals.  
In the next section I outline the welfare outcomes of post-apartheid South Africa as a 
culmination of class contestations that existed between capital and societal mobilisation as 
illustrated in the preceding sections. It also put into perspective the general developmental 
character of the welfare regime within the context of the pensions’ debate. 
Section III: Welfare Outcomes in the Post-1994 era: Developmental Welfare & the 
Position of Pensions  
6.4 Penetrating Society: From RDP to Developmental Social Welfare 
According to Tom Lodge post-apartheid South Africa embraced social penetration as one of 
the tools to strengthen its image in the eyes of the citizens637. Within the socio-political 
context of South Africa by social penetration Lodge means the extent to which the state 
exercises control over its citizens, as well as the length it travels in order to fulfil the 
mandate of providing social benefits. Moreover, social penetration was associated with the 
expediency of the governmental response to the frustrations of the poor and 
dispossessed638.  
Borrowing Lodge’s understanding of social penetration, Mauritius embraced a 
commitment to the creation of a welfare state with universal access to social benefits. South 
Africa’s on the other hand, resolved to settle for its lesser variant. Social penetration was 
designed to take form in what the government came to adopt as a developmental social 
welfare model. In the eyes of the new Ministry of Welfare and Population Development, the 
new strategy was in sync with the programmes of reconstruction and development which 
provided the social development blueprint for the ANC government during the first few 
years after taking power639. Indeed the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), 
as it became commonly known, was a reflection of government’s commitment to 
redistribution through the budget and one ideologically emphatic on state intervention 
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instead of creating the welfare state. Ironically the RDP was a programme drawn up by the 
left, even though it was adopted by the ANC as an election trump card. Acknowledging the 
need for a “stronger welfare system”, COSATU unequivocally discouraged against the idea 
of providing “handouts” for the unemployed but championed participation in the 
economy640. There is no doubt that the programmes of reconstruction and development can 
be considered to be the first attempt by the new government to try and curb the social 
problems that confronted the new nation in transition, although not underpinned by radical 
ideological undertones. In the same vein, there is no disputing the fact that the RDP’s 
mandate was the one of addressing South Africa’s host of social problems, which spanned 
from the provision of housing as its key priority, primary health care, water and 
electrification of mainly erstwhile rural areas, albeit without a clearly defined welfare 
framework641.  
It came as no surprise that the overarching principles of the developmental social 
welfare model adopted in the 1997 White Paper on Social Welfare centred on self-reliance 
with public assistance reserved only for the poor and vulnerable642. The concept of 
developmental social welfare was first introduced to the global social protection discourse 
by the United Nations (UN) in 1989 as one of the important dimensions of social 
development. The concept was reincarnated at the 1995 UN World Summit for Social 
Development held in Copenhagen643. Advocated for by Professor James Midgley, who had 
been tasked to formulate a social policy system that would enable the South African 
government to address poverty and dispossession, a ‘developmental social welfare’ 
paradigm entered the country’s social policy discourse and was adopted as its social 
development framework. Like the RDP, it was never intended to be a fully-fledged welfare 
state model that would embrace extensive welfare offerings.  
Significantly, this approach was adopted to dovetail neoliberal notions of public 
assistance with rather uncanny similarities to apartheid’s minimalist welfare model. 
Therefore championing the message of self-sufficiency instead, the developmental 
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approach sought to promote the tradition of self-empowerment that was envisioned to 
yield more productive outcomes within the sector of the economy in the long run. Hence in 
a journal article titled Promoting a Developmental Perspective in Social Welfare, Midgley 
charged that “the developmental approach is less concerned with transferring resources 
from the productive economy to social welfare services than with ensuring that social 
policies contribute to development” 644. It is clear that Midgley held strongly the belief that 
market-focused economics should be placed above the more socially focused pro-poor 
policies with the former serving as the benefactor channel to advance the egalitarian cause.  
In view of this reality, social penetration for the post-apartheid state’s social 
development entailed inheriting apartheid’s pattern of redistribution through the budget in 
order to meet the basic needs of the citizens. But never was social penetration, albeit 
enabled by the progressive tax regime that redistributed from the affluent to those at the 
bottom of the socioeconomic pile, underwritten by socialist ideals of going beyond the 
minimalistic provisions of social benefits. The ANC was cognisant of the pressures of the 
market to embrace the neoliberal economic orthodoxy whilst at the same time feeling the 
pressure from the society to deliver on its social promises. It was a dilemma that prompted 
a less comprehensive developmental welfare paradigm as the ANC’s indirect method of 
backing down on its ambitious social plans, albeit with a much softened tone. A complete 
change of heart, therefore, would have risked having the party’s legitimacy being called into 
question amongst its supporters. In Mauritius it was the opposite, although the socialist 
rhetoric was toned down with pragmatism to ensure continued success of the economy 
required to fund the state’s social obligations. Indeed under Chapter 2 of the Constitution, 
South Africa guarantees the right for adequate housing, education, healthcare and social 
security (which entails social assistance)645. However, under the developmental welfare 
framework, such legal provisions have only done so much to push the boundaries of social 
penetration.  
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South Africa has failed to define the national poverty datum line646 which, in Alfred 
Pfaller’s terms, goes contrary to the common expectations of a welfare state for ensuring 
that “each citizen ought to enjoy a certain minimum standard of living” no matter “how he 
fares in the market”647. Instead social penetration has only become synonymous with the 
social assistance sector, which has since the advent of democracy, served the role of lifting 
millions of South Africans out of poverty due to significant portions of GDP being dedicated 
to that sector year on year. It is in this respect that South Africa has become known for 
erecting one of the most generous and extensive welfare programmes with non-
contributory social assistance having been made payable to 14 million people in 2010 up 
from 2.6 million in 1994648, all of which reflect an increase of 19 per cent. Certainly, social 
grants – rather than growth in the labour market – have helped to reduce poverty 
considerably. Of late the economy has not been able to create jobs causing many South 
Africans to rely on government assistance. According to a 2012 research survey conducted 
by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), in 2001, only eight per cent of the 
population benefited from social grants. During the financial year of 2012/2013 that figure 
soared to 31 per cent649.  
6.4.1 Lack of National Consensus and Implications on Social Security 
The Post-apartheid social security sector has not resonated with the broader context of 
political transition. Rather attempts to usher in reforms within the area of social security 
have been met by the state’s reluctance. Two distinctive social inquiries since the ascension 
to power by the ANC lends credence to this claim, namely the 1995 Lund Inquiry to improve 
the system of support for the vulnerable African children and the Taylor Inquiry of 2000 on 
the gaps within the social security sector of South Africa650. I shall address each one 
individually.  
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First under assessment is the Child Support Grant which became the first post-
apartheid government’s modification of the social security system. At first glance it most 
certainly qualified to be regarded as a major revision of the social security system but it was 
nothing less than being just a replacement of its precursor, the State Maintenance Grant 
(SMG). Upon taking political power, the ANC-led government appointed Professor Frances 
Lund in 1995 to preside over a Committee on Child and Family Support which would 
evaluate the current system of state support as well as to suggest alternative policy options 
that targeted children and families. Popularly known as the Lund Committee, it would 
become the first post-apartheid social inquiry commissioned by the ANC government that 
offered a glimpse into the ANC’s fiscal conservatism towards social reforms. The SMG 
offered generous child maintenance grants to parents/guardians looking after poor 
children651. However the system was deemed by the ANC to be inappropriate for the new 
South Africa because it assumed that the only children in need were those born to single 
parents652. This became the case even though equalising access of the SMG was deemed too 
costly to be within the reach of government, affordability wise. Hence in 1998 the state 
opted for the cheaper child-oriented support system known as the Child Support Grant as 
opposed to the ‘wider group’ coverage option being suggested by the Lund Committee. The 
family oriented SMG was finally renounced in 2002 following a decision to have it 
discontinued over a five-year period. 
Even under these circumstances applicants of the grants were required to be 
involved in “developmental programmes” as to avert the unwanted consequences of 
increased dependence on state support and trying to get South Africans to adopt a self-
empowerment oriented mindset. However this criterion was later overturned because such 
development projects did not exist in certain parts of the country.  
The debate around universal income grant also adds to the record of the state’s 
unwillingness to fundamentally reform social security. Government appointed a Committee 
of Inquiry into Comprehensive Social Security, commonly known as the Taylor Committee, 
under the leadership of Professor Viviene Taylor of UCT. The committee was entrusted with 
the responsibility of investigating the gaps in the existing social security system. Upon the 
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conclusion of the inquiry, it recommended in favour of the introduction of the universal 
Basic Income Grant (BIG) commencing at the value of R100 per month for all South Africans. 
Research showed that at the time an additional R100 in the bank would have increased the 
incomes of 18 million South Africans surviving on less than R250 per month by 60 per 
cent653. However, government was adamant in 2004 that the system was untenable with 
Trevor Manuel, then Minister of Finance, stating that the grant will “bankrupt the 
country”654. He later on, in another interview after his tenure as Minister in the Presidency 
ended, expressed in no uncertain terms that “individual effort should be encouraged over 
state-dependence”655.  
However the justification not to allow the grant to take effect on financial grounds 
was far removed from reason. The financial reports of the next financial year (2005/2006) 
however declared that the revenues collected by government exceeded budget estimates 
by R41.2 billion (USD 5.2 billion) with the Ministry of Finance emboldened to hand out an 
amount of R19.1 billion (USD 2.4 billion) in tax cuts for the 2006/2007 financial year656. 
What this revelation suggests, as Di Lollo pointed out, is that the surplus and cuts, 
hypothetically speaking, were capable of financing a monthly income of approximately R100 
(USD 13) for each of the 47 million citizens in that year657.  
What is perplexing is that whilst government lamented the high financial costs of 
putting in effect the grant, it continued to create significant welfare machinery which 
disperses monthly social grants to over 15 million South Africans. As Everatt’s observations 
note: “[that] the dominant voice within the ANC after Mandela was one that chided the 
poor for remaining poor, rejected a basic income grant but was unable to resist pressure for 
major cash transfers to the poor in the form of social grants”658. Indeed political ideologies 
instead of fear of the possibility of haemorrhaging state coffers were the issue. Hence 
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contradicting the National Treasury’s earlier assertions of financial prudence, the Trade and 
Industry Minister, Alec Erwin, stated that “[it is] not the money but the idea” that is not 
viable659. Thoko Didiza, former Land Affairs Minister, echoed similar sentiments during the 
chairing of the ANC’s social transformation department, with the following: “This discussion 
at the moment is about the values underpinning such a grant”. The Minister further stated 
that government holds the belief that “only persons who are disabled or ill should get 
handouts”660. 
Against the background of this reality, there is no doubt that government’s hesitant 
approach serves as a major irony considering the promise of the ANC-led government in the 
1990s that: “[t]here will be universal access to an integrated and sustainable social 
security”661. In the ANC’s view, the fact that social assistance has achieved wider coverage 
with greater development impact (see section below) is an indication of being in tune with 
the spirit of universalism such as that of its counterpart, Mauritius. Such records of success, 
however, do not offer enough grounds to make a strong case for a universal welfare state 
considering the means-tested and target based element that governs the area of social 
security as a whole. So far it is only with regard to the National Health Insurance (NHI) that 
government has come close to acting in more socially democratic terms. Through this health 
system government seeks to bridge the rich-poor divide by attempting to ensure that all 
South Africans access integrated health care services of high quality. For this purpose, the 
system has been estimated to cost the public R46 billion annually after the first five years of 
its implementation. Indeed this initiative will be truly progressive if it gets off the ground. 
Hence resources for supporting the scheme will be sourced through the tax system and by 
putting current fulltime workers not belonging to medical schemes under a deductions 
payroll662.  
In short it is this national consensus that has kept the universal social security system 
of Mauritius intact yet absent in South Africa. Surely at the time the ANC came to power – 
as opposed to when Mauritius’s Labour Party assumed political power – the culture of an 
interventionist approach that was in harmony with a social democratic ethos was non-
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existent in South Africa. Hence government lamented in its 1997 White Paper for Social 
Welfare that “[t]here is no national consensus on a welfare policy framework and its 
relationship to a national reconstruction and development strategy”663. But it is equally the 
absence of such a consensus that made the government to feel unmoved to create a more 
universal welfare system, let alone a welfare state at all.  
The developmental welfare approach, which continues to shape policy, reflects the 
absence of national consensus alluded to earlier. Hence the decision to opt for the less 
comprehensive approach was taken with the hindsight of the 1993 Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development Survey (PLSD), conducted by Southern Africa Labour and 
Development Research Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town (UCT) in conjunction 
with the World Bank (WB). It showed that large sections of society believed that 
government should radically seek to reverse the scourge of unemployment and crime. In 
another 1993/1994 social survey conducted by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
(IDASA), between 67 and 79 per cent of respondents raised concerns on the issue of 
unemployment whilst between 58 and 65 per cent of respondents lamented the high levels 
of crime664. The creation of the welfare state never surfaced as a top priority in these 
surveys. 
The current welfare outcomes echo the developmental experiences of the pre-1994, 
era whereby the absence of broad-based coalitions challenging the capitalist system yielded 
less extensive welfare outcomes. The left in the first quarter of the 20th century became pre-
occupied with the promotion of a welfare path that was based along racial lines, thus failing 
to entrench universal welfare principles in the social fabric of the nation. Coupling this 
heritage is that the poor themselves, comprised by mainly the black majority, were not 
politically empowered to exercise universal franchise as to make political choices that would 
champion their interests. Instead “their struggles generally revolved around opposition to 
rather demands to change”665. Even the left who helped to formulate the socialist driven 
RDP for post-apartheid South Africa were unmoved to champion the concept of universal 
social wage that actually did not discriminate on the basis of household income or assets. In 
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Mauritius on the other hand, the public (from all socioeconomic backgrounds) were able to 
act in one accord to vote out public officials when they lead reforms that threaten to trim 
down the universal welfare state (see Chapter 5). Certainly their modus operandi is not the 
one of opposition alone, but also one of effecting material change.  
Indeed reforms also rely squarely on the character of national politics. Certainly the 
lack of national consensus is ascribed to the political disposition that caters mainly for two 
big stakeholders within the corporatist constitutional order, namely labour and business. 
Inevitably the voices of the organised poor have been left in the sidelines unheard (see 
previous section on the structure of corporatism). According to Richard Sandbrook et al666, 
the ANC has adopted a much more autocratic approach, one which resulted in the political 
system that shuns and scolds dissenting civil society. Another academic also specialising in 
industrial relations and welfare state-building in post-apartheid South Africa has states that 
the nature of “corporatism in South Africa has become undemocratic”667. As Ralph Miliband 
observes of the displaced power of the poor in a typical capitalistic system668: 
The trouble, for the poor, is that the forces operating against them are very 
stronger than those working in their favour. What is involved here is not 
recognition, or discovery of the right policies, or the creation of the right 
administrative framework, or even the goodwill of power holders. The matter 
goes deeper than that, and concerns the distribution of power in society 
Without a doubt what contributed to the ANC’s draconian ways of handling dissent, even 
under a liberal constitutional framework that promotes the values of accountability and 
freedom of association, is its dominant party status. Therefore it is not a mistake that the 
ANC can make policies which sway in favour of its partners. After all South Africa’s de facto 
two party system, unlike Mauritius’s vibrant multi-party democratic culture, hinders political 
parties from wielding a forceful momentum pushing for the revision of policies. But 
exacerbating that dynamic in South Africa even the more is the lack of social democratic 
ethos defining the philosophies of major political parties. The latter remains a character that 
Mauritius’s political culture thoroughly enjoys, as virtually all political parties in that country 
espouse centre-left political ideologies. In South Africa major political parties have remained 
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virtually silent on this issue, over time leaving the government less pressured to spearhead 
welfare outcomes which adhere to social democratic norms. The DA remains largely a 
centre right political party even though its quest to win the support of the poor black voters 
in recent times has caused it to speak increasingly in the terms of a kind of social democracy 
that resonates with the centre-right camp. The Congress of the People (COPE) and Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) are unfavourable to social spending, whereas the newly established 
political party of Dr Mamphele Ramphele, Agang SA, decries South Africa’s obsession with 
‘excessive’ welfare expenditure and perennial dependence on social grants. So in essence 
the ANC has been left to its devices with minimal pressure to implement drastic social 
reforms. 
6.4.2 The structural legacies of the developmental approach 
It is clear that through the developmental welfare model successive ANC governments 
resigned from leaning to social democracy as the basis for South Africa’s welfare framework. 
Through the embrace of the Anglo-Saxon laissez faire welfare model, whilst simultaneously 
displacing its socialist traditions, the South African welfare regime lost the chances of 
becoming a social democracy because structural properties of the economy had already 
been altered less to its favour shown previously in Section 6.2 of this Chapter. Section II also 
showed that the fragmentation of social mobilisation allowed the pursuit of élite interests at 
the expense of broad-reaching ones, thus providing the conditions for capitalism to rear its 
head including in the social security sector. Joining Esping-Andersen on the typologies of 
welfare capitalism, Jeremy Seekings posits in his account of the typologies of welfare 
capitalism in the global South that the backsliding welfare trajectory of South Africa 
conforms to the worker-pauperist type. These sort of welfare regimes put premium both on 
occupation-based “semi-social” insurance and state-funded sets of social assistance 
programmes whilst concurrently encouraging smallholder production669. As already 
demonstrated in the previous section, social assistance is the key pillar of the country’s 
welfare trajectory alongside occupational insurance schemes which are being made to all 
employed in the formal sector of the economy. 
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But the 1997 White Paper for Social Welfare unequivocally stated that the 
developmental approach has been penned to conform with the ‘growth first’ and 
‘redistribution later’ belief promoted by the neoliberal beliefs of the 1996 Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy. It was certainly the total opposite of the 
coexistence of growth and redistribution approach inherent in Mauritius’s social policy 
framework that stood firm in defiance of the structural adjustments of International 
Financial Institutions for the period of the 1980s (see Section 5.4.1 in Chapter 5).  
Certainly it is one of the sacrosanct objectives of traditional welfare models that 
governments should strive to achieve employment that sweeps across the spectrum of 
society. Hence even the proponents of the employment-centric approach to social 
development have turned a blind eye to the fact that “jobs are one aspect of a wider 
realisation of social rights, not a substitute for it”670. Yet the government’s unfaltering 
position that it would “rather create work opportunities” instead of “handouts” reinforces 
employment as a magic portal for attaining wellbeing at the time when jobs remain virtually 
unattainable for millions of South Africans671. For instance one in every four South Africans 
of a working age is unemployed. And moreover, South Africa shows a proclivity towards 
casualised, subcontracting, and/or temporary patterns of employment, which rely largely on 
seasonal factors.  
The fact that the South African government conceded in 2010 (against the 
background of 870 000 job losses in 2009) that it can only create one million jobs by 2014 
throws into the policy debate the question of the Expanded Public Works Programmes 
(EPWP). These public works programmes were conceived and implemented during the 
Thabo Mbeki administration as poor relief measures to help many young South Africans 
unable to find work get work experience. They are, however, predated by other poor relief 
programmes spanning since 1996, also intended specifically to help curb the scourge of 
unemployment672. In this sense, the EPWP adopted a two pronged approach, signifying an 
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attempt by government to kill two birds with one stone: first to help people reduce their 
dependence on social grants, and second to serve as a bridge to getting waged employment. 
On these objectives government maintains that it will ultimately emerge triumphant. For 
instance, in his opening of Parliament in 2011, Jacob Zuma affirmed that South Africa “... is 
building a developmental state and not a welfare state”, further charging that “... social 
grants will be linked to economic activity and community development, to enable short-
term beneficiaries to become self-supporting in the long term”673. To this end, R52 billion 
was earmarked in the 2010 Budget with the intention of creating 4.5 million short-term 
work opportunities for the express purpose of reducing unemployment to 15 per cent by 
the year 2014674. Whether these programmes can be regarded as work opportunities or not 
remains questionable. However one thing is certain; South Africa’s workfare orthodoxy of 
substituting poor relief for expansive social protection675 remains in league with the centrist 
or centre right camp and certainly falls short of meeting the threshold required for the 
centre-left welfare approach to prevail.  
In the next discussion I show that the unemployment problems in South Africa’s 
labour market have caused old-age pensions to assume the responsibility of mitigating the 
country’s social ills. Its power and impact on the developmental outcomes within the poor 
communities has dwarfed those of other social grants being provided for by government. 
This is because government has allotted vast amounts of resources towards these safety 
nets, echoing the intentions of the developmental welfare shown in the previous section to 
preferably keep the public budget at a bare minimum. Consequently the scheme covertly 
sits at the epicentre of a tug of war between the ruling party and opposition parties in the 
ongoing quest for electoral support. 
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6.5 Pensions in the South African Society 
Non-contributory social assistance constitutes the key pillar of South Africa’s social welfare 
structure. As already hinted above, 14 million (28 per cent) South Africans benefit from the 
state’s targeted non-contributory social assistance676. This situation is against the 
background of the unemployment problem, which currently stands at 25 per cent (without 
expanded definition) and 34.4 per cent when taking into account the proportion of 
discouraged workers677. Indeed, there is a strong correlation between social protection and 
levels of inequality. Without social grants, South Africa’s Gini coefficient would be at a high 
of 0.8678. However, when social grants are factored in, the figure drops to 0.73, although still 
remaining a discouraging reality considering the 1995 Gini coefficient of 0.56679. South 
Africa views its social assistance scheme as universal, since it targets mainly the poor and 
dispossessed, thus deeming it the most effective anti-poverty fighting mechanism. The 
figures suggest that a large proportion of the population (of 50 million), whether urban or 
rural, depend on the state to stay out of poverty680. 
As such, the Government offers the following main social assistance schemes for 
those living at the very margins of society: State Old Age Pension (SOAP), Child Support 
Grant (CSG), Disability Grant, Foster Grant and Care Dependency Grant. They are being 
administered by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) – a separate national 
government agency681. This system of non-contributory social assistance forms part and 
parcel of the overall three-tiered social security structure. It is shown in the diagram in 
Appendix 6A. 
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Before getting to pensions, one needs to paint the picture of the void being filled by 
government’s redistributive measures mainly via social security within the general context 
of the South African socioeconomic landscape. It will help put into perspective the role 
being played by pensions in meeting government’s social obligations relative to these other 
forms of offerings. 
 Social security was extended as a statutory right for all citizens by the NP 
Government under the legal provisions of Social Assistance Act of 1992. Social Security was 
as a result intended to serve the following two objectives: (a) to reduce poverty among 
people and vulnerable to low income such as the elderly, children, and people with 
disabilities who are unable to participate in the labour market, and (b) to devote sizeable 
financial investments in the healthcare sector, nutrition and education in a bid to make 
human capital compatible with plans of accelerating the economy, growth and 
development. Additional objectives of social security include prevention of destitution, 
social compensation and redistribution682. 
Within the pool of non-contributory social assistance programmes available, the 
state has since the end of apartheid been disproportionately reliant on the old-age pension 
scheme as a mechanism to alleviate poverty683. This claim complements the current welfare 
expenditure which stands at 3.5 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), out of which 
the old-age pension scheme receives the lion’s share of 1.3 per cent of GDP684. This renders 
occupation insurance schemes to account for a small portion of the South African welfare 
system, since they cover mainly the formally employed. Hence, the Financial Service Board 
(FSB) has estimated that 7 273 897 were active members of occupational and voluntary 
arrangements of which 2 138 272 are pensioners685. When put into perspective, it means 
that 15 per cent of the population have private savings which will shield them against 
economic shocks during the years of retirement, whereas 4 per cent of the population have 
occupational insurance.  
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Even the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) which is supposed to cover temporary 
shocks of unemployment due to retrenchment for those that used to be formally employed 
raises questions around its impact. For instance, of the 4 125 000 persons unemployed in 
the 2008/2009 financial year, only 44 200 people claimed unemployment benefits from the 
UIF686. In other words only 10 per cent of the unemployed population were able to benefit 
from the occupations social insurance. What explains this pattern is that only 55 per cent of 
the unemployed group never worked before and as a result they were unable to make 
contributions to the Fund to protect themselves against contingencies during periods of 
unemployment. Another explanation for this low take-up rate was because 44 per cent 
were unemployed for a period of up to a year, suggesting that they ended up exceeding the 
safety net period of 6 months687. 
What is apparent is that social security bears resonance with racial patterns of 
economic distribution. Indeed the South African social landscape is one which speaks of a 
special type of social stratification since it has become synonymous with race. For instance 
in the 2011 Census, Statistics South Africa (STATS SA) revealed that the average annual 
household income for whites was 365 134 compared to that for blacks of 60 613, whilst that 
for Indians/Asians and Coloureds was 251 541 and 112 172 respectively688. For purposes of 
convenience, the following income classes have been identified and designated to explain 
the context. They shed light into reasons why certain income/racial groups are likely to 
receive state assistance as well as regional variations that go with patterns of provision of 
social assistance: quintile 5 (the affluent class), quintile 4 (stable urban working class), 
quintile 3 (insecure formal sector class), and quintile 1 and 2 (the very poor/outsiders 
class)689.  
In 1997 Quintile 5 constituted the upper class which was dominated mainly by 
whites. They comprised 12 per cent of all households in South Africa yet their income 
accounted for 45 per cent of the total income of the country. This reality was ascribed to 
high acquisition of skills as well as the managerial roles they occupied. The contingencies 
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faced by this group were similar to the ones of industrialised countries and occupational 
insurance usually covered against risks. Households belonging to quintile 4 group comprised 
mainly the urban working class who were represented disproportionately by blacks 
although coloureds and Indians/Asians had a sizeable representation. Their well-paid jobs 
afforded them occupational insurance to cover against risks during retirement but they 
remain the vulnerable category since their skills set does not offer them same contingencies 
as the upper class. Hence “... the group is also affected by rules relating to the withdrawal of 
benefits when they change jobs and by the means test for old age pensions”690. Households 
in quintile 3 were the most complex of all groups. These households comprise mainly better-
paid farm workers with families and property in the rural areas but economically dependent 
on urban areas. They were mainly subjected to fluctuating fortunes due to high risk of 
unemployment ascribed to cyclical factors, as well as the uncertain prospects of finding 
employment. However those who possess some skills have the higher likelihood of 
graduating into quintile four. Occupational insurance did not play a comprehensive role for 
this group even though they received nominal coverage from it. As a result many under this 
category opted for provident funds over occupational retirement provision since taking 
lump sum retirement benefits rendered them eligible to be covered by the means-tested 
old-age pensions. The last quintile group(s) comprised predominantly rural black people and 
they were at the bottom of the socioeconomic pile. Their lack of educational attainment 
deprived them of skills that could assist them to break out of poverty. They did not have a 
regular income since they were prone to being casualised. Those that were able to find 
permanent employment or receive social pensions were more capable “to move up the 
income ladder”691. Occupational insurance was certainly not within the reach of this group, 
thus making social assistance (especially old-age pensions) a vital source of income692. 
Frances Lund argued that pensions have been at the centre of poverty alleviation, with 
benefits being transferred to the children of the beneficiaries and their grand-children also. 
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These played an important role in enhancing educational outcomes as well as the improving 
the health of their dependents693. 
The situation has slightly changed from that of the transitional years of the 1990s. 
Pensions remain the key pillar in the fight against poverty however their distribution retains 
apartheid’s racial patterns of provision. Blacks remain the majority grant beneficiaries with 
figures standing at 33.5 per cent and Indians and Coloureds at 12.4 per cent and 23.3 per 
cent respectively compared to the figure of six per cent for whites694. Income households in 
quintile 5 still predominantly rely on investments and wages as sources of income, whereas 
quintiles 1 and 2 alone receive a considerable share of 31 per cent from the child grants 
(CSG, Foster Grants and Care Dependency Grants combined) compared to 20 per cent 
singlehandedly for SOAP (see Appendix 6B)695.  
State Old Age Pension (SOAP) by 1970 blacks comprised 70 per cent of all pensioners 
whilst receiving only 43 per cent of pension spending. By 1990 the latter proportion had 
increased to 63 per cent as changes towards pension parity were being made696. The 
equalisation of pensions is what became responsible for the rise in spending on social old-
age pensions, which spanned from 0.59 per cent of GDP in 1970 (although down from 0.86 
in 1960) to 1.82 per cent in 1993697. Table 6.1 and 6.2 shows the proportion of individuals 
eligible for pensions. They reveal that currently 84 per cent of SOAP beneficiaries and 60 per 
cent for Child Support Grant are Africans compared to 23 and two per cent of whites698, 
even though the budget for SOAP accounts for 1.2 per cent of GDP (compared to the 1.86 of 
1993) referred to earlier in this chapter.  
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TABLE 6.1: RECIPIENTS OF STATE GRANTS 
 
TABLE 6.2: HOUSEHOLDS WITH STATE GRANTS 
 
Source: Republic of South Africa (2008), cited in Woolard, Ingrid et al, Op. Cit, 2010, p.16 
 Just as pensions were crucial in poverty-stricken rural areas during the apartheid-era, they 
remain the major source of sustenance in those areas today. For instance, STATS SA’s 
General Household Survey (GHS) of 2010 showed that in predominantly rural provinces, 
notably Limpopo and the Eastern Cape, grants are more relevant than remittances, which 
account for 70.7 and 23.95 per cent of household income respectively699. Of course Child 
Support Grants are partly responsible for the high take-up rate of social grants; hence, in 
recent years they have increased in popularity to contest the SOAP to be in pole position 
(see Appendix 6C). This trend is also clearly visible in welfare expenditure patterns. During 
the 2002/2003 financial year, pensions accounted for more than one half of all social 
assistance, making pensions the foremost instrument of redistribution via the budget. By 
2006/2007, however, 37 per cent of social assistance was allocated to old-age pensions, 
whereas the child support grant accounted for a significantly large amount of 31 per cent700. 
Current figures published by the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) show that 
although the welfare budget had gone up to 39 per cent child support grant expenditure as 
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a proportion of the total grant expenditure has seen a significant increase of 36 per cent701. 
However, no matter the size of the programme, the developmental impact of the SOAP is 
more expanded compared to that one of CSG since impact is intergenerational and not 
focused on the nutritionals aspects of the child alone702. Also value wise (as per purchasing 
power parity (PPP)) SOAPs surpasses that of its challenger CSG by 135 per cent as Table 6.3 
below shows. 
TABLE 6.3: REAL VALUE OF SOCIAL GRANTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 2010 
 
Source: Republic of South Africa (2010), cited in Woolard, Ingrid, et al Op. Cit, p. 18 
Given the popularity of pensions amongst black Africans the ANC Government has 
come to use them as tools of political exploit – in the same manner in which pensions were 
used as a trump card to win white votes by the apartheid government and government 
before 1948 (See Chapter 3). It is therefore important to look at pensions within the context 
of the intentions of the developmental welfare framework to grasp this assertion. As 
indicated in previous sections, the developmental welfare disdains the notion of the state 
assuming the responsibility of looking after the marginalised. However, just as in white 
South Africa during the politically turbulent years of the 1920s, pensions have passed as a 
function of perpetuating the interests of corporate capital in post-apartheid South Africa 
since they help contain social tensions. This reality has made pensions an easier bit for 
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capital to commit to over a battery of welfare programmes that would have sprung up if the 
state had adopted a comprehensive welfare paradigm of Mauritius’s kind. 
But one crude reality about pensions is that the resolutely poor status of blacks 
creates conditions which cause the ruling élite to exploit them as a function of political 
expediency. Indeed the state of poverty gives the ANC the chance to use pensions to 
frighten voters, encouraging them not to support alternative political parties as they would 
not honour the delivery of these grants703. The party’s scheming tactic is fuelled by 
knowledge of the fact that a “large section of the population continue to invest their hope 
for a better future in the ANC as the liberator from the oppressive white government [my 
emphasis]704. Indeed Devereux hit the point on the head by positing that social grants are 
tools used by the politicians to tighten their grip to power. Kanya Adam summarises in 
incisive detail the unholy alliance between pensions and power gripping tactics of the ruling 
élites: “[t]he more the socioeconomic conditions for the majority remain the same, the 
more the Government has to fall back on a symbolic demonstration of liberation”705. 
There is no evidence that pensions serve the patron-client purpose of helping the 
political élite retain power. However, there are subtle indications which suggest that 
pensions may be used as functions of the political élite’s grip on power. The government’s 
conspicuous reliance on pensions as a means to win the battle against poverty and 
inequality (behind the background of unemployment) has indirectly caused the poor 
quarters of society to reaffirm the belief that the ANC-led government sympathises with the 
plight of the have-nots. Although not yet empirically proven, there is a perception in the 
South African social milieu that voting a political alternative to the ANC will result in the 
discontinuation of the grants. Political parties and representatives of civil society have made 
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utterances which seem to suggest the continuation of the grants by the ANC is pivotal to the 
party’s politicking machinery. Moeletsi Mbeki, a critic of BEE and government, has 
previously accused the ANC of using social grants to secure a political power base by 
increasing grants, hence, from 2 million in 1996 to 15.5 million today706. Similarly, concerns 
abound about the sustainability of these grants. The views by pundits, including SAIRR and 
the former Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, Tito Mboweni, is that these 
measures are not sustainable in the long run and statistics are in concurrence707. Out of a 
population of 50 million, only 5 million South Africans pay income tax. Of the taxpaying 
category, 10 per cent contribute more than 50 percent of total tax revenue708.  
Yet the political importance of grants became even more apparent during a by-
election campaign for Ward 18 in Umzimkhulu in KwaZulu-Natal that took place on 15 May 
2013, in which the leader of the Democratic Alliance tried allaying the fears of the 
electorates by assuring them that the “DA will not take away [their] grants [...]”. Even ultra-
leftist political entrants, the EFF, have entered the fray in the run-up to the general elections 
of 2014 with its leader, Julius Malema, stating his party’s intentions to increase the value of 
social grants if they take the reins of state power709. But no one in the political mainstream 
could have captured the politically emotive nature of the social grants system more 
emphatically than the leader of Agang SA. During the launch of the party on 25 April 2013 at 
the University of the Witwatersrand, Mamphele Ramphele noted that: “[...] many of us, we 
who against the odds, stood up to the military might of the apartheid government, now we 
live in fear [...] People in poor communities say they are afraid of losing their social grants if 
they stand up against the ruling party”.710 
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6.6 Concluding Remarks  
South Africa’s post-apartheid developmental trajectory remains one that is plagued with 
contradictions. These contradictions pertain to the three elements that have helped make 
sense of the welfare paradigm that came into being, namely the state, corporate capital and 
the social mobilisation capacity of broad-based organisations. Firstly, the state, articulating 
the policy aspirations of the ANC, has had a change of heart since the advent of democracy, 
since the kind of social progress it promised voters abruptly took second priority, making 
way for neoliberal economic interests to be at the forefront of policy endeavours. Secondly, 
the economy itself, stable as it has been for the most of the ANC’s rule, enjoyed relative 
comfort, resulting in most corporations becoming relatively prosperous. Yet within the 
realm of the economy there is an ever more pressing need for corporations to commit more 
to the social agenda as well to create sustainable jobs. Thirdly, the mobilisation capacity of 
social forces lacks the assertiveness to have the welfare agenda receiving priority amongst 
the ruling classes. 
What has emerged on the welfare policy making agenda is priority for an 
individualistic developmental welfare model, which was devised through a top-down 
approach by both bureaucrats and economic technocrats in the employ of the political 
office bearers. The lack of bottom-up policy-making processes is not unique to South Africa. 
Even the more comprehensive welfare paradigm of Mauritius comes from the top; it is just 
that its welfare outcomes resonate with the country’s social fabric because of the politicised 
nature of the universal welfare state, which compels politicians to be more responsive. In 
South Africa, both the state and capital are the culprits for the minimalist character of the 
social developmental agenda; however, societal mobilisation led by labour also shares an 
equal amount of blame. As shown by Mauritius’s developmental trajectory, broad-based 
mobilisation gave shape to the substantive nature of the welfare paradigm and, through 
unity, societal mobilisation has caused the character of the welfare state to remain intact 
and not conform to neoliberal ideological orthodoxy. What has been the problem 
hampering further commitment beyond current welfare offerings has much to do with the 
fact that labour is inherently distant from the society it is supposed to champion. Whilst in 
Mauritius the working classes remain the vanguard of the cross-class broad-based 
mobilisation movement, in South Africa, labour disdains broad-based societal mobilisation 
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that is representative of all classes. As asserted previously in this chapter, this disdain has 
created the conditions upon which capital and the state take the society for a ride, since 
there are neither formidable agencies of restraint keeping the ruling élite in check, nor 
pressing reconsiderations in favour of more substantive social reforms. Instead, labour is 
more close to capital than it is to the broad spectrum of society because of its alignment 
with the ruling élite and preoccupation with the politics of state power. As a result, élite 
interests have prevailed and they have made broad-reaching socioeconomic reforms 
unnecessary and undesirable within large quarters of government.  
What the failures of the BIG Coalition have come to reveal is the need to bridge the 
gap between the social classes through a mobilisation movement that unites a wide 
spectrum of society in the spirit of broad-reaching socioeconomic transformation. In 
Mauritius, this propensity has shown to yield a commitment that leans in favour of the 
society amongst the ruling élite. In South Africa, structural changes that shade into the 
social development sector can only take effect upon the realisation inside the labour 
movement that grassroots collaborations hold the key to a massive transformative 
paradigm that is more responsive to the plight of the economically dispossessed.  
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Chapter VII: Welfare Paradigms of South Africa and Mauritius: 
Reflections and Prospects for Future Research 
 
“[...] political legitimacy rest on the tacit normative idea that government stands in the same 
relationship to its citizens that a father does to his children”. 
 – Michael Schatzberg711 
7.1. Introduction 
Historical conditions are indispensable for understanding the emergence of social 
democratic outcomes. Their role is to shed light on those historical antecedents that are 
responsible for current-day developmental paths. The demise of the plantocracy and the 
formation of independent peasantry became pivotal in the quest to promote the ideals of 
democratisation and the regulation of markets in a manner that benefits the general public. 
This study set out to understand the variations in welfare outcomes in Mauritius and South 
Africa across various historical periods. It specifically addressed the question why Mauritius 
erected a more comprehensive welfare paradigm and South Africa a less substantive 
approach. Additionally, it sought to decipher the mystery behind the rise of pensions to pre-
eminence as features defining these welfare paradigms, and how societal pressures in either 
context played varying roles in underpinning the different types of welfare regimes that 
ensued.  
This study argued that the development of different welfare paradigms hinged on 
the character of social forces and the relationship they forged with the rest of society in the 
quest to align the interests of capital with those of the society. The social democratic 
welfare consensus in Mauritius was spearheaded by the organised working classes who 
forged close societal relations transcending class divisions. This collaboration became a 
politically powerful force, thus preventing the retrenchment of the welfare state by the 
ruling élite. In South Africa, the political significance of organised workers in the post-1994 
political settlement strengthened the notion of redistributive justice amongst the ruling 
classes. However, the wedge driven between the workers and the broad spectrum of society 
failed to inspire a mass-based rejection of the state’s minimalist orientation. This rendered 
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the welfare consensus in South Africa incapable of heralding a welfare state of the kind of 
that in Mauritius.  
In Mauritius, a smallholding class played a vital role in creating social democracy, 
whilst in South Africa the provision of the political space for the formerly marginalised 
agrarian élite served as the watershed for social reforms. It was the manner in which the 
state responded to calls for social change in the two countries that shaped the character of 
the modern-day welfare state. The lack of hesitation to adopt universal welfare doctrines 
during the formative years of welfare state development served as a concrete foundation 
for the retention of a social democratic ethos as the most distinguishable feature of the 
Mauritian welfare system. South Africa’s current-day welfare regime was a carry-over from 
the apartheid regime’s liberal welfare state with the amalgamation of the socialist principles 
of redistribution in a bid to respond accordingly to the social challenges plaguing the 
country. It comes as no surprise that the developmental welfare model captured the 
persistent embrace of neoliberal doctrines by South Africa’s social development framework, 
whilst concurrently being shy to curtsy fully to sweeping redistributive causes. The 
continued dominance of pensions within the spectrum of social development needs to be 
regarded against the background of social, political and economic formations that dictate 
their existence as well as their relevance. The South African economy is dominated by 
neoliberal traditions. Nevertheless, pensions are tolerated by capital as an indispensable 
feature that helps lessen the state’s poor record in redistributing the country’s resources. In 
Mauritius, the neoliberal economic framework understands the importance of 
grassroots/broad-based involvement within the policy-making echelons of the state, and it 
does not have the propensity to leave social reforms out in the cold. Hence, Mauritius has 
retained universal of old-age pensions as the integral part of its social reform agenda 
alongside a welfare framework that embraces the notion of egalitarian redistribution. 
In the next section I shall outline the similarities and differences in the socio-political 
and socioeconomic dynamics of South Africa and Mauritius, and the lessons they convey in 
explaining the evolution of welfare outcomes over time. Before getting to that part, I will 
first put Sandbrook et al’s analytical framework within the general context of the theories 
that informed this study. I shall then end with suggestions for future research. 
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7.2. Theoretical Reflections and Welfare Outcomes through Prisms of Critical 
Junctures, Configurations of Class Forces and the Structural Properties of 
Capitalism 
The strength of employing the institutionalist and structuralist perspectives in this study to 
try to decipher the welfare paradigms of South Africa and Mauritius over time is found in 
the fact that they both recognise that path dependence is a function of historical process-
tracing. Historical antecedents in both countries created conditions that ensured that 
successive welfare policy choices do not to stray from their original themes. Against this 
background, one must try to avoid the trap of thinking that path dependence is intransigent 
and not open to adapting to new conditions. According to Robert Cox, path-dependent 
trajectories are subject to change depending on the prevailing circumstances, which dictate 
the alteration of goals. And, should they undergo change, they seldom make radical 
adjustments from their original form712. Drawing on Cox’s traditions, path dependence is 
rendered to qualify as an empirical question as opposed to it passing solely as a theoretical 
assumption. In the case of South Africa and Mauritius, we certainly have seen that path 
dependence can either be obstinate or willing to undergo modification so as to move with 
the times. Indeed, path dependence has enabled Mauritius to keep its social democratic 
character intact as a welfare state with a universal pension scheme that has remained 
unchanged in form since its commencement in the late 1950s. In the South African case, 
path dependence has shifted slightly away from the values of the welfare state of white 
South Africa, although there is policy continuity from the previous dispensation’s policies, as 
pensions still remain a dominant feature. Hence the liberal welfare state of the white 
government has bequeathed post-apartheid with a welfare regime that is underpinned by a 
developmental model of individual effort and minimum state intervention as its ideological 
mainstay.  
 Nevertheless, state-funded old-age pensions in Mauritius and South Africa are being 
regarded by office bearers as revered entities of public policy, even though they occupy 
separate domains of social policy in the two countries. We have seen pensions being made 
to exist in a disparate domain to that which defines the entire social policy framework in 
South Africa. Hence they are designed to mitigate the effects of the failures of the economy, 
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rather than to correct the root causes of the prevailing challenges, like most welfare states 
do. On the other hand, pensions in Mauritius have been integrated, enmeshed and defined 
to correspond with the theme of state responsiveness to social dislocation as a whole (see 
Section 7.5 below). 
 Upon assumption of power in South Africa, the ANC was unable to take the lead in 
steering the ship of the economy to embrace a more socially sympathetic pathway, and this 
has had significant implications. It certainly served to fulfil a critical juncture moment in 
terms of which a laissez faire welfare approach prevailed over progressive ideals. On the 
other hand, social forces there took the back seat, often choosing to toe the party political 
line as opposed to fighting for a renewed approach in policy outlook. We have seen this 
relaxed pattern among the leadership of the industrial unions who easily got lured into the 
apparatus of state power. A critical juncture in this regard was not that of a new awakening 
in the orientation and structure of the economy, but that which laid the firm foundations for 
the retention of the old order of control which did not agree with the notion of expansive 
social reforms. As a result, the neoliberal forces ended up having control of the policy-
making apparatus of the state, with pensions as a compromise that big business was willing 
to live with. In Mauritius, however, a pragmatic contingent of Fabian policymakers swelled 
the apparatus of the state and they pulled no punches in designing a macroeconomic 
framework that forged solid social partnerships. Unlike in the case of South Africa just 
before the dawn of democracy, social forces in Mauritius kept the political leaders on their 
toes and refused to back down to the pressures of capital. It is this critical juncture in post-
independence Mauritius which laid solid foundations for the entrenchment of the social 
democratic outlook irrevocably within the social, political and economic fabric of the island. 
The outcome was a framework that helped big capital to broker the type of class 
compromise that did more to embrace the virtues of social justice than the deal that was 
struck in South Africa after 1994.  
The variations in welfare capitalism in the two countries rest not on critical junctures 
and class compromise alone. Configurations of social forces and their proximity to the state 
have shown in Mauritius and South Africa to have far-reaching implications in terms of 
keeping the welfare consensus in form. With the benefit of hindsight, here I allude to the 
point made by Vivien Schmidt on the significance of political institutional capacity in keeping 
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the welfare consensus alive in the small European states of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The term refers to the general accessibility of the 
state to society at large and the forms of information exchange between the state and social 
partners. It implies that allowing space for grassroots forces to make demands for 
continuous revisions of public policy gives the welfare state its social basis713.  
 The decrease in social partners in these countries has led to changes in the structural 
makeup of the welfare state in the EU to differ from that of post-war Europe714. In Denmark 
and Sweden alone, the lack of willingness and ability of social partners to take part in the 
negotiations altered the path dependency of these countries to endorse welfare state 
retrenchment by way of privatising pensions, amongst others. South Africa may not be a 
small state like Mauritius or any of those assessed by Schmidt above, but its welfare 
outcomes largely resemble those in the abovementioned European small states, largely 
because of the integrity of political institutional capacity, which remains jittery. Civil society 
in South Africa – especially that in the form of the trade unions – is robust, and somewhat 
able to take part in policy negotiations. However, its fundamental weakness lies in the fact 
that the most influential members have been incorporated within a populist political 
alliance that has half-heartedly pursued the progressive agenda in office. In Mauritius, the 
embeddedness of the state in society forms the basis for the success of its welfare state, 
since the capacity of political institutions has not been compromised. Mauritius does not 
suffer from the lack of multiplicity of civil society that remains unwavering in its 
determination to challenge the status quo. Moreover, they have jealously guarded their 
independence by resisting co-option into the ruling fraternity. 
The state-society nexus in South Africa and Mauritius provides significant lessons on 
the variations in welfare capitalism in the global South and the role of social mobilisation in 
determining the extent of the social responsiveness of the economy. 
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7.3. The Cases: Varieties of Welfare Capitalism as a Mirror to the Quality of Social 
Mobilisation 
From the reading of South Africa and Mauritius’s welfare trajectories, this study showed 
that, when corporate capital is on a collision course with society, it elicits collective 
reactions of the underclass to counterweight its dominance. The following sections illustrate 
that the kind of social policy outcomes that followed in the two cases were underpinned by 
the extent to which the mass movement had reached out to the broader spectrum of 
society to forge stronger associational ties.  
7.3.1. Capital as the Catalyst for Social Awareness 
The shift from subsistence agriculture to an exchange economy in Mauritius and South 
Africa heralded social awareness in which the lines dividing the rich from the poor became 
evident and reflective of one group’s position in the hierarchy of the new system of 
production. The new economic order in Mauritius was characterised by sugar production. It 
was informed by a laissez faire economic approach as a result of the early integration of the 
island into the global economy. In South Africa, the advent of diamond-centred mining 
brought the industrial revolution to South Africa, whereas the discovery of gold afterwards 
became the centre around which this industrialisation revolved715. Similar to Mauritius, the 
rise of industrialisation in South Africa followed the free market orthodoxy, which was 
compounded by the fact that the English industrialists, who brought with them Anglo-Saxon 
economic traditions, held sway. The South African economic experience reached a moment 
of maturity when its mineral resources began to feature prominently in international trade, 
going on to establish the country’s importance in the global capitalist economic fraternity. 
The legacy of South Africa and Mauritius’s embrace of the neoliberal economic order 
during their early economic take-off echoes in the macroeconomic choices the two 
countries have adopted. Mauritius’s past sugar successes is the reason the country has 
managed to diversify its post-colonial economy and it is also the reason the sugar 
plantocracy successfully campaigned to embrace the free market that defines its current 
economic paradigm. In South Africa, mining-dominated capital also had a hold on the 
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economic life of the country during the run-up to the dawn of the new democratic 
dispensation. This specific reality coerced the new ruling élite in South Africa to protect 
neoliberal economic interests through policies that promoted the free market agenda. It is 
clear that the marginalisation of mining interests after the demise of apartheid could have 
had negative consequences in the realm of the economy, since all major industries were 
built around the success of the mining sector.  
During both the colonial and post-colonial eras, capitalism wielded disproportionate 
influence over the economic trajectory of Mauritius and South Africa, and it has 
demonstrated in both cases that, if it were left to its devices, it could have spawned far-
reaching negative social consequences. Certainly the aloofness characterising capital’s 
approach to the plight of the poor in Mauritius during the colonial days precipitated a sort 
of social awareness in which the subordinate classes in the villages organised themselves as 
a collective to pursue developmental projects of broader societal beneficence. Ultimately 
the collective approach of the subordinate classes presented fertile ground in which the rise 
of social resistance could garner its mobilising strengths and support in a bid to challenge 
the state for the lack of intervention in that regard. In South Africa, the persistent low 
socioeconomic status of the deagrarianised Afrikaner peasantry foreshadowed the 
mobilised resistance in which organised workers in the mining sector pushed the state to 
pass legislative packages that offered job security and material wellbeing for the unskilled 
white workers.  
Even the welfare paradigms that followed the end of colonialism in both cases were 
illustrative of a social awareness that was prompted by capitalist control of the economy 
and the manner in which it had not lived up to society’s expectations to address the 
prevailing social and economic challenges. In Mauritius, for instance, it became clear that 
social awareness was driven by the need to protect the welfare consensus established 
during the colonial days, and for capital to stay the course in pursuing social transformation 
in the new, independent nation marred by soaring levels of poverty and social dislocation. 
Social awareness in post-apartheid South Africa was underpinned by reparation ideals that 
promoted redress as a result of socioeconomic conditions that threatened the stability of 
the nation in transition. Indeed, in South Africa, contrary to the case in Mauritius, the notion 
of the redistributive state was not driven so much by the quest to achieve social justice as it 
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was about keeping social and political tempers from flaring. South Africa’s interventionist 
approach within the welfare sector was a response to an ever-pressing need to quell 
potential political disturbance. Variations in the welfare responses in the two countries echo 
the differences in approach to mobilisation by the mass movement.  
7.3.2. The quality of social responses hinges on the character of social 
mobilisation 
What this study has brought to the fore is that the degree of social penetration, which came 
in the form of the welfare state in both cases, was commensurate with the quality of social 
mobilisation that presided over social relations. In both Mauritius and South Africa there 
could not have been social mobilisation without a social awareness that conjured up a 
picture of the extent of economic marginalisation of the subordinate classes within the 
overall scheme of the capitalist economic system. This brought about a consciousness 
amongst the subordinate classes that their continued marginalisation will continue 
unabated as long as their material interests remained at the mercy of market forces. In 
essence, social mobilisation was borne out of the desperation of those sidelined in the 
economic establishment to correct the status quo, which was conceived to be achievable 
only through collective action.  
What the cases of South Africa and Mauritius have come to reveal is that the extent 
to which the state honours its social obligation is contingent upon how much social forces 
are willing to break sweat and unleash the sort of social returns desirable for the society as a 
whole in a democratic and open political order. Also, the strength of the activities of these 
social forces rests equally on the extent to which they are able to defy social class barriers 
and mobilise in one accord against the lack of state responsiveness. In Mauritius and South 
Africa, social programmes were devised by the ruling incumbents at the top; however, in 
both cases the quality of social response resonates with the type of pressures coming from 
the grassroots. Hence, the universal welfare commitment in Mauritius remains intact 
because the mass-based movement refuses to remain passive when the ruling incumbents 
attempt to take a regressive course on the welfare front. In South Africa, the developmental 
welfare model, although ironically sympathetic towards social grants, retains its (overall) 
minimalist character due to the lack of formidable social pressure pushing for extensive 
social reforms. What the cases of South Africa and Mauritius have shown in this study is that 
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the state can disperse welfare programmes with better efficiency without the inclusion of 
social forces in the upper echelons of policy making. However, it is the mass movement that 
dictates the scope and length of how far the ruling incumbents should go in realising those 
social ideals.  
This study by no means is attempting to make a case against capitalism. In fact, it 
purports that capitalism can be a force for good if it brings its demands into balance with 
the interests of society. Marginalising the business community would be counterintuitive for 
the reform agenda, as that alone would be tantamount to killing the goose that lays the 
golden egg. As we have seen in the cases of South Africa and Mauritius, the state 
singlehandedly remains ill-equipped to perform the task of conditioning the market, as the 
ruling élite in either case usually cosy up to business interests, although to varying degrees. 
Therefore the mass movement serves as the guardian that keeps the checks and balances in 
the event that the incumbents stray from course. In Mauritius, the mass-based movement 
led by the unions has been able to achieve this, alerting society at large to the intentions of 
the state in the domain of social policy (see Section 7.3.4 below). This has had a ripple 
effect, bringing about an awareness that retaining the welfare consensus is achievable only 
if the general public votes the incumbents that threaten to kill the universal welfare 
consensus out of power. In South Africa, the labour federation has been more effective as 
an instrument of politicking to garner votes for the ANC than as the promoter of social 
justice amongst its comrades, who have assumed positions of authority within the 
commanding heights of state power. This very void in South Africa has been exacerbated by 
the preponderance of middle-class social movements that are more effective in exploiting 
middle-class avenues of enforcing accountability, such as the judicial courts. Consequently, 
these social movements are less successful at being enmeshed and intermingled with the 
larger society and forging broad-based coalitions based on the values of collective 
responsibility towards achieving common goals. When mass mobilisation endures over time 
and elicits similar political effects within the social spectrum as in Mauritius, it ushers in a 
competitive centre-left political environment in which political opponents jostle each other 
on the policy-making front in the race for pole position. 
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7.3.3. Social Mobilisation as the Promoter of Competitive Centre-Left Politics 
The mass movement in Mauritius accounts for the success of the social democratic welfare 
agenda in Mauritius, so much so that it gave rise to a centre-left political culture at the 
epicentre of the country’s developmental trajectory. For instance, self-identified social 
democratic parties such as the Mauritian Labour Party have their roots planted deeply in the 
broad-based mass movement. Due to broad-reaching societal coalitions dominating the 
social sphere in Mauritius, social democratic parties in government have championed 
egalitarian policies that are reflective of their roots. However, a unique feature of the social 
politics of Mauritius, compared to that of South Africa, is the prevalence of broad-based 
movements that are not beholden to specific political parties so that they continue pledging 
their allegiance to them even when they abandon the progressive agenda.  
 Due to the meritocratic character of the mass movement in Mauritius, other social 
forces led by the working class have gone on to establish alternative parties, all claiming sole 
custodianship of the social democratic ethos. Modern-day Mauritius is a hive of political 
contestation, as it has been since the advent of independence, with all major parties 
espousing social democratic ideals as key to the assumption of office. Because of all these 
parties contesting for votes, any party presenting a less desirable social plan tends to be 
overshadowed by the more vocal ones espousing explicit centre-left politics, whilst 
unfaithful incumbents to the social democratic welfare consensus are guaranteed not to 
survive the next elections. The competitive nature of Mauritius’s centre-left-dominated 
politics is certainly one aspect that helped the universal welfare consensus become a fait 
accompli, with prospects of retraction nowhere in sight. Universal old-age pensions are the 
pride of the social democratic welfare state in Mauritius, whilst in South Africa old-age 
pensions are the paragon of unfaltering, public-funded commitment within the broader 
scheme of a restricted welfare paradigm. In South Africa, political movements such as the 
ruling ANC, albeit founded on social democratic traditions, are at liberty to speak about 
their disapproval of the notion of the welfare state without fear of being at the receiving 
end of political retribution by the voters. Without a doubt, such a faux pas would set the cat 
amongst the pigeons in Mauritius, where civil society watches and listens with the utmost 
care to the policy utterances of political office bearers.  
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 The strength of the mass movement in promoting a competitive centre-left political 
culture in Mauritius immediately exposes the defects of social mobilisation in South Africa 
for failing to unleash similar political outcomes. Hence, whilst Mauritius has an oversupply 
of centre-left parties, in South Africa there is a shortage of left-leaning ones. This assertion 
does not suggest that a sudden rise of a labour-led, mass-based movement will serve as a 
magic wand to usher in a competitive centre-left political reckoning in South Africa. Hence, a 
mass-based mobilisation culture is cultivated over time and it must endure and rise above a 
cumulative series of trials to be instilled as an integral part of social politics that is inclined 
to champion social justice. What this line of thinking asserts, however, is that, should the 
mass movement begin to make entry into the social political scene, it will be set to stimulate 
the social discourse and keep conversations going about the social development trajectory 
that must be espoused and pursued.  
In South Africa, there is promise of a competitive political awakening like that of 
Mauritius to take shape (hopefully) in the not too distant future. The decision by the 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) to sever ties with its political 
mother body, COSATU, is set to herald a new era in the South African body politik. Numsa is 
speculated to be in the process of launching an independent socialist party that espouses 
working-class interests. Should that goal be materialised, there is an expectation that 
Numsa will forge stronger broad-based class coalitions, thus creating a channel through 
which grassroots voices feature and participate in the national debate. Also, should a 
socialist party emerge and be founded on broader associational ties, political pressure from 
the left is likely to be bottom-up and better positioned to press for a radical pursuit of pro-
poor causes as in Mauritius. The question whether this void is not currently being filled by 
the newly formed Workers and Socialist Party (Wasp) is worth addressing. Wasp might 
perhaps assert itself as a party to be reckoned with one day, but at present it has yet to 
prove itself to be a strong contender commanding the authority that will shake the ANC out 
of complacency.  
Indeed, Numsa’s strength is bolstered by its importance to the three-party alliance, 
owing to the great following it enjoys (as COSATU’s largest union, boasting 330 000 
members) and the monthly contributions (of R800 000) it makes to the federation’s coffers, 
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of which a sizeable portion is channelled to oil the ANC’s election machinery716. This makes 
the decision to part ways likely to undermine the political strength of the ruling party going 
into the 2014 elections. Hence, Numsa’s promise that it will not support the ANC in the 
elections and that it is ready to welcome workers from a broad range of sectors – including 
the mining sector – lends credence to this claim717. With the 2014 general elections in 
hindsight, the EFF looks poised to overtake Numsa in terms of forging close ties with 
aggrieved communities sooner. The EFF has been seen addressing striking AMCU workers in 
the North West province, where the party is also beginning to enjoy a large following. The 
next section shows that, if the relationship between the state and capital is inherently 
unhealthy for the advancement of society’s interests, this relationship might only remain as 
pervasive as the mass movement allows it to be. 
7.3.4. The Mass Movement as the Guardian of the Welfare Consensus 
This study challenged the assertions of Sandbrook et al, Bunwaree and Meisenhelder718, 
inter alia that the ruling élite usually take the credit for the policy endurance of the social 
development framework in Mauritius. Sandbrook et al also go so far as to credit the ANC’s 
programmatic approach towards alleviating socioeconomic risks for the resilience of the 
progressive agenda in South Africa. What came out of the abovementioned accounts is that 
the ruling élite’s commitment to social justice lies in the social democratic traditions of their 
parties. What this line of reasoning implies is that, when political organisations are steeped 
in history and tradition, there is no turning back on the ideological front. In contrast, the 
ruling élite, even though grounded in socialist traditions, can end up championing ideals 
that are at odds with their roots. The cases of the ANC in South Africa and the many centre-
left organisations in Mauritius attest to this assertion.  
 Mauritius’s post-colonial welfare trajectory has seen a number of political 
movements assuming power, and many times these organisations were in the receiving end 
                                                          
716
 Mail and Guardian Online Edition, “Numsa may withhold R2m poll cash”, Available online at: 
http://mg.co.za/index.php?view=article&urlid=2013-09-13-00-numsa-may-withhold-r2m-poll-cash, 13 
September 2013, Accessed on 21 December 2013 
717
 Independent Online (IOL), “Furious Numsa bosses dump ANC”, Accessed online at: 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/furious-numsa-bosses-dump-anc-1.1611466, 24 November 2013, Accessed 
at: 21 December 2013 
718
 Sandbrook, Richard, Op. Cit, p. 182; Bunwaree, Sheila, Op. Cit, 1997, p. 224; and Meisenhelder, Thomas, Op. 
Cit, pp. 279 - 297 
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of heavy criticism from civil society when they threatened to retrench the welfare 
consensus. Indications of these reactions and implications for political outcomes are plenty: 
The MLP was voted out of power following broad-based sentiments that the party was in 
league with neoliberal interests in the late 1970s, whilst the MSM was given the boot when 
there were indications that it was going with the World Bank’s instructions to roll back 
public expenditure in the mid-1990s when the economy was experiencing difficulties. The 
most recent incident occurred during the 2005 elections, which saw the ruling incumbents 
made up of the MMM/MSM coalition being replaced by the MLP for passing reforms that 
saw the substitution of universal pensions with the means-tested approach. And at times, 
when the going got tough in the neoliberal camp, we have seen the state in Mauritius 
relying on the reactionary nature of the mass movement to avoid imposing structural 
economic adjustments of the Bretton Woods Institutions. 
 Indeed, the presence of the broad-based movement in Mauritius remains the reason 
why the country’s welfare framework, unlike that of South Africa, has remained relevant 
and more in touch with the society, even in the midst of an overtly neoliberal 
macroeconomic paradigm. The ANC’s half-hearted approach to the progressive agenda is a 
result of the lack of broad-based mobilisation of the calibre of that in Mauritius, where the 
removal of class divisions between the labouring and non-labouring classes has unleashed 
policies that have yet to hearken to the pulse of society. The ANC’s monopolising of the 
social politics in South Africa has had a stifling effect on the emergence of a grassroots 
culture that challenges the shortcomings of government’s policies on the social front. 
Through COSATU, the state has curtailed the emergence of social movements that mobilise 
communities’ support to question the state’s methods of addressing social and economic 
risks in the townships. The result of the subtle subversion of the voices of protest, especially 
when they question the legitimacy of the state, is currently seen in the perennial strikes that 
have emerged from the townships and the burgeoning culture of protests in rural 
communities, such as Maluleke in the Limpopo Province of South Africa. Economically 
disempowered parts of South Africa have literally gone up in flames, and this is ascribed to a 
widely held perception amongst the country’s poor that their voices have been rendered 
irrelevant by those in power, whilst the rich continue to enjoy the spoils of freedom. This 
perception is the main reason why many of these communities are beginning desperately to 
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seek solace in far-left political parties such as the EFF, because they promise radical 
socioeconomic change.  
 To conclude this section, the divergent social policy outcomes in South Africa and 
Mauritius do exist not in a vacuum. There is a clear correlation between social mobilisation 
and the social policy outcomes within the context of the predominance of neoliberal 
economic choices. The next section presents the social policy outcomes of the two cases, 
which have both placed pensions on the social policy pedestal, in explicit comparative 
detail. It is shown that, as much as old-age pensions define the two cases’ welfare regimes 
the most, old-age pensions have been prioritised in South Africa at the exclusion of 
comprehensive social reforms. The reason pensions receive priority in South Africa is 
because they play a developmental role and therefore offer convenient compensation for 
the contradictions of capitalism exposed by the persistence of poverty and the incessant 
dependence on state intervention. In Mauritius, universal pensions symbolise a 
commitment to social justice, and thus are an effective acid test for a society that refuses to 
be dragged down a class-conscious road. 
7.4. Welfare Policy Outcomes and the Dominance of Pensions 
Whilst capitalist interests, class power and the ideologies of political parties converged to 
shape the liberally inclined developmental welfare model in South Africa and the social 
democratic approach in Mauritius, pensions are at the forefront of both countries’ welfare 
regimes. But how they fit within the overall structural design of each welfare regime is also 
salient. Old-age pensions and the liberal welfare model of South Africa are complementary, 
but they operate in completely different domains of social policy. On the one hand, the 
liberal character of the welfare model in South Africa is distant and at odds with the notion 
of a social democratic welfare outcome, let alone the idea of the welfare state being 
realised in that respect. On the other hand, pensions have set themselves apart from 
government’s liberal approach, receiving greater fiscal attention relative to other means of 
public support in a fashion that is virtually universal in orientation. The developmental 
welfare model, as already indicated, is not supportive of the concept of welfare state 
creation, but it finds it acceptable that pensions maintain the position they have due to their 
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role as recompense for some of the structural shortcomings that have marred the social and 
economic domain in South Africa.  
The class compromise struck in post-apartheid South Africa placed priority on 
pensions as government’s foremost method of addressing the plight of the poor, whilst 
other material gaps were intended to be filled by market forces. Compounding this 
approach is a political culture that (a) does not espouse centre-left ideals and (b) is not 
assertive enough to press for more extensive welfare reforms, which is a far cry from 
Mauritius’s vibrant and less predictable political culture. Figure 7.1 below captures the 
abovementioned dynamics in South Africa within the scheme of the overall social 
development approach. A liberal developmental welfare model embodies the social policy 
outcomes of South Africa. However, pensions alone are the major priority of the state, in a 
manner that is starkly distinguishable from the minimalism of the entire structure of the 
welfare regime in terms of fiscal commitment and design. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.1: EMERGENCE OF DEVELOPMENTAL WELFARE OUTCOMES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 Conversely, a social democratic welfare model has come to characterise Mauritius’s welfare 
trajectory in the manner in which universal pensions and classic social democratic 
orientation have been designed to complement one another, as seen in Figure 7.2. Unlike 
the one of its counterpart South Africa, illustrated in Figure 7.1, the old-age pension scheme 
and the social democratic framework operate in a harmonised manner with the country’s 
social policy framework, instead of in a disparate manner. Across the board, the social fabric 
of Mauritius espouses the social democratic methods of dispersing social goods, which in 
turn create a fertile ground for a competitive political culture to emerge. Universal old-age 
pensions in particular have been the bone of much political contention, whilst Mauritius’s 
welfare framework is all encompassing and universal in character. This explains why the 
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welfare model of Mauritius has come to be synonymous with its universal old-age pension 
scheme. Years of diligently carrying out the social democratic ideal helped entrench it within 
the social fabric. But it is the peculiar manner in which the working class forged alliances 
with the public in general, the competitive centre-left political sphere, and capitalism’s 
acceptance of assuming an active role in the ideal to foster a social formation, that helped 
Mauritius’s welfare framework end up with its classic social democratic character. The 
diagram below illustrates the factorial interplay in the emergence of Mauritius’s social 
democratic character, which is, like that of South Africa, defined mainly by its universal old-
age pension scheme.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 7.2: EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN MAURITIUS 
7.5. Points to ponder for future research 
This research has learnt that successful developmental trajectories can prioritise the welfare 
agenda without compromising growth prospects. Mauritius is the embodiment of a 
developmental and welfare state combined that underscores the premise that growth and 
social investment are complementary. When we go further afield we also learn that the 
developmental state experiences of the NICs were informed by the understanding that 
equality is the province of a successful economic upturn. Dani Rodrik also echoes this 
sentiment by charging that “social welfare is the flipside” of an open economy719. Indeed, in 
East Asia, developmental states pursued an outward growth strategy whilst redistributing 
wealth simultaneously. The same can be said about Mauritius.  
This raises compelling questions about the direction in which South Africa’s 
developmental trajectory is headed, and whether that will have a negative or positive 
impact on the country’s social prospects. Through the NDP, South Africa seeks to achieve 
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many goals, including that of becoming a developmental state that is in touch with the 
social context. Given the government’s current ambivalence towards the welfare state 
agenda, one is curious to discover whether its developmental take-off – should it ever be 
realised – will bring about a new meaning for what has traditionally underpinned 
developmental states in other parts of the world. In addition, will growth and equality 
continue existing as polar opposites, or will there be renewed efforts to incline this 
‘newfound’ economic approach to be more receptive of the notion of social justice as its 
underlying strength? The jury is out to see how things will eventually pan out within the 
sector of social policy when and if South Africa realises its developmental agenda. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 3A 
Figure 3.5: Number of Pensioners by Race and Maximum or Partial Pensions 
 
        Source: Seekings, Jeremy, Op. Cit, 2008, p. 530 
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Appendix 3B 
Figure 3.6: Number of Pensioners by Race and Maximum or Partial Pensions 
 
Source: Same as Appendix A 
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Appendix 3C 
Table 3.1: Social Pensions and Grants by Category and Race 
  
Source: Van der Berg, Servaas, Op. Cit, 1997, p. 493 
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Appendix 3D 
Table 3.2: Total Number of Social Pensions and Grants Paid, 1993 
Pension/ 
Grant Type 
White Col. Ind.                           Black  
All TBVC Other 
homelands 
Rest 
of  
SA 
Total 
Old-age 122.9 129.6 34.4 300.9 464.9 453.5 1227.1 1513.6 
War 
veterans 
8.9  4.8 0.1 0.9 1.3 1.5 3.7 17.5 
Disability 38.8 102.5 22.8 80.1 120.6 134.5 335.1 499.2 
Blind 0.8 1.6 0.4 3.7 5.6 6.7 16.0 18.7 
Special care 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.7 2.0 2.1 
Parent 
allowances 
9.6 64.2 14.9 5.4 8.1 16.0 29.4 118.2 
Child 
maintenance 
25.7 167.0 26.6 15.4 23.1 53.9 92.4 311.7 
Foster 
parent 
5.9 22.9 2.0 2.3 3.4 11.1 16.8 47.6 
Single 
parent 
3.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 
Total  215.5 493.3 101.3 416.4 627.3 678.3 1722.5 2532.7 
Source: Van der Berg, Servaas, Op. Cit, 2002, p. 28 
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Table 3.3: Total Transfer Payments to Individuals, R’000 
Year   Aged ('000) Disability 
('000) 
Childcare 
('000) 
Total ('000) 
  Tricameral         
1990 Assembly 490 000 115 552 77 227 683 579 
1990 Delegates 69 045 51 579 55 028 175  652 
1990 Representatives 289 875 201 247 210 478 701 598 
          1.560 829 
  Province         
1990 Cape 117 446 61 234 11 320 190 000 
1990 Natal 80 288 26 758 6 339 113 385 
1990 OFS 101 645 35 317 3 915 140 877 
1990 TVL 324 626 74 515 13 761 412 902 
          857 164 
  Homelands         
1990 Bophutatswana 97 919  24 020 1 619 123 558 
1990 Ciskei 62 529 18 894 6 586 88 009 
1990 Gazankulu 65 262 - 150 65 412 
1990 KaNgwane 33 112 - 6 33 118 
1987 KwaNdebele - - - 16 088 
1989 KwaZulu 255 879 79 582 3 569 339 030 
1990 Lebowa 164 359 - 166 164 475 
1989 QwaQwa - - - 22 845 
1990 Transkei 230 786 56 187 1 412 288 385 
1989 Venda 37 749 - 130 37 879 
        Total 1 178 799 
        Grand Total 3 596 792 
Source: Ibid, p. 29 
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Appendix 4A 
Table 4.2: Illustrating the Growth of the Mauritian Sugar and World Markets: 1820 - 1939 
 
Source: Deerr, Noel, Op. Cit, 1949, p. 531 
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Appendix 4B 
Table 4.3: Data of Former British Colonies Used for the Statistical 
Analysis
 
       (Appendix 4B - continued overleaf) 
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Source: Lange, Matthew, Op. Cit, 2004, pp. 921 – 922 
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Appendix 5A 
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Appendix 5B 
Table 5.3: Investment Incentives 
 
(Appendix 5B – continued overleaf) 
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Appendix 5C 
Table 5.4: Table Illustrating Frequency of Themes In Investment Guidebooks by State 
 
(Appendix 5C - continued overleaf) 
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Source: Klak, Thomas, Op. Cit, 145 
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Appendix 5D 
Table 5.5: Social Expenses – Budget 1967 -2004  
 
Source: Bunwaree, Sheila, Op. Cit, 2007, p. 225 
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Appendix 5E 
Table 5.6: Employment in the EPZs, 1983 - 1993 
 
Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Government of Mauritius – Various Publications, Port 
Louis, Government Printers, 1992 in YeungLamko, Louis (1998) 
Table 5.7: EPZ Gross Earnings and GDP Contributions, 1983 – 1995  
 
Source: Same as the preceding table 
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Appendix 6A 
Figure 6.1: Three Tier System of South Africa’s Social Security Sector 
                        TIER 1 TIER 2               TIER 3 
 
 
Source: Republic of South Africa (2010), Cited in Woolard, Ingrid, Op. Cit, 2010, p. 5 
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Appendix 6B 
Figure 6.2: Sources of Household Income, By Quintile 
 
Source: NIDS, 2008, Cited in Woolard, Ingrid, Op. Cit, 2010, p. 19 
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Appendix 6C 
Table 6.4: Value of Grants, 2010 
 
Source: Republic of South Africa (2010), cited in Woolard, Ingrid, Op. Cit, p. 18 
Figure 6.3: Real Value of Social Assistance Grants, January 1994-February 2007  
 
Source: Seekings, Jeremy, Op. Cit, 2007, p. 3 
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